MASTER 
NEGA  TIVE 
NO.  91-80315 


MICROFILMED  1991 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES/NEW  YORK 


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AUTHOR: 


LOTZE,  HERMANN 


TITLE: 


OUTLINES  OF 
PSYCHOLOGY 

PLACE* 

MINNEAPOLIS 

DA  TE : 

[188- 


Restrictions  on  Use: 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 


Master  Negative  # 


BIBLIOGRAPHIC  MICROFORM  TARGET 


Original  Material  as  Filmed  -  Existing  Bibliographic  Record 


D193L91    "^ '^ '^•^•««P' 


V6 


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LoteeHermaaiii4.e^Kudolf-Hemann.  1817-1881. 

omy  of  the  braCby  a  i  XSA   P''' tS?  *^^  ^°^^ 
Minn,  S.  M.  WUuims  tl88-t;  •"     ^^'^"eapolis, 

«.  ISO  p.,  2  L    illus.,  II  pL    20- 


i 

I 


I.  Hcrrick,  Clarence  Luther,  1858-1904. 


Library  of  Congress 


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7-28743 


TECHNICAL  MICROFORM  DATA 


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FILM     SIZE: 

IMAGE  PLACEMENT:    lA    II 

DATE     FILMED: /c2 

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1100  Wayne  Avenue.  Suite  1100 
Silver  Spring.  Maryland  20910 

301/587-8202 


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MONUFOCTURED  TO  flllM  STRNDRRDS 
BY  RPPLIED  IMAGE,  INC. 


»  ^ 


OUTLINES 


-    OF — 


PSYCHOLOGY 


I  )TCT  ATI  ( )  XS     FU( )  M     LECTU  KKS 


— BY  — 


HHKMANN  LOTZH 


THAXSLATKl).    WITH    A    CHAPTER    ON 


Tin-    ANATOMY    OF    THE    BRAIX 


— BY 


C.  L  HERHICK 


ILLUSTRATED- 


MINNEAPOLIS,    MINN. 

B .     M .     WILLIAMS 


L.  KIMHALL  ^  CO., 

riONT. 


,  ■  -■*  _.  _ .  •'•- 


PIJ  KKACE. 


t' 


Tlir   translation  of  Lotze's   (n/nH/ztnu/c  drr  Pst/i/t- 
oJof/ir,  wliicli  forms  tlie  principal  part  of  this  hook,  was 
nuuh'  in    ISS'J.  an<l  it  was  expected  to  ]Mihlish  it  at  once, 
('ircnnistances  j^revented.  for  the  time,  the  carrvin*'-  ont 
of  the  plfin.  hut  hitely   a   personal   need  of  some   snniU 
text  hook  to  nse  in  connection  with  the  stndv   of  com- 
paratiw  anatomy   in   the  scientitic   department   of  an 
under<rradnat(>  conrse  led  to  its   revival.     This  circum- 
stance explains  why  the  short  (  ha]>ter  on  anatomy  has 
)>een  appended  nnnecess.irily.  as  it  may  seem.     It  is  he- 
lieved  that,  in  its  present  form,  this  volume   will    prove 
eonveni^'iit:    tirstly.  for    nse  in    conm^ction    with    the 
little  that  can  usually  he  said  uihmi    the   ]divsioh)«'-v    of 
the  nervous  svstem  in  the  comparative  anatomv  of  our 
ordinary    c<dle^^es.    at     the    same    time    furnishin*'-    a 
tliorou«;hly  reliahle  foundation  upon  whicli  to  add    the 
moH' exteiidcMJ  work  in  psycliolooy ;  secondlv.  as  a   hrst 
hook  o^'  ]»sycholo;^y  where  for  any  reason    the   physio- 
hitJ^ical    side    dtM*s   not    receive  special  attention    in  the 
]diilosophical    <lepartment.     Of    the    value    (»f    Lotze's 
little  work  nothin<>:  need  he  said  here,  the^ivat  (German 
]diilosopher    is    rai)idly    «^ainin*>-   reco^niti(»n    even    in 


A 


IV 


PREFACK. 


ti 


Auieru-a,  while  the  series  of  **  Outlines.**  of  which  this 
forms  a  [lart,  has  l)eeii  exeee(liii»»ly  well  received 
ahroad.  Attention  may  he  asked,  however,  to  the  fact 
that  these  are  hut  OHtline^,  and  emhrace  ])ut  the  dictated 
portions  of  an  extended  lecture  c<Mirse.  Their  use  in 
the  school  room  implies  oral  ex[)lanation  and  illustra- 
tion, or,  hetter,  they  may  form  the  frame  work  for  a 
lecture  course  which  mav  deal  as  fullv  with  anatomical 
and  physiological  details  as  time  permits,  it  is  a  matter 
of  regret  that  no  English  work  in  this  department  has 
as  vet  a])peared  which  is  not  devoted  to  the  indirect  in- 
culcation of  a  theorv  (unorthodox  or  otherwise ),  or  for 
some  other  reas(m  unadapted  to  place  in  the  hands  of 
college  stutlents.  Of  the  writer*s  ])art  of  the  work  it  is 
not  l>ecoming  to  speak  further  than  to  express  the  hope 
that  the  sacritice  of  literal  jiccuracy  will  he  found  to 
have  l)een  attended  with  cinnpensating  advantages  in 
])ersj)icuity.  The  very  forcihle  and  c(dlo(|uial  style, 
which  is  so  striking  in  the  original,  is  verv  hard  to 
imitate,  and  one  may  he  satisfied  if  the  attempt  prove 
intelliidhle. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


iNTKOnrCTlON 


PAGE, 

1 


1>AHT  FIRST.     INDIVIDUAL    ELEMENTS   OF    THE 
INNER   LIFE. 

Cii.vi'TKH  First.-    Simple  Sensations    .        .        -        - 

Section    1.  Definitions— Excitations  of  Sense      - 

Section    2.  Nervous  Action 

Section    3.  Sensation  Proer 

Section    4.  Correspond^  .ice  between  the  Irritation  and 

Sensation       -        -        -        -        - 

Section    5.  Duration  of  Sensation         .        .        .        - 

Section    6.  Intensity  of  Sensory  Stimuli 

Section    7.  Weber's  Law 

Section    8.  Increments  in  Intensity      .        .        .        - 

Se<  TioN    9.  Periodicity  of  Sensory  Stimuli 

Section  10.  Subjective  Sensation 

Section  11.  Complexity  of  Organs  of  Sense 

Section  12.  Sul)jectivity  or  Objectivity  of  Sensations  - 

CiiAiTEH  Se(  OND.— Ti»e  Prmjcss  of  Conception      - 

Section  1.  ('oncepts   distinguished    from    Sensations 

Section  2.  Unconscious  Concepts         -        - '      - 

SEcriON  8.  ^lemory 

Section  4.  Vividness  of  Concepts         .... 

Section  5.  Contents  of  Conception   .        -        -        - 

Section  0.  The  Power  of  Concepts       .        .        -        - 


;> 


9 

10 

11 

13 

14 

16  • 

17 

19 

20 


'>2 


'>2 
22 
23 
24 
26 
26 


if 


VI 


TABLE    OF   CON'TKXTS. 


TAHLK    OF   CONTKNTS. 


Vll 


Sk(  TiON    7.     Ass(K'iatinii  of  Concepts 


27 


C'liAi'TKH  Timti). — K«'l;itiv<*  Knowledire  ami  Attention   .     »»! 


SKiTroN  1.  C()inpan'<l  Concepts - 

Sk(  TioN  *2.  The  Faculty  Iin.jlvrd  in  ('(»n»|>arison 

Sk(  TFON  :>.  General  Notions       ...        - 

Skction  4.  I/nnitations  of  Co  scioiisness 

Section  ."i.  Observation  ami  Attention 

CiiAi'TKU  FouKTii.     The  Intuitions  of  Space  - 


SKCI'ION      1. 

Skc'hon  2. 

Sk(  TioN  :>. 

Skction  4. 

Skction  o. 

Sk(ti(>n  ({. 

Skction  7. 

Skchon  ><. 

Skction  1>. 

Skction  10. 

Sk(  TION  11. 

Skction  V2. 
Sk(tion  1:». 
Skction  14. 
Skction  l"). 


How  is  the  Idea  of  Spue  I'nHluccd 
Visual  K  'presentation  .         .         .         - 

The  Soul  Cne-Xtended       .         .         -         . 
Coinhiuation  of  Discrete  Impressions 
Oriiiin  of  Spjitial  Intuitions  Inexplicahle 
Theory  of  Lcnal  Indices      .         .         .         . 
Application  of  this  Theory 
Further  Flahoration     -        .        .        .         . 
I'nificathni  of  I'hices  tf)  Form  Space 
The  Third  Dimension  -         -         .         . 
Oriiriu  of  the  Notion  of  Direction  • 

Siniiie  Vision 

Lm-al  Indices  in  the  Skin 
Function  of  the  Muscular  Sense 
Concepts  of  Space  of  the  Hlind 


:U 


•1^ 


•  )■» 


:J4 


•  >  4 


:;<> 
41 
4-2 
44 
4.-) 
45 
4(5 
47 
4t> 


CiiArTKK  Fifth.     Sensuous  I'erception  and  Illusions     -    51 


Skctiox  I 

Sktfon  2. 

Sk(  TioN  :». 

Skction  4. 

Skction  5. 


Knors  ('f  the  Understandinu  Distiniiuished  51 

Illusions  of  Siiiht        •        •        -        -        -  52 

Secondary  Kffects  of  Orirans  of  Sens«-  5:^ 

Illusory  Motion^ 54 

Sensations  of  D(»ul»le  Contact  -        -        -  55 


Ciiattku  Sixth.    The  Suscoptihilities    - 

Skction  1.  Feeliiiirs   Dist  in  vanished    from    Sensation 

Sk(TIon  2.  Source  of  the  Feeliniis 

Sk(  tion  i).  Sensuous  Feeliiii^s 

Sk(  TION  4.  .+2sthic  and  Ethical  Feeliniis 

Skction  5.  Affections  ami  Sentiments 

Sk(TIon  ().  Self-consciousness        -        -        .         . 

Cll APTKK  Sk\  KNTII.       Motioil  -  .  .  . 


CAiiK. 
-        .)! 

s       .>t 

-  58 
58 

-  51) 
(30 

-  (U 


Skction  1. 

Skction  2. 

Skction  A. 

Skcthkn  4. 

Skction  5. 

Skction  (>. 


Conditions  of  Motion 
Initiatory  Impulses  .         .         .         . 
Reflex  Motions     ...        - 
Mimic-  Motions        .        .        .        . 
Imitiative  Motions       ... 
Voluntary  arid  Inyoluntrav    Motions 


PART   SECOND.    THE   SOIL. 


CiiArTiiU  First.-  On  the  Existence  of  the  Soul 


Skction  i. 

Skctic»n  2. 

Skction  'l 

Skc'I'ion  4. 

Skciion  5. 


Alcthod  of  Study       .         -         .         -         - 
.Materialistic  Explanation    - 
Construction   of    Cnity    in    Consciousnc 
Doctrine  of  Monads     ...         - 
IJody  and  Soul 


Skction  1. 

Skction  2. 

Skction  ;i. 

Skction  4. 

Section  5. 


Conditions  of  Reciprocity 
inapplicability  of  Mechanical  Analoiry 
Cause  of  Correllation 
The  Link  Het\yeen  Soul  and  Rody 
The  Ncjtion  of  Materiality.     - 


0:J 
(i:5 
(U 
(14 
(»5 


71 
71 


72 


CiiArTKU    Skconi).     The    Reciprocal    Action     Between 

Soul  and  Body     .        .        .        .     7(f 


7(i 


77 


78 
70 


I 


Vlll 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTti. 


CiiAPTKU  Tinui).— Tlie  Seat  of  the  Soul  ...        - 

Skction  1.     Position 

Skction  2.     Omnipresence 

Section  8.  Pliysical  Analo«!:ies  Applied  to  the  (^i)eia- 

tion  of  Psych ical  Forces 

Section  4.  Soul  Centers  in  the  Brain    -        -        -        - 

Section  5.  A  Fallacious  Notion  of  Position     - 

Section  6.  The  Soul  and  the  Brain       .... 

Section  7.  Partial  Truth  of  Materialism  - 

CiiAiTEK  FoiKTir.  — The  Relation  of  the  Soul  to  Time  - 

Section    1.     Immortality     -.---- 
Section    2.     Substance  as  Explaining:  Existence    - 
Section    8.    Essential  Unity  of  Nature  and  the  Condi- 
tioning Power  of  the  Absolute     - 
Section    4.     Source  of  Permanency  in  Nature.   (Fiirure 

omitted) 

Section    5.     Birth  of  the  Soul 


PAGE. 

-     83 


CiiAPTEK  Fifth."  The  Soul's  Essence     .        -        -        - 

Section    1.     Meaning  of  Essence  .... 

Section    2.    The     Doctrine    of    Faculties.      (Figun- 

omitted) 

Se(;tion    3.     Herbart's  Explanation      .... 
Section    4.    The  Soul's  Act-^  not  Automatic  •        - 
Section    5.     Idealistic  Interpretation  -        -        .        . 

Chapteu  Sixth.     The  Mutable  Coidition  of  the  Soul 


Section  1. 

Skction  2. 

Skction  ;J. 

Section  4. 

Section  '). 


The  Conditions  of  the  Soul's  Action 
Unconsciousness  .... 

Hypnotism 

Partial  Unconsciousness 
Cor|>oreal  Basis  of  Memory     - 


82 
82 

8a 

84 
84 
8(; 
80 

88 

88 
89 

00 

91 
92 

93 

93 

.    04 
95 

.    97 

98 

-  101 

101 

-  102 
103 

-  104 

105 


TAIII.E   OF    CONTENTS. 


IX 


Section  (1. 
Section  7 
Skction  8. 
Skction  9. 
Skction  10. 
Section  11. 


Dreaming 

The  Temperaments  -        ... 

l*hr<Mio!o«»y 

Sensorium  and  Motorium  Commune 
Corporeal  Basis  of  Higher  Faculties 
Morbid  Activitv     Somnambuhiuce 


Chai'TEK  Skvknth.-  -The  Realm  of  Soul> 


Skcti(>n  1. 

Secticjn  2. 

Section  3. 

Section  4. 

Section  o. 

Section  <>. 


P.VCJK. 

-  100 
107 

-  108 
109 

-  Ill 
112 

-  114 


Animal  and  Plant  Souls  ....       114 

Diversity  of  Souls 115 

llumanitv  Distini;uished   bv  Understand- 

«  ft 

ing 110 

llumanitv  Distinguished  bv  Reason  -         -  117 

ft  >r^  ft 

llumanitv  Distiniiuished  bv  Will   -        -       118 

ft  V-  ft 

Fr.'edom  of  the  Will 119 


PART  THIRD.  THE  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  BRAIN 


Stkictiue  ok  the  Bkain  - 


Section  1. 

Section  2. 

Section  3. 

Sectickn  4. 

Section  5. 

Section  (>. 

Section  7. 

Section  8. 

Section  9. 

Section  10. 


125 

Cells  as  Unit^  of  Structure  -         -         -        -125 

Origin  of  Cells 120 

Three  Stages  of  Growth  and  Three  Prim- 
itive' Germ  Lavers         ....       120 

ft 

Nerve  Cells  and  Nerves      -        -        -  •     -  127 
Motorv  and  Sensory  Nerves    -        -        -      128 

«  ft 

Chemical  Constituents        ....  130 
Form    and    Development   of   the   Central 
Portion  of  the  Nervous  Svstem   -        -      132 

ft 

Connection  Between  the  Brain  and  other 

l)arts  of  the  Nervous  System  -  -  -  138 
Physiology  of  the  Brain  ....  141 
Development  of  Sensory  Functions  -        -  143 


INTRODUCTION. 


Sensations,  conceptions,  feelings,  and  acts  of  will  con- 
stitute the  group  of  familiar  facts  which  we  are  accus- 
tomed to  designate,  although  with  a  reservation  in  view 
of  future  discoveries,  as  the  life  of  a  peculiar  being— ///^ 
sohL 

In  order  to  fully  meet  our  scientific  requirements  it  is 
necessary,  ^firsf^  through  the  agency  of  observation,  to 
completely  set  forth  all  the  individual  elements  of  this 
life  and  the  general  formula^s  for  their  combination— 
Descriptive  or  Empirical  Psycholociy;  secondh/,  to  spec- 
ify the  nature  of  the  subject  in  which  this  life  subsists 
as  well  as  those  active  forces  and  conditions  by  which 
this  life  is  produced  and  caused  to  maintain  that  course 
with  which  experience  ha^  made  us  familiar— AV^^/r/^^a- 
fort/  or  Metaphysical  Psychology;  fually,  to  give  a 
rational  explanation  why  all  these  facts  exist,  or,  in 
general,  the  mission  of  soul-life  in  the  world— Ideal  or 
Specfflatirc  Psychology,  Now  since  the  latter  problem 
does  not  admit  of  a  solution  in  strict  scientific  form, 
while  the  treatment  of  the  first  is  easily  combined  with 
that  of  the  second,  the  question  with  which  we  are 
chiefly  concerned  is  this:  ''Under  what  conditions  and 


IXTRODrCTION. 


by  means  of  what  forces  are  the  single  j)rocesses 
of  spiritual  life  ])rodnced:  how  are  they  united  with, 
and  moditied  by  each  other  so  as  to  produce,  through 
their  combined  activity,  the  total  of  spiritual  life." 

Our  course  is  that  ofEered  by  the  phenomena  them- 
selves, that  is,  we  l^egin  wiih  external  impressions,  by 
which  the  spiritual  activity  is  excited  from  moment  to 
moment  afresh,  then  consider  the  manifold  internal 
tran^f()rmations  which  these  imj)ressions  undergo,  lastly 
the  reflex  activities — motions  or  other  acts— which  re- 
sult from  them. 

Only  after  the  enumeraion  of  these  individual  ele- 
ments of  the  spiritual  life  is  it  possible  to  pass  to  a  com- 
prehensive consideration  of  the  nature  of  that  subject 

which  controls  this  life. 


PART  FIRST. 


The  Individual  FJements  of  the  Inner  Life. 


CHAPTER  FIRST. 


SIMPLE  SENSATIONS. 

§1.  We  here  iindersttind  by  simple  sensations  those 
which  evince  no  combination  of  similar  or  dis-similar 
parts,  and  we,  furthermore,  assume  them  to  be  induced 
(as  is  usually  the  case)  by  external  impressions. 

In  this  case  we  distinguish  in  the  production  of  a  sen- 
sation, as  the  first  process,  the  exfenml  sense  excitement. 
No  object  becomes,  by  virtue  of  its  existence  simply, 
an  object  of  apprehension:  it  becomes  such  only  as  it 
either  itself  approaches  to  contact  with  our  body,  as  in 
theca.se  of  impact,  or  communicates  to  the  surrounding 
medium  motions  which  extend  from  element  to  element 
until  at  length  they  reach  our  body,  as  is  the  ctise  with 
sound  and  light  waves. 

In  all  cases,  however,  the  external  sensorv  stimulus 
is  a  motion  of  some  sort  or  other  and  has  no  similarity 
to  the  mental  processes  which  are  evoked  by  it. 

§2.  The  second  essential  is  that  process  within  the 
body  which  is  caused  by  the  external  excitement.  By 
their  contact  with  the  body  these  external  irritants  pro- 
duce manifold  changes  in  the  external  layers,  of  which 
we  know  little,  and  which  we  do  not  need  to  follow 


6 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


psychologically  l)ecause  they  can  only  become  the 
sources  of  sensation  when  they  reach  the  ends  of  the 
nerves  distributed  throu^^hout  the  body.  In  them  an 
excitement  is  produced  which  must  extend  through  the 
entire  length  of  the  nerve-thread  to  the  l)rain  before  a 
sensation  can  be  produced. 

An  injury  of  the  nerve,  which  prevents  this  trans- 
mission, results  in  the  complete  loss  to  consciousness  of 
knowledge   of  the  irritations  in  the  peripheral  nerve 

termini. 

In  what  that  excitement  known  as  the  nervous  action 
consists  is  not  detinitely  ascertained,  but  it  is  only  im- 
portant in  psychology  to  answer  the  question  whether 
this  is  simply  a  sort  of  physical  motion  or  whether  it 
already  participates  in  the  character  of  psychical  life. 

Sensation  does  not  simi)ly  exist  at  large  in  the  nerves 
but  we  must  explain  just  what  it  is  that  is  affected  by 
the  sensation.  The  nerve  as  a  whole  it  cannot  l^e,  for  the 
nerve  is  an  aggregate  of  many  parts  and.  moreover,  is 
never,  as  a  whole,  in  a  state  of  excitement  but,  on  the 
contrary,  one  part  is  affected  after  another  successively. 

It  would  therefore  be  necessary  to  assume  that  each 
indivisible  atom  of  the  nerve  is  a  sensitive  subject  and 
each  transmits  its  sensation  to  its  neighbor  until  at  last 
it  reaches  the  soul. 

The  fact  that  the  transmission  of  the  excitement  may 
be  prevented  by  alterations  in  the  })hysical  continuity 
of  the  nerve,  as,  for  example,  by  incision,  shows  that 


this  transmission  is  the  result,  not  of  an  immediate  sym- 
pathy, but  of  a  physical  effect  produced  upon  one  nerve 
atom  bv  another. 

ft/ 

Then  we  must  suppose  that  the  atom  a  acts  physic- 
ally upon  the  atom  b  and,  as  a  result  of  this  action,  b 
enters  the  state  of  sensation  E.  Then  atom  b  imparts 
a  physical  impulse  to  atom  c  which  thus,  in  turn,  be- 
comes affected  by  the  sensation  E,  The  last  nerve  atom 
z  acts  then,  in  a  way  entirely  unknown,  upon  the  soul 
and  now  this  also  is  so  excited  as  to  produce  its  sensa- 
tion E, 

It  is  easy  to  see  that  this  last  impulse,  by  means  of 
which  our  sensation  (which  is,  after  all,  the  only  thing 
of  which  we  really  know  anything)  is  produced,  would 
have  exactly  the  same  result  if  the  nerve  atoms  exerted 
simply  a  physical  influence  upon  each  other  and  if  their 
own  sensations  (which  are  simply  assumptions  and  not 
discovered  facts)  did  not  exist  at  all.  Since  the  idea  of 
sensation  in  the  nerves  themselves  contributes  nothing 
to  the  explanation  of  our  own  sensations,  and,  more- 
over, is  not  demonstrable,  while  the  passage  of  a  phy- 
sical impulse  can  not  Ije  denied,  we  shall,  in  the  future, 
consider  the  nervous  action  as  simply  physical  motion 
which  pjisses  from  one  nerve  element  to  another  and 
which  does  not  partake  of  the  psychical  nature  charac- 
teristic of  the  resulting  sensation. 

§3.  The  third  link  in  this  chain  of  processes  is  that 


8 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


9 


condition  of  consciousness  so  familiiir  to  all.  the  fietfsa- 
lion  itself — the  act  of  seeing  a  light  of  a  definite  color 
or  the  hearing  of  a  sound,  for  example. 

Of  the  two  elements  in  this  process  which  we  are 
able  to  distinguish  in  our  thinking,  namely  the  qualit- 
ative content,  which  we  perceive,  and  the  perceiving 
activity  by  which  it  is  made  known  to  us,  neither  the 
one  or  the  other  is  comparable  with  the  nature  of  the 
external  excitement  or  the  nerve  process.  As  accur- 
ately as  we  may  analyze  the  nature  of  ether  waves  we 
never  discover  in  them  the  reason  why  they  are  seen  as 
light  rather  than  heard  as  sound,  nor  why  one  sort  is 
perceiyed  as  red  and  another  as  blue  and  not  the  re- 
verse. Furthermore,  however  we  may  combine  the 
physical  motions  of  nerve  atoms  there  never  comes  a 
point  where  it  is  clear  that  the  motion  last  produced  is 
not  to  remain  motion  but  must  pass  over  into  the  en- 
tirely different  process  of  sensation. 

Yain  are  all  attempts  to  discover  how  it  is  that  the 
simple  physical  motion  gradually  passes  over  into  sen- 
sation. We  must,  the  rather,  be  content  to  state  that 
nature  has,  by  one  of  its  imposed  necessities,  quite  un- 
known to  us,  so  correllated  these  two  dissimilar  series  of 
processes — motions  and  sensations — (which  we  are  un- 
able to  derive  the  one  from  the  other)  that  a  member  of 
the  one  series  always  produces  a  definite  member  of  the 
other. 


§4.  It.  would  be  assumed  that  these  two  series  of 
processes  would  not  be  linked  together  without  system, 
but  rather  that  similar  excitements  in  one  series  would 
correspond  to  similar  sensations  in  the  other  and  differ- 
ent excitements  to  different  sensations.  And,  when,  in 
the  series  of  stimuli,  a  definite  progress,  retardation, 
periodicity,  or  prominent  elements  occur  it  would  be 
expected  that,  in  some  way,  all  these  would  find  expres- 
sion in  the  corresponding  series  of  sensations. 

This  assumption  is  but  partially  supported  by  exper- 
ience. In  the  first  place,  the  various  classes  of  sensa- 
tions (^colors,  sounds,  odors)  occur  serially  one  after  the 
other,  forming  no  complete  system.  It  does  not  in  the 
least  follow  because  we  perceive  ether  waves  as  light 
that  we  must  perceive  air  waves  as  sound.  The  same 
is  true  of  the  individual  elements  of  the  different 
classes.  He  whose  experience  of  taste  and  sight  was 
limited  to  the  taste  sour  and  the  color  vellow  would 
not  be  led  to  suspect  the  existence  of  bitter  and  blue. 

Again,  it  is  only  in  the  case  of  sounds  that  we  find  a 
definite  progression  in  the  series  of  excitements  corres- 
ponding to  a  similar  progressive  arrangement  of  the 
series  of  sensations;  the  pitch  of  sounds  increasing  with 
the  rapidity  of  the  vibrations  of  the  sound  waves.  It 
should  here  be  noticed  that  the  manner  in  which  the 
sensations  reflect  the  variation  in  the  exciting  cause  is 
itself  quite  peculiar.  The  difference  in  pitch  between 
two  tones  has  no  similarity  to  the  difference  lietween 


8 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


condition  of  consciousnes«s  so  familiar  to  all,  the  sensa- 
tion itself — the  act  of  seeino;  a  light  of  a  definite  color 
or  the  hearing  of  a  sound,  for  example. 

Of  the  two  elements  in  this  process  which  we  are 
able  to  distinguish  in  our  thinking,  namely  the  qualit- 
ative content,  which  we  perceive,  and  the  perceiving 
activity  by  which  it  is  made  known  to  us,  neither  the 
one  or  the  other  is  comparable  with  the  nature  of  the 
external  excitement  or  the  nerve  process.  As  accur- 
ately as  we  may  analyze  the  nature  of  ether  waves  we 
never  discover  in  them  the  reason  why  they  are  seen  as 
light  rather  than  heard  as  sound,  nor  why  one  sort  is 
perceiyed  as  red  and  another  as  blue  and  not  the  re- 
verse. Furthermore,  however  we  may  combine  the 
physical  motions  of  nerve  atoms  there  never  comes  a 
point  where  it  is  clear  that  the  motion  last  produced  is 
not  to  remain  motion  but  must  pass  over  into  the  en- 
tirely different  process  of  sensation. 

Vain  are  all  attempts  to  discover  how  it  is  that  the 
simple  [)hysical  motion  gradually  passes  over  into  sen- 
sation. We  must,  the  rather,  be  ccmtent  to  state  that 
nature  has,  by  one  of  its  imposed  necessities,  quite  un- 
known to  us,  so  correllated  these  two  dissimilar  series  of 
processes — motions  and  sensations — (which  we  are  un- 
able to  derive  the  one  from  the  other)  that  a  member  of 
the  one  series  always  produces  a  definite  member  of  the 
other. 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


9 


§4.  It.  would  be  assumed  that  these  two  series  of 
processes  would  not  be  linked  together  without  system, 
but  rather  that  similar  excitements  in  one  series  would 
correspond  to  similar  sensations  in  the  other  and  differ- 
ent excitements  to  different  sensations.  And,  when,  in 
the  series  of  stimuli,  a  definite  progress,  retardation, 
periodicity,  or  prominent  elements  occur  it  would  be 
expected  that,  in  some  way,  all  these  w^ould  find  expres- 
sion in  the  corresponding  series  of  sensations. 

This  assumption  is  but  partially  supported  by  exper- 
ience. In  the  first  place,  the  various  classes  of  sensa- 
tions ("colors,  sounds,  odors)  occur  serially  one  after  the 
other,  forming  no  complete  system.  It  does  not  in  the 
least  follow  because  we  perceive  ether  waves  as  light 
that  we  must  perceive  air  waves  as  sound.  The  same 
is  true  of  the  individual  elements  of  the  different 
classes.  He  whose  experience  of  taste  and  sight  was 
limited  to  the  taste  sour  and  the  color  yellow  would 
not  }ye  led  to  suspect  the  existence  of  bitter  and  blue. 

Again,  it  is  only  in  the  case  of  sounds  that  we  find  a 
definite  progression  in  the  series  of  excitements  corres- 
ponding to  a  similar  progressive  arrangement  of  the 
series  of  sensations;  the  pitch  of  sounds  increasing  with 
the  rapidity  of  the  vibrations  of  the  sound  waves.  It 
should  here  be  noticed  that  the  manner  in  which  the 
sensations  reflect  the  variation  in  the  exciting  cause  is 
itself  quite  peculiar.  The  difference  in  pitch  between 
two  tones  has  no  similarity  to  the  difference  between 


10 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


11 


two  num})ers.  but  expresses  jui  entirely  peculiar -increase 
of  qualitative  intensity  which  could  not  have  been  ex- 
pected and  of  which  we  have  no  other  illustration. 

In  like  manner  the  remarkable  instance  of  the  doub- 
Yni^  of  the  number  of  waves  finds  a  peculiar  expression 
in  the  octave,  which  is  not  perceived  as  the  doubling  of 
anythinji^  but  as  a  remarkable  combination  of  identity 
and  dissimilarity  between  the  tones  unexemplified  else- 
where.  . 

On  the  other  hand  colors,  although  they  correspond 
in  their  prismatic  arrangement  to  a  similarly  in^retising 
wave-rate,  do  not  at  all  arrange  their  ini[)ressions  in  a 
series  of  increasing  intensity.  This  discrepancy  results 
from  the  fact  that  we  can  only  legitimately  expect  a 
correspondence  between  sensations  and  their  immediate 
causes — the  nerve-})rocesses.  The  latter,  however,  we 
do  not  understand,  and  are  forced  to  compare,  in  all 
cases,  only  the  results  of  sensation  with  the  external 
stimulus  upon  which,  as  we  saw,  they  do  not  immedi- 
ately depend. 

Finally,  since  our  sensations  do  not  form  a  perfect 
system,  it  is  possible  that  the  realm  of  sensations  is  not 
exhausted  bv  our  senses  but  that  other  animal  souls 
may  exist  with  entirely  different,  although^  of  course, 
to  us  unknown,  forms  of  sensation. 

§5,  The  duration  of  sensation  can  be  roughly  com- 
pared, in   general,  to  that  of  the  nerve  process  which 


produces  it.  For  we  find,  under  ordinary  circumstances, 
that  it  never  continues  longer  than  the  duration  of  the 
external  irritation,  unless  the  latter  leaves  behind  en- 
during effects  without  or  within  us,  which  themselves 
constitute  the  stimulus  for  new  senj^ations. 

Strictly  speaking,  however,  an  excitement  of  the  nerve, 
once  produced,  cannot  cease  of  itself  but  must  be  inter- 
rupted by  active  opposition.  This  is  usually  furnished 
during  health  by  the  continuous  activity  of  the  nutrit- 
ive process,  by  means  of  which  the  normal  and  indifferent 
condition  of  the  nerves  is  restored  and  they  thus  pre- 
pared to  impartially  receive  new  impressions. 

Very  generally,  however,  not  only  when  the  irrita- 
tion is  very  severe  but  particularly  in  the  case  of  the 
sense  of  sight,  the  process  may  not  be  rapid  enough. 
Then  we  have  continuous  or  sometimes  periodical  exci- 
tations corresponding  to  the  well-known  illusions,  /.  e., 
actual  sensations,  which,  if  active  enough,  prevent  the 
sense  from  receiving  new  impressions.  An  example  of 
this  is  furnished  l)y  the  brilliant  figures  produced  by 
looking  at  the  sun. 

§6.  Every  day  experience,  as,  for  example,  observa- 
tion of  an  approaching  light  or  of  an  expiring  sound, 
shows  that  we  are,  in  general,  very  sensitive  to  small 
differences  in  the  intensity  of  the  stimuli  of  sense. 
They  are,  however,  only  perceived  as  more  or  less  in- 
tense and  the  moment  never  comes  when  we  can  affirm, 


12 


OUTLINES   OF    P?5Y('H0L0GY. 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


13 


from  the  evidence  furnished  by  the  impression  simply, 
that  one  light  is  half  as  bright  or  one  sound  half  as 
loud  as  another. 

This  circumstance  prevents  us  from  finding,  by  the 
most  direct  method,  the  exact  law  governing  the  de- 
pendence of  the  sensation  upon  the  intensity  of  the 
stimulus. 

We  can,  indeed,  easily  arrange  a  series  of  irritations 
which  admit  of  an  accurate  measurement  of  their  var- 
ious intensities  but  we  can  not,  by  means  of  the  obser- 
vation of  the  intensity  of  our  own  sensation  corres- 
ponding to  them,  refer  to  each  its  value  in  nuful)ers. 
We  can  not,  therefore,  derive  from  the  comparison  of 
these  two  sets  of  values  the  general  law  which  suffices 
for  all.  We  are,  therefore,  driven  to  the  following  cir- 
cumlocution, depending  on  the  fortunate  circumstance 
that  we  are  at  least  able  to  judge  with  a  high  degree  of 
accuracy  and  certainty  of  the  likeness  of  two  sensa- 
tions. According  to  the  fundamental  experiments  of 
Ernst  Heinrich  Weber  (article  ''Sense  of  touch  and 
sensation  *'  in  R.  Wagner's  Dii'tionary  of  Fht/aiolof/j/, 
vol.  Ill,  part  2.)  which  have  since  been  confirmed  and 
extended  by  many  others,  twosimilar  excitements,  when 
they  begin  to  vary,  do  not  produce  two  evidently  dis- 
tinguishable (instead  of  identical)  sensati(ms  until  their 
intensities  stand  in  a  definite  geometric  ratio.  This 
ratio  remains  the  same  for  one  and  the  same  sense, 
within  the  limits,  of  course,  of  irritations  so  small  jus 


not  to  awaken  the  nerve  and  so  violent  as  to  disturb  the 
functi(m.  On  the  other  hand  it  is  different  for  differ- 
ent senses,  approaching  about  3  :  4  for  the  hearing 
and  simple  feeling  of  pressure  upon  the  skin;  15  :  10 
for  the  latter  when  supplemented  by  muscular  sensa- 
tion in  lifting;   100  :  101  for  sensations  of  light. 

§7.  The  dependence  of  our  capacity  for  distinguish- 
ing impressions  upon  the  ratio  of  the  intensity  of  the 
irritation,  which  has  been  derived  from  observation,  is 
embodied  in  Weber  s  Lair. 

It  does  not  explain,  however,  in  what  way  the  ratio 
of  the  intensity  of  the  irritation  really  prepares  us  to 
distinguish  impressions. 

It  does  not  explain,  namely,  whether  the  variations 
.  in  the  intensity  of  the  irritations  produce  a  noticable 
difference  in  the  infeHsiff/  of  sejisations,  these  otherwise 
remaining  the  same,  or  whether  they  produce  sensations 
qmditatireJii  different,  and  which  are  in  this  way  dis- 
tinguished. 

In  itself,  every  sensation  is  a  single  indivisible  act.  To 
separate  in  thought  as  distinct  elements  the  qualitative 
content  and  the  intensity  with  which  it  is  perceived  is 
indubitably  permissible  in  so  far  as  the  immediate  im- 
pression, with  regard  to  which  we  can  alone  decide, 
agrees  with  it.  This  is,  for  example,  the  case  with 
sounds.  Here  we  may  really  convince  ourselves  that  a 
sound  of  definite  pitch  and  timbre  may   become  louder 


14 


OlTLlNEts    UF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


15 


or  fainter  without  altering  its  character  on  this  account. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  quite  questionable  if  the  sen- 
sation of  a  heavy  pressure  is  the  same  as  that  of  a 
lighter  one,  or  if  the  taste  of  a  concentrated  acid  is 
really  the  same  taste  as  that  of  a  more  dilute  acid  of  the 
same  kind.  Still  more  reluctant  are  we  to  consider  the 
sensation  of  cold  as  simply  that  of  a  feebler  heat. 
Both  are,  rather,  opposite  poles,  although  the  agencies 
producing  them  are  similar  processes. 

Finally,  various  intensities  of  light  have  really  vari- 
ous colors;  a  less  brilliant  white  is  not  simply  p*le 
white,  but  it  has  become  gray,  and  this  gray,  as  well  Jis 
black,  cannot  be  considered  as  simply  a  feebler  sensation 
of  white.  These  points  have  been  overlooked  hitherto 
and  not  disposed  of. 

The  following  discussion  depends  upon  the  assump- 
tion, which,  although  unproven,  may  l)e  correct,  that 
sensations  are  distinguished  because  their  intensities 
varv  according  to  a  definite  scale. 

§8.  It  must  l)e  first  remembered  that  for  each  sense  a 
certain  small  irritation  is  necessaiy  Ijefore  a  sensation 
can  result.  Naturally,  in  order  to  explain  this  circum- 
stance, which  is  not  at  all  self-evident^  a  resistance  of 
some  sort  must  l^e  assumed  by  reason  of  which  a  very 
small  irritation  is  prevented  from  affecting  the  mind. 
Where  this  resistance  is  offered  is  not  known. 

It  is  farther  assumed  that  the  passage  from  complete 


identity  or  imperceptible  difference  in  two  impressions 
to  a  difference  just  distinguishable  is  always  one  and  the 
same  constant  increment  of  the  sensation  (/.  e.,  of  the 
second  impression  as  comjmred  to  the  firsts  and  that 
the  minuteness  of  the  distinction,  may,  therefore,  be 
employed  as  a  scale  for  measuring  the  intensity  of  the 
sensation. 

It  may  be  inquired,  how  must  the  irritation  increase 
so  that  the  i)assage  from  one  value  of  it  to  another 
may  always  produce  a  constant  increment  in  the  inten- 
sity of  sensation.  According  to  the  experiments  refer- 
red to  the  answer  is  this:  In  order  that  the  intensity  of 
the  sensation  nuiy  increase  by  a  constant  difference,  i.  e.^ 
in  arithmetical  ratio,  the  intensity  of  the  irritation 
must  be  increased  much  more  rapidly,  /.  e.^  in  geometri- 
cal ratio;  or,  the  relation  of  the  first  to  the  second  is 
comparable  to  that  of  a  logarithm  to  the  number  of 
which  it  is  the  logarithm;  more  simply  expressed,  sen- 
sation belongs  to  that  class  of  activities  which  rise  in 
intensity  with  greater  ditficulty  the  more  intense  the  ac- 
tivity they  are  already  exerting. 

The  following  questions  remain  to  answer: — 

1.  Why  this  peculiar  relation  occurs  at  all,  and  why 
the  sensation  and  the  irritation  are  not,  the  rather,  di- 
rectly i)roi)ortional.  which  would  seem  more  natural? 
None  of  the  theories  offered  is  satisfactory,  but  the  most 
})lausi))le  assuna])tion  is  that,  in  the   transformation  of 


10 


OUTLINRS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


17 


the  external  irritation,  something  or  other  takes  place 
which  proceeds  slower  as  the  irritation  increases. 

2.  But  why  is  it  that  all  impressions  are  not  distin- 
guished—that, for  example,  a  weight  3  must  increase  to 
4  in  order  to  produce  an  additional  sensation  of  pressure 
and  none  is  produced  by  3^,  3^,or  3|?  Certain  arrange- 
ments can  be  easily  thought  of  by  which  this  discontin- 
uity in  the  series  of  sensations  could  be  produced  but 
it  is  not  in  the  least  known  where  or  how  in  the  body 
or  soul  such  arrangements  are  situated. 
Both  these  riddles  are  quite  unsolved. 

(Comp.  G,  T/t.  Fechuer.  Elements  of  Psycho-physics, 
Leipzig,  1860. 

O.  E.  Mueller,  Foundation  of  Psycho-physics,  Berlin, 

1878.) 

§9.  It  may,  perhaps,  be  claimed  that  a  state  of  rest  or 
an  entirely  unvaried  excitement  is  never  the  immediate* 
occasion  of  sensation,  but  that  the  passage  from  one 
condition  to  another  is  always  necessary.  From  this  it 
would  follow  that  sensations  which  may  continue  to  us 
for  a  long  time,  for  example,  the  seeing  of  a  light  or  the 
hearing  of  a  sound,  must  be  based  on  series  of  single  im- 
pulses with  intervening  pauses  so  that  here  also  a  fre- 
quent repetition  of  alterations  between  excitement  and 
a  state  of  rest  would  occur. 

In  the  case  of  sensations  of  light  and  sound  this  can 
be  proven.     Here  even  every  single  flash  of  light  and 


every  shortest  sound  consists  of  a  considerable  number 
of  discrete  impulses  which  are  transferred  to  the  organs 
of  sense.  In  the  case  of  the  other  senses  this  evidence 
is  wanting. 

If  it  l3e  said  that  all  processes  of  stimulation  which 
are  to  produce  sensations  must  have  the  form  of  oscill- 
ations between  two  opposite  conditions,  it,  at  least,  must 
not  Ije  understood  that  the  sensation  consists  in  the 
enumeration  of  these  impulses.  They  can  only  be  regard- 
ed simply  as  the  actual  conditions  upon  which  the  origin 
of  sensation  in  an  unknown  way  depends.  In  the  con- 
tent of  sensation  itself— in  redness  or  warmth— we  dis- 
cover no  motion  whatever  and  still  less  the  numljer  of 
the  oscillations  by  reason  of  which  it  becomes  the  cause 
of  sensation. 

§10.  If  an  excitement  a,  which  is  ordinnrily  produced 
by  the  operation  of  an  external  irritant  and  which  i^  fol- 
lowed by  the  sensation  A,  be  exceptionally  produced  by 
an  irritant  arising  within  the  body  then  the  same  sensa- 
tion A  will  follow:  this  is  called  suhjectice  sensatmu 

Common  exami)les  are  the  ringing  in  the  ear,  flashes 
of  light  in  the  eye,  and  fever  chills  and  heat. 
^  In  connection  with  this  stands  the  theory  of  the 
specijir  enerf/i/  of  the  nerve  according  to  which  each  in- 
dividual sensory  nerve  always  produces  the  same  sensa- 
tion however  it  may  l)e  irritated.  If  it  were  so,  it  would 
not  be  strange,  for  every  connected  system  of  parts 


18 


OUTLINES   OF    PSY(  HOLOOY. 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


19 


which  is  disturbed  but  not  destroyinl  reacts  in  attempts 
to  regain  its  equilil)riuni,  the  form  of  whicli  re-action, 
depending  upon  its  own  structure  and  its  inherent  ac- 
tive forces,  is  not  altered  by  the  diversity  of  the  disturb- 
ing  irritants.  But^  in  that  case,  since  tliis  attem})t  in 
one  nerve  is  distinguishabh*  from  that  in  every  other, 
each  nerve  must  have  its  own  peculiar  structure,  a  con- 
dition which  we  have  not,  as  yet.  tliscovered. 

There  are  no  facts,  however,  which  require  tobt^tlius 
exphiined.  vVe  simply  know  that  light  stimuli,  blows, 
pressure  and  the  })assage  of  electrical  currents  throuuh 
the  eye  waken  sensations  of  light,  and.  ]>erhaps.  that 
blows  and  electricity  produce  sensations  of  souud.  jiud 
the  latter  of  taste. 

Now  a  motion  of  the  ponderable  ])ortion  of  the  elastic 
globe  of  the  eye  can  hardly  take  ]»l5ice  as  the  result  of  a 
Idow  without  its  being  followed  by  a  translation  of  a 
j)art  of  it  into  motions  of  the  ether  within  it.  thus 
producing  light  waves  which  would  constitute  as  suffic- 
ient an  irritant  to  affect  the  ojitic  nerve  as  if  they 
came  from  without. 

In  like  nuinner,  a  blow  nniy  impart  to  tense  mem- 
branes and  orgHiis  vibrations  which  then  constitute 
nornud  stimuli  to  the  auditory  nerve  ecpially  withsouu<? 
wjives  from  without. 

Finally,  the  electric  current  produces  certniu  chemical 
decom])ositions  of  the  fluids  of  the  mouth  in  which  are  to 
be  found  sufficient  irritants  to  affect  the  gustatorv  nerve. 


Hence  it  may  \je  maintained  that  in  order  that  the 
nerve  should  reach  the  condition  a  which  is  fcdlowed 
Uy  the  sensation  A  a  definite  adecjnate  irritation  is  jiec- 
essary,  but  very  many  inadequate  irritants  exist  which 
sulxlivide  in  tneir  operation  into  various  components, 
one  of  which  nuiy  be  an  irritant  adequate  to  jiroduce 
the  sensation  A.  others  being  perceived  at  the  same 
time  in  other  sensations,  as,  for  example,  the  simultan- 
eous feeling  of  pain  in  case  of  a  blow. 

5511.  The  operation  of  the  external   irritation  is  not 
as  sim|)le  as  formerly  sup]K)sed;  waves  of  light  not  act- 
ing, for  example,   directly    upon   the  optic    nerves   to 
awaken  according  to  their  constituticm  all  possible  color 
and  light  seiLsations.     There  are  found  in  the  eye  pecu- 
liarly constructed  layers,  as  yet  not   well    understood 
(rod  and  spindle  layers )  which  appear  to  l)e  designed  to 
translate  the  light  waves  entering  them  into  chemical 
changes  in  a  peculiar  su})stance   (optic-purple)   which 
then  act  as  irritants  upon  the  optic  nerve.     Fn  the  skin 
and  tongue  we  likewise  find  peculiar  tactile  and  gusta- 
tory organs,  which,    in   some  unknown   way,  are  sup- 
posed to  give  to  the  irritation  the  deflnite  character  nec- 
essary to  affect  the  nerves  contained  in  them. 

In  the  ear  we  find  something  analogous,  although 
here  the  simpler  arrangement  seems  to  prevail,  each 
single  nerve-fibre  being  recei>tive  only  to  a  single  tone. 
The  entire  expanse  of  the  fibres  (in  the  organ  of  (,^orti) 


III 


20 


OUTLIK^ES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


21 


fl: 


•'II 


I 


is  thus  like  a  piano  and  each  thread  receptive  to  only 
one  rate  of  vibration. 

A  siniihir  hypotliesis  is  in  vogue  iistotheeye.  Accord- 
ing to  this  theory  there  are  three  sorts  of  threads,  of 
which  each  is  irritated  independently,  and  each  is  sensi- 
tive to  one  of  the  three  fundamental  colors — green,  red, 
and  violet.  The  other  colors  result  from  the  simultaneous 
irritation  of  threads  of  the  other  sorts. 

This  hypothesis  is  not  invented  gratuitously,  l)ut  to  ac- 
count for  the  phenomena  of  color-blindness  which  are 
explained  by  it. 

It  is  necessary  to  explain,  however,  why  a  definite 
combination  of  simultaneous  excitements  can  j)roduce 
from  red,  green  and  violet,  the  other  colors,  as  yellow, 
blue,  and  red,  which,  so  far  as  the  impressions  of  sensa- 
tion are  concerned,  seem  not  at  all  likely  to  be  derived 
from  them.  # 

§12.  In  one  sense,  all  sensations  are  but  subjective, 
i,  e.^  only  appearances  in  our  consciousness  which  have 
nothing  corresponding  to  them  in  the  external  world. 
Even  in  antiquity  this  truth  Wius  outlined,  and  modern 
physics  fills  out  the  picture.  The  external  world  is 
neither  silent  nor  loud,  neither  bright  nor  dark,  but  is 
as  utterly  incomparable  to  these  as  is  sweetness  to  a 
line.  Nothing  is  happening  outside  of  our  bodies  but 
motions  of  various  sorts. 

Physiology  often  makes  the  untenable  statement  that 


sensations  are  simply  apprehensions  of  our  own  condi- 
tion. All  that  goes  on  in  the  nerves  while  we  are  see- 
ing is  not  in  the  least  perceived  by  us,  and  there  is  known 
no  process  in  our  souls  preceding  the  sensation  so  in- 
tiniJitely  that  it  may  be  called  an  act  of  perception  of 
the  sensation.  It  may  be  said,  therefore,  that  sensa- 
tions are  appearances  within  us  which  are,  indeed,  the 
results  of  external  irritations,  ])ut  are  not  strictly  rep- 
resentations of  them. 

The  proofs  upon  which  this  theory  rests,  all,  admit  of 
evasion.  It  may  be  still  assumed  that  things  are  really 
red  or  sweet,  but  we  cannot  know  them  to  be  so  except 
as  they  cause  motions  to  operate  upon  us  which  cer- 
tainly are  neither  red  nor  sweet,  but  cause  to  arise  in 
our  minds  the  same  redness  and  sweetness,  as  sensations, 
that  really  are  peculiarities  of  things.  The  real  proof 
is  that  such  objective  peculiarities  are  unthinkable- 
Wherein  consists  the  brightness  of  a  light  which  no 
one  ever  saw,  or  the  sound  of  a  tone  no  one  has  heard 
is  quite  as  impossible  to  say,  as  what  a  toothache  would 
be  which  no  one  ever  had. 

It  is,  therefore,  part  of  the  very  nature  of  colors, 
sounds,  odors,  etc.,  to  be  limited  to  a  single  position  and 
a  single  occasion.  They  can,  namely,  only  exist  in  the 
consciousness  of  a  soul,  and  then  only  when  the  sensa- 
tion is  felt. 


Ol'TLlNKS   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


O 


(  HAl»TEH  SECOND. 

THK  PROCESS  OF  CONCEFI^IOX. 

sjl.  CoiK*e|»ts,  in  tontrjist  to  sensations,  are  those  |U(- 
tnres  of  nieniorv  which  are  left  in  consciousness  hv 
earlier  sensation>. 

This  agrees  with  our  ordinary  use  of  language;  we 
conceive  of  the  absent,  which  we  do  not  })erceive,  hut 
perceive  the  present  which  do  not  recpiire  to  conceive 
of.  Conception  is  jjeculiarly  distinguished  from  sensa- 
tion. The  conce[)t  of  the  brightest  light  does  not 
gleam,  of  the  loudest  tone  does  not  resound,  of  the 
acutest  juiin  <loes  not  ache.  In  each  case,  however,  the 
concept  accurately  re[)resents  the  gleam,  the  sound  and 
the  pain  which  it  does  not  really  reproduce. 

§2.  These  jtictures  of  menuu'y  are  not  nhniys  pre- 
sent in  consciousness  in  this  form.  They  appear  only 
now  and  then.  but.  when  thev  do.  in  such  a  way  that 
no  external  irritation  is  necessary  for  their  repnxhic- 
tion.  It  f(»ll<»\v>  that  they  were  not  entirely  lost  in  the 
meantime,  but  must  have  transformed  themselves  into 
some  condition-,  which  we  cannot,  of  course,  describe, 
but  for  which  we  may  employ  the  contradictorv   but 

•>'  I.  ft 

convenient  iiiune.  ■■  iinconseious  concepts,"  to  iiidicate 


that  thev  are  f„rnie.l  from  concepts  and.  under  pn.per 
cn-cmiistaiices.  may  ajjrain  become  concepts.     The  study 

of  th,.  process  of  conception  .nmst  explain    both    these 
states. 

p.  Tlie  disaj.pearance  of  concepts  from  the  con- 
sciousness no  one  can  observe;  we  can  speak  only  m.on 
the  l)asis  „f  .leci-sions  drawn  from  what  we  find  in  con- 
sciousness afterwards,  and  upon  general  principles. 

Two  views  stood  ()j)p„sed  to  each  other.  It  was  for- 
merly thou-ht  that  the  disappearance  of  concepts  is 
<(uite  natural,  and  that  the  opposite-w^«,o/-.y-requires 
explanation.  Xow.  however,  following'  the  analogy  of 
the  physical  law  of  inertia,  it  is  thought  necessary  to 
explaiu  JoniHti,,,).  liecuuse  the  continuance  of  an  ex- 
cited condition  is  self-evident. 

This  analogy  is  rather  lame.  It  applies  to  the 
motions  of  JKMlies.  but  motion  is  only  an  alteration  in 
external  relations  by  which  the  moved  body  does  not 
suffer,  because  it  is  situated  exactly  a.s  favorably  in  one 
place  as  the  other,  an.l  has  neither  cause  nor  standard 
for  j.utting  forth  a  resistance  to  the  motion.  The  soul, 
on  the  contrary,  is  placed  in  various  internal  conditiouJ 
according  as  a.  or  b,  or  nothing  is  conceived.  It  is 
conceival.le  that  it  reacts  against  each  of  the  impres- 
sions ottered,  and  thus,  without  annihilating  any  of 
them  may.  i>erhiips.  change  them  from  conscious  sen- 
sations into  uncon.scions  states. 


24 


OUTLINES    OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


Even  the  principle  of  the  unify  of  the  soiih  ^^xmm\h\^ 
as  it  is  in  itself — even  this  unity,  which  makes  necessary 
the  reflex  action  between  the  many  conceptions,  so  that 
one  must  rephice  the  other — does  not  lead  us  to  the  goal. 
For,  if  it  be  asked  in  what  way  the  soul,  in  its  unity, 
utilizes  the  plurality  of  concepts,  the  most  reasonable 
assumption  would  be  that  all  qualitatively  diverse  sen- 
sations or  concepts  are  fused  in  a  single  homogeneous 
intermediate  condition. 

Yet  this  is  not  the  case,  but  the  concepts,  for  exam- 
ple, of  blue  and  yellow,  or  large  and  small,  when  once 
originated  in  the  consciousness  as  distinct,  never  mingle. 
It  is  also  clear  that  all  the  higher  spiritual  products, 
which  consist  chiefly  of  relations  between  different 
points  which  are  to  be  compared,  would  be  impossible 
if,  in  this  fusing  into  a  common  condition,  the  diversity 
of  the  different  points  were  lost. 

The  following  thoughts  are  suggested  simply  as  hy- 
potheses which  are  not  deducible  from  principles. 


§4.  According  to  the  analogy  of  physical  mechanics, 
concepts  might  be  considered  as  forces  which  oper- 
ate upon  each  other  according  to  the  degree  of  their 
resistance  and  intensity.  Both  parts  of  this  hypoth- 
esis are  difficult  to  support  by  experience.  In  regard, 
firstly,  to  the  intensity,  this  notion  is  employable 
in  the  case  of  sensations,  in  as  far  as  the  greater  per- 
ceived content  is  an  effect  of  the  greater  activity  of  sen- 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


25 


sation,  or  a  more  severe  agitation  or  affection  of  the 
perceiving  subject.  But  the  simple  concept  of  a  bright 
light  is  no  greater  than  that  of  a  feeble  shimmer,  and 
that  of  thunder  requires  no  greater  effort  than  that  of  a 
slight  noise. 

The  conceiving  activity  seems  then  to  permit  of  no 
distinction  in  intensity,  but  this  must  be  found  alone  in 
the  conceived  content. 

Moreover,  the  more  or  less  obscure  concepts,  which 
we  think  we  have  of  one  and  the  same  content,  by  no 
means  produce  a  diverse  intensity  of  the  conception. 

Simple  concepts  which  seem   obscure  to  us,  as,  for 
example,  that  of  the  taste  of  a  rare  fruit,  we  do  not 
have  at  all,  but  simply  know,  from  other  sources,  that 
the  fruit    has  a  taste.      The  greater  the  field  within^ 
which  a  choice  is  possible  between  various  tastes  with-  / 
out  reaching  a  decision,  so  much  the  more  obscure  ap-  / 
pears  the  concept  of  the  real  taste  which  we  are  seeking  \ 
but  do  not  possess.  ^ 

Complex  concepts,  such  as  pictures  of  external  objects 
or  scientific  formulae,  are  not  obscure  because  the  entire 
content  becomes  gradually  fainter,  but  because  it  be- 
comes discontinuous.  Single  portions  drop  out  entirely, 
but,  particularly,  the  definite  relations  in  which  the  re- 
maining constituents  stand  to  each  other  are  forgotten. 
The  greater  the  number  of  the  possible  connections 
between  which  one  hesitates,  the  greater  the,  so-called, 
obscurity  of  the  concept.     On  the  other  hand,  as  soon 


26 


orTT.IXES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY 


OrTLIXKS    OF    PSYCHOKOOY. 


97 


as  M  concept  is  thought  complete  in  Jill  its  juirts  and 
connections,  it  is  not  possible  to  conceive  it  more  or 
less  vividly.  The  increase  in  clearness  which  seems  to 
resnlt  from  the  association  hv  research   with   the  con- 

« 

cept,  say  of  a  triangle,  of  the  many  other  thoughts  un- 
known to  the  beginner,  is  bnt  apparent. 

§5  The  second  of  the  notions  employed,  that  of  re- 
sistence,  awakens  the  question  whether  it  refers  to  the 
content  of  the  concept,  or  to  the  activity  by  which  it  is 
conceived.  These  are  not  identical.  Concepts  are 
never  that  which  they  represent,  that  of  red  is  not  red, 
that  of  a  triangle  is  no  triangle,  that  of  pjussion  is  not  a 
passionate  concept. 

If  two  conceived  contents  oppose  one  another,  as  right 
and  left,  pins  and  minus,  black  and  white,  it  does  not, 
in  the  least,  follow  that  the  conceiving  activities  which 
produced  them  are  also  opposed,  and  so,  according  to 
the  analogy  of  op])osed  physical  motion,  would  tend  to 
neutralize  each  other. 

§6.  The  notions  of  intensity  and  reaction  wonld  only 
be  applicable  to  the  founding  of  a  system  of  psychical 
mechanics  if  thcY  conld  be  referred  to  the  conceiving; 
activity. 

This  is  not  the  case.  Tt  conld  merely  be  accepted  as 
a  fact,  if  the  intensitv  and  reaction  of  conceived  con- 
tents  were  the  causes  of  the  alterations  of  conception. 


V 


E\i»<*rience  does  not  contirm  this;  conceptions  of  larger 
cojittMits  by  no  means  dis])lace  those  of  smaller.  On  the 
contrary,  the  latter  are  sometimes  in  a  j)osition  to  sup- 
press t'ven  the  sensations  of  external   irritation. 

Now  concepts  never  enter  the  soul  without  doing 
souiething  else:  connected  with  every  impression  is  that 
which  is  conceived  to  be  its  result,  and  also  a  sense  of 
the  value  which  it  has  for  the  physical  and  s])iritual 
well-being  of  the  one  perceiving. 

These  feelings  of  pleasure  and  dis])leasure  are  just  as 
ca])able  of  gradual  diminution  as  the  simple  conception 
is  incapable  of  it.  This  feeling  of  participation  is  sus^ 
ceptible  to  great  variations  de})endant  upon  variations 
in  the  state  of  mind,  and  according  to  the  amount  of 
this  feeling  of  participation,  or.  briefly  stated,  according 
to  the  amount  of  interest  which  a  concept,  for  various 
reasons,  excites  in  the  soul  at  each  instant,  it  operates 
with  greater  or  less  force  to  suj)press  other  concepts. 
It  is  in  this,  rather  than  any  inherent  peculiarity 
which  the  concept  has,  that  what  we  call  the  power 
of  the  concept  consists. 

§7.  The  second  question  was,  how  do  concepts  return 
into  consciousness?  With  regard  to  this,  it  is  simply 
known  that  a  conce])t.  b,  very  frequently  returns  if  an- 
other, a,  be  i)roduced  in  consciousness. 

As,  however,  not  any  b  aj)i>ears  as  a  result  of  the 
presence  of  any  a  we  please,  there  must  be  a  more  in- 


28 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


2U 


timate  connection  l^etween  those  which  reproduce  each 
other  than  exists  l>etween  those  which  do  not  so  repro- 
duce each  other.  This  connection  is  cjilled  association 
— a  simple  name  which  does  not  in  the  least  express  in 
what  the  connection  consists.  Likewise  is  reprodac- 
tion  a  simple  name  for  the  fact  that  a  o^ven  a  recalls 
into  consciousness  b,  which  is  associated  with  it. 

Nevertheless,  the  conditions  under  which  both  assoc- 
iation and  reproduction  actually  take  place  may  he 
studied. 

The  two  primary  classes  which  are  usually  first  men- 
tioned, /.  e.,  reproduction,  on  the  one  hand,  of  likes  hy 
like,  and,  on  the  other,  of  opposites  by  opposed  concepts, 
are  not  readily  supported  by  experience.  For  it  cannot  be 
said  that  a  sound  or  color  recalls  more  vividly  all  other 
sounds  and  colors  than  some  other  concepts.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  opposites  remind  of  each  other,  as  darkness 
of  light,  night  of  day,  plus  of  minus;  the  reason  is  not 
their  opposition  alone,  but  the  special  importance  which 
these  have  for  our  life  or  its  activities,  so  that  we  are 
thus  reminded  of  the  one  by  the  other. 

But  the  third  and  fourth  cases,  the  reproduction  of 
parts  of  bodies  occupying  space  by  other  parts  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  mutual  reproduction  of  the  parts  of 
a  successive  whole,  as,  for  example,  a  melody  in  its 
original  order,  do  certainly  occur. 

Examples  are  unnecessary.  Neither  does  it  seem  nec- 
essary to  refer  the  third  case,  as  is  often  done,  back  to 


the  fourth,  ])ecause,  it  is  said,  the  perception  of  a  sim- 
ultaneous whole  takes  place  in  a  successive  manner,  the 
eye  requiring  to  run  over  the  whole  and  thus  gradually 
perceiving  the  connection  of  each  several  part  with  the 
next.  We  do,  indeed,  form  accurate  images  only  in  this 
way,  but  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  an  instantaneous 
glance  may  form  images  of  which  the  single  parts  are 
capable  of  reproducing  each  other. 

The  facts  may,  therefore,  be  thus  summarized: — 

Every  pair  of  concepts,  whatever  their  content,  assoc- 
iate themselves  whenever  they  are  produced  simultan- 
eously or  one  immediately  following  the  other  (i.  e., 
without  intermediate  ones).  To  this  case  may  be  re- 
ferred without  further  argument,  the  special  ease  with 
which  a  number  of  concepts  may  be  repeated  in  their 
order  but  not  out  of  it. 

If,  finally,  i  in  mediate  reproduction  be  given  as  a  spec- 
ial case,  comprising  instances  where  the  concept  or  sen- 
sation a  is  again  awakened  by  the  influence  of  a  new 
irritation  which  produces  the  same  a,  it  must  be  re- 
memljered  that  the  second  a  could  not  be  recognized  as 
a  repetition  of  the  first  if  they  were  really  both  ident- 
ical. 

The  first  one,  however,  which  is  thus  awaked  by  the 
second,  now  reproduces,  on  its  part,  those  associated  cir- 
cumstances under  which  it  was  previously  experienced, 
and  these  are  different  from  those  of  the  present 
moment.     The  recognition  of  the  original  a  is,  there- 


30 


orTLINKS    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


fore,  dependent  upon   iiiediate<l   rej)roductioii.   /.  ^ ..  of 
other  concepts  throii-i^h  the  ii^^ency  of  a. 

§S,  Most  concepts,  in  the  conrse  of  a  lifetime.  ass(»c- 
iate  themselves  in  the  same  way  with  many  others.  If, 
therefore,  a  definite  f  is  aofain  distingnished  in  con- 
sciousness, it  is  (piite  uncertain  which  of  the  many 
others.  15,  h,  i,  or  k,  with  which  it  was  formerly  assoc- 
iated, niav  now  )>e  reproduced. 

The  })asis  for  the  decision  in  favor  of  any  out'  lies 
partly  in  the  course  which  the  c(mcepts  ])rior  to  f  have 
taken,  with  which  g,  ll.  i,  and  k  may  not  equally  a-:ree; 
partly  in  our  mood  (U*  the  humor  produced  each 
moment  bv  the  activitv  or  restraints  of  our  heiui^; 
partly,  tiiially,  in  the  peculiar  conditions  of  the  physical 
life,  which  we  will  liere  omit  entirely,  hut  of  which  we 
will  speak  further  on. 

These  views  cm  only  he  carried  out  in  ai^eneral  way, 
it  hein;^-  impossihlc  to  hasc  theories  \i])on  them  which 
can  l)e  carrieil  int(»  details,  and  e((ually  imi)ossihle  in  an 
individual  case  to  <liscover  the  causes  which  have  really 
produced  the  seemingly  capricious  flow  of  our  thought. 


CHAPTKIJ  THIRD. 

REF.ATIVK  KNOWLEDCtE  AND  ATTENTION. 

%\.  Up  to  this  time  we  have  s])okeu  of  the  relations 
and  alterations  in  conce])tions.  In  onr  inner  life,  how- 
ever, there  is.  besides  these  elements,  a  eonce})ti(m  of 
these  relations  ami  vicissitudes.  These  two  thin^js  are 
quite  different. 

We  know  that  when  the  concejit  of  bine  and  red  ap- 
])ear  at  once  within  us.  they,  by  no  means  combine  to 
prodiice  vi«det.  If  this  were  the  case,  the  result  would 
l»e  a  sim])le  coiKe])t  takin*::  the  jdace  of  the  others,  and 
a  compariscm  of  the  two  would  be  made  impossible  by 
their  disa])|)earauce. 

Every  comparison-  in  general,  every  relation  between  ' 
two  elements  (in  this  case  red  au<l  blue) — is  evidence 
that  both  the  factcu's  are  distinct,  and  that  a  conceiving 
activity  passes  from  the  (uie.  a.  to  the  other,  bandthat 
tliis  alteration  which  is  experiemed  in  passing  from  the 
concept  (►f  a  to  that  of  b  is  itself  in  consciousness. 
Snch  an  activity  we  exert  when  we  compare  red  with 
blue,  antl  the  result  is  a  new  concept  of  qualitative  sim- 
ilarity which  we  accord  to  both. 

If  51  strong  and  a  weak  light  are  perceived  at  (nice, 
the  result  is  n(»t  the  sensation  of  a  single  light  ecpialintr 


32 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


the  sum  of  them  both,  but  they  remain  distinct,  and  in 
passing  again  from  one  to  the  other  we  become  con- 
scious of  another  quantitive  alteration  of  our  condition, 
i,  e.,  the  simple  perception  of  more  or  less  of  the  same 
impression. 

Finally,  if  two  identical  impressions  have  appeared 
within  us  they  do  not  unite  to  form  a  third,  but,  as  we 
compare  them,  as  above,  and  do  not  l)ecome  conscious 
during  the  transition  of  an  alteration  in  the  concept, 
the  new  conception  of  equality  arises. 

§2.  It  is  imi)ortaiit  to  explain  that  all  these  new  con- 
cepts, which  we  consider  as  of  a  higher  order,  do  not 
appear  as  resultants  of  a  mere  reciprocation  of  the  orig- 
inal simple  concepts  in  the  same  way  that  in  mechanics 
a  third  movement  results  from  the  union  of  two  others. 
This  analogy  does  not  hold  good  at  all  in  the  spiritual 
realm.  The  two  impressions,  a  and  b,  are  rather  to  be 
considered  as  stimuli  which  operate  upon  the  peculiar 
and  unit  nature  of  a  conceiving  subject,  and,  in  this, 
give  rise  to  the  reactionary  activity  through  which  new 
concepts,  for  example,  that  of  similarity,  identity,  con- 
trariety, etc.,  result,  which  would  not  l)e  produced  by  a 
simple  combined  iictivity  of  the  separate  impressions 
without  the  stimulation  of  this  new  spiritual  activity. 


§3.  In    the  same  way  as  these    new    concept    are 
formed,  all  of  what  we  call  (jeneral  notions  are  produced. 


OfTLIXK,s   OF   PSY(HU1.()GY. 


3- 


Ft  ,s  customary  to  assume  that  dissi„,ilar  constituents 
of  compared   cmcepts  neutralize  ea.h   other  by  their 
contradiction,   but  the  ren.aining  siu,ilar  components 
constitute  directly   the   abstract   part.     However    the 
single  exan.ples,  out  of  which   we  construct  a  .re'neril 
notion,  are  not  destroye.1  in  the  pn.cess.  but  their  con- 
cej.ts  remain  along  with  the  general  notion  which   as  -t 
new  product,  simply  refers   to  these.     Moreover    the 
general  notion  never  forms  a  permanent  picture  which 
may  1^  conceive.1  of  in  the  same  conspicuous  way  ..s 
the  single  examples  from  whidi  it  is  composed.    "Color 
...  general"  can  not  l.e  imaged  to  th^n.ind  -itdoes  not 
look  green  or  red-it  does  not  "look"  at  ail,  and  just 
so  the  concept  "animal-  produces  „o  distinct  im^u^e 
l.ke  the  con<.e,.t  of  a  single  species.     .All  such  general 
-H.t.ons  are  not,  therefore.  pr.Hlucts  of  the  combined 
operation  of  many  single  concepts,  for  thev  would  then 
have   the   same  character  as  their  components      The 
.."..les  with  which  we  designate  them  (su.h  as  the  word 
«<>I<'>-)  Hi-e  simply  conveniences  for  the  conception  of  a 
^joup   ot  sn.gle  impressions,  but   with  the   accessory 

Idea  that  they  refer  not  to  then,    l.nf  i     n 

•'  f"  ".fill.  i)ut  to  the  common 

features  contained  in  them,  which  cannot,  however  l,e 
sei.arated  from  them  as  a  similar  concept. 

H.  Upon  this  fact  depends  the  various  narrower  and 

•'•oader  meanings  of  the  wor,l  .■on.no.,.nes..     It  often 

happens  that  we  perceive  the  plurality  of  elements,  but  do 


34 


OUTLINKS   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


not  know  how  to  distinguish  at  the  u.oment  their  .lefinite 
rehitions.     On  the  other  hand,  it  is  possible  to  l.ecome 
conscious  of  them  later,  even  after  the  sensuous  impres- 
sion is  past.     It  follows  that  these  impressions  were  by 
no  means  outside  of  consciousness,  otherwise  we  could 
not    rememlier   then,  afterwards.     But  the  faculty  of 
comparison,  which  enumerates  and  conceives  of  the  re- 
lations actually  existing  between  them  w,is  not  exerted. 
It  is  seen  from  this  that  the  two  operations  are  sep- 
arable. 

The  j.rocess  of  comi)arison.  as  the  higher,  can  not  be 
employed  without  the  simple  perception  of  the  sensa- 
tion, but  the  lower  is  not  necessarily  accomi.anied  by 

>  • 

the  higher. 

Common  experience  shows  that  there  are  n.any  cir- 
cumstances which  prevent  the  appearam-e  of  this  higher 
activity.  In  many  emotions  we  hear  the  sounds  but 
do  not  understand  the  words;  or,  understand  the  words 
but  not  the  significance  which  they  have  for  us.  Even 
bodily  and  some  little  understo.xl  conditions  cause  that 
the  simple  sensation  of  impressions  persist  while  neither 
their  external  nor  internal  connection  reaches  our  con- 
sciousness (mind-blindness ). 

85,  What  we  have  above  mentioned  is  nothing,  in 
reality,  but  a  series  of  various  degrees  of  cUention.  This 
was  formeriy  considered  as  an  activity  of  the  soul 
which,  like  a  departing  and  approaching  light,  illumin- 


OUTLINES  OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


35 


ates,  more  or  less  brilliantly,  the  impression,  while  it  is 
of  Itself  imperceived.  Later  this  idea  of  an  activity  was 
entirely  rejected  (Herbart).  and  the  statement  was 
made  that  the  fact  that  we  are  attentive  to  something 
signifies  .simply  that  the  concept  of  this  something 
rises  111  our  consciousness  by  its  own  intensity. 

We  cannot  accej.t  the  latter  =,«sumption,  nor  can  we 
admit  the  statement  that  attention  is  simplv  a  more  in- 
tense illumination  of  the  content.  We  attain  anything 
through  the  iigency  of  attention  only  when  the  con- 
ceived content  affords  opportunity  for  the  operation  of 
our  faculty  of  reference  and  comparison. 

Even  a  simple  content  is  compared  by  us  at  least  with 
other    simj.le    contents,    or    with    itself    in   different 
moments  of  its  duration.     We  learn  from  this  that  the 
mere  o(,xarafw»  of  the  content,  intense  as  it  may  be 
amounts  to  nothing.    It  is  plain,  finally,  that  this"com- 
parison  of  one  content  with  another  may  be  carried  to 
any  desirable  extent.     Various  stages  may  thus,  indeal 
be    distinguished   in    the  consciousness  according    ai 
simply  the  thing  itself  and  its  own  nature  is  conceived- 
or  Its  connection  with  others}  or.  finally,  its  significance' 
and  importance  to  our  personal  life. 


CHAPTKR  FOURTH. 

THK  IXTLITTONS  OF  SPACE. 

§1.  Metaphysics  niises  the  .loubt  whether  the  exist, 
eiice  of  extenae.1  space,  in  which  we  are  contained  along 
with  other  things,  is  real:  whetlier.  the  rather,  the  ex- 
tended world  is  not  an  intuition  within  us. 

Neglecting  this  (piestion  for  the  present,  we  proceed 
upon  "the  common  assumption.  Hut  since  things  can- 
not l)ecome  ol.jects  of  our  perception  by  virtue  of  their 
existence  simply  but  always  on  account  of  activities 
which  they  exert  upon  us.  we  are  led  to  the  question :- 
"How  do  objectscause  us  to  conceive  of  them  in  that 
condition  of  extension  in  which  they  are  actually  situ- 
ated  without  us? 

^•>.  In  the  eye  Uiitiire  has  carefully  arrauKed  an  ap- 
paratus which  causes  the  light  rays  froui  an  illuniin- 
ated  point  to  be  a-ain  collected  in  a  point  upon  the 
retina  and  the  various  points  in  the  picture  here 
formed  to  occui)y  the  same  relative  positions  as  the 
points  in  the  object  to  which  they  correspond.  This 
so-called  ima-e  of  the  object  thus  carefully  produced 
is  without  doul)t.  an  indispensilde  reipiisite  to  the  per- 
ception of  an   o))ject  in   its  true   form    and    position. 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


But  it  is  a  fundamental  error  to  suppose  that  the 
simple  existence  of  this  picture  is  alone  sufficient  to  ex- 
plain our  concept  of  the  i)osition  of  its  parts. 

This  whole  picture  is  essentially  nothing  but  a  repre- 
sentation of  the  external  object  within  the  organ  of 
sense,  and  how  we  experience  or  know  anything  about 
it  is  just  as  much  of  a  question  as  was  the  question 
how  we  perceive  the  external  object. 

§3.  If  the  soul  itself  were  considered  a  beinj?  havin*^ 
extension,  the  impressions  upon  the  retina  might  be 
transferred  to  the  soul  with  their  perfect  geometrical 
regularity.  Then  one  point  of  the  soul  would  be  ex- 
cited by  green,  another  by  red.  and  a  third  by  yellow, 
and  the  three  would  lie  as  accurately  upon  the  angles 
of  a  triangle  as  the  corresponding  excitations  on  the 
retina. 

But  it  is  readily  seen  that  nothing  is  really  gained. 
The  simple  fact  that  three  different  points  in  the  soul 
are  excited  is  simply  a  triplicity  of  disconnected  facts. 
No  knowledge  of  this,  /.  e.,  of  the  triplicity  or  the  rela- 
tive position  of  the  three  points  is  thus  produced.  For 
this  pur])ose  there  must  be  a  unifying  activity,  to  which, 
therefore,  as  to  every  activity,  all  predicates  of  exten- 
sion or  magnitude  in  space  are  entirely  foreign. 

§4, The  same  idea  becomes  more  apparent  if  we  lay  aside 
the  useless  notion  of  a  soul  possessing  extension  and 


38 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


consider  it  as  a  super-sensuous  l)eing,  which,  in  order  to 
be  brought  into  rehition  with  definitions  of  space  must  be 
regarded  as  an  indivisible  point.     In   the  passage  into 
this  indivisable  point  the  manifold  impressions  must 
certainly  lose  all  geometrical  relations  which  may  have 
been  retained  upon  the   retina  as  do  the  rays  of  light 
which  converge  to  the  focus  of  a  lense.     Beyond    the 
focus  the  rays  diverge  in  the  same  order  as  they  came. 
Nothing  analogous  to  this,  however,  takes  place  in  our 
consciousness.     The  various  impressions  which  existed 
contemporaneously  do  not  again  l>ecome  distinct,  but, 
instead,  excite  the  activity  of  conception,  which  dis- 
tributes their  images  upon  the  space   which   is    only 
an  intuition  of  its  own.    Here  applies  again  the  remark 
that  the  concept  is  not  that  which  it  conceives,  and  the 
concept  of  a  left  hand  point  does  not  lie  at  the  left  of  a 
concept  of  a  point  at  the  right,  but  the  conception 
which  itself  has  no  properties  of  extension,  so  conceives 
the  points  as  though  one  lay  to  the  le^t,  the  other  to  the 
right. 


§5.  The  following  result  is  before  us:— 
Many  impressions  are  in  the  soul  at  once,  but  not 
spatially  distinct,  but  rather  like  the  simultaneous  tones 
of  a  chord,  /.  e.,  qualitatively  diverse  but  not  alongside 
or  under  one  another.  Nevertheless,  out  of  these 
impressions  must  be  produced  the  concept  of  relations 
in  space.     The  question  immediately  arises,  how  does  it 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


happen  that  the  soul  does  not  apprehend  them  as  they 
really  are,  /.  e.,  unextended.  rather  than  in  spatial  rela- 
tions, which  they  are  not.  The  sufficient  ground  cannot 
lie  in  the  impressions  themselves,  but  must  be  simply  in 
the  nature  of  the  soul  in  which  they  appear,  and  upon 
which  they  merely  operate  as  stimuli. 

On  this  account  it  is  customary  to  consider  this  tend- 
ency of  the  soul  to  conceive  of  space  as  a  primitive,  in- 
born capacity.  In  truth  one  must  be  contented  with 
this  result.  All  the  attempts  to  explain  why  this 
intuition  of  space  is  a  necessary  attribute  of  the  soul 
have  completely  failed  hitherto. 

There  is  no  occasion  for  complaint,  however,  for  the 
simplest  elements  of  the  soul's  experience  must  simply 
be  accepted  as  proved  facts.  No  one,  for  example,  seri- 
ously asks  why  air  waves  are  heard  rather  than  tasted. 


§6.  Much  more  important  is  the  second  question: 
Supposing  the  soul  to  possess  the  function  of  conceiving 
certain  diverse  impressions  as  distributed  in  space,  how 
is  it  that  each  individual  impression  is  so  referred  to  a 
definite  point  in  the  space  thus  conceived  that  the  result 
is  a  faithful  representation  of  the  object  which  affects 
the  eye  ? 

Obviously,  the  impressions  themselves  must  furnish 
the  clue.  The  simple  qualities  of  the  sensation  red  or 
green  do  not  contain  it,  however,  for  each  such  color 
may,  from  time  to  time,  appear  in  every  part  of  space, 


40 


OUTLIN'KS    (^F    PSYCHOLOGY. 


and  c;in  not,  theretuiv.  he  referred    ulwiiys  to  u  definite 

point. 

But  now  we  remember  that  the  eare  with  wliicli  the 
accurate  position  of  the  various  irritants  u])«m  tlie  retina 
is  insured  cannot  he  in  vain.  Certainly  it  is  true  that  an 
impression  is  not  perceived  at  a  detinite  point  Ijecause  it 
is  at  that  point,  hut  it  is  certain  that  it  mi^ht  affect  the 
soul  far  differently  in  this  ]>osition  than  if  it  were  pro- 
duced in  any  other  point. 

Now  we  will  imajjjine  the  followinjj;:  arran«i:ement: 
Each  coh)r-impression  R,  for  example  red,  produces  the 
same  sensation  of  redness  whenever  it  affects  the  retina. 
But  along  with  this  in  each  point,  a,  b,  C,  etc.,  a  certain 
accessory  impression,  A,  B,  C,  etc.,  is  produced  which 
is   independent  of  the  nature  of  the  color  seen,  and 
simply  depends  u}K)n  the   peculiarities  of  the  irritated 
spot.     In  this  manner  a  local   impression  is  associated 
with  each  color-impression,  so  that  RA  will  indicate  a 
red  reaction  at  the  point  a,    RB  a  red  reaction  at  the 
point  b.     These  associated  impressions  become  indices 
which  enable  the  soul  to  refer  the  same  sensation  red 
now  to  one  and  now  to  another  place,  or  even   simult- 
aneously to  various  points  in  the  space  perceived  by  it. 
In  order  that  this  may  occur  in  an   orderly  manner 
these  accessory  impressions  must  be  (piite  distinct  from 
the  principal  ones,  and  not  interfere  with  them.     But 
they  must  not  only  ]>e  like  in  kind,  but  detinite   mem- 
bers of  a  series,  or  a  system  of  series,  so  that  each  im- 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


41 


pression  R  may  ]>e  able,  by  its  local  index,  to  distinguish, 
not  simply  a  particular,  but  an  absolutely  definite  pi 
from  all  others. 


ace 


§7.  This  is  the  theory  of  local  imlires.  The  funda- 
mental idea  is  that  all  diversities  in  exteiLsion,  and 
relations  between  im])ressions  ui)on  the  retina  must  be 
translated  into  corresponding  unextended  but  simply 
intensive  relations  between  the  impressions  concurring 
without  extension  in  the  soul.  These  are  not  reflected 
in  actually  discrete  imj)ressioiis,  but  there  results  simply 
a  concept  of  such  a  redistribution. 

Up  to  this  j)oint  we  hold  this  principle  to  be  neces- 
sarily valid.     On  the  other  hand,  only  hypotheses  are 
available  to  answer  the  question,  in  what  these  impres- 
sions consist  which  are  assumed  as  accessory  to  the 
sense  of  sight.     We  suggest  as  follows:  If  a  bright 
light  fall  upcm  the  sides  of  the  retina,  where,  as  is  well- 
known,  the  sensitiveness  to  impressions  is  duller  than 
in  the  middle,  there  results  a  rotation  of  the  eye  so  that 
the  more  sensitive  part  of  the  retina  l>ecomes  the  re- 
<^eptive  organ.     This  we  call  casting  a  glance  upon  that 
light.     This  motion  takes  place  involuntarily,  origin- 
ally   without   our   realizing   its   purpose,   and    always 
without  our  consciousness  of  the  means  by  which  it  is 
efifected. 

We  may,  therefore,  include  it  among  the  so-called 
reflex  motions  which  result  from  the  excitement  of  a 


42 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY, 


nerve,  otherwise  sensory  in  function,  to  transmit  a 
stimulus  resultin<<  in  a  definite  motion:  this  taking 
phice  by  means  of  existinj^  anatomical  connections,  in 
a    way    entirely    mechanical,  without  farther  agency 

of  the  mind. 

Now  in  order  to  ])roduce  such  a  rotation  of  the  eye, 
suited  to  the  purpose  mentioned,  each  individual  part 
of  the  retina  must,  when  irritated,  produce  a  degree  and 
direction  of  this  rotatiou  peculiar  to  it  alone.  At  the 
same  time,  however,  all  these  rotations  would  be  quite 
analogous  motions  and  meml)ers  of  a  series  graduated 
according  to  their  niaguitude  and  direction. 


§8.  The   application   of   this   theory   (many   minor 
points  aside)  is  as  follows: — 

If  a  bright  light  fall  u])on  a  point  F  of  a  retina 
which  has,  as  yet,  had  no  sensation  of  light,  there  re- 
sults, by  virtue  of  the  connection  of  nervous  processes, 
such  a  rotation  of  the  eye  that,  instead  of  P,  the  point 
E,  where  the  impressions  are  most  vivid,  is  submitted 
to   the   irritation   of   the  light.     During   the  rotation 
of  the  eye  through  the  arc   P  E,  the  soul  is  conscious 
of   its   position    at   each  instant,   a  feeling  similar  to 
that   by  which    we   are  informed    of   the  position  of 
our  mem}>ers  in  the  dark.     The  arc  P  E,  therefore,  cor- 
responds to  a  series  of  constantly  changing  sensations 
of  position,  the  first  memljer  of  which  we  may  also  call 
P  and  the  last  E.     Now,  when  in  a  second  instance  the 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY'. 


43 


i\ 


point  P  is  affected  by  light,  the  result  is  notonly  arep- 
ititon  of  the  rotation  P  E,  but  the  very  first  member,  P, 
of  the  series  of  sensations  of  positions  reproduces  the 
whole  aissociated  series  P  E,  and  this  series  of  concepts 
is  independent  of  the  actual  rotation  through  the  arc 
PE. 

The  same  thing  would  take  place  in  another  point 
Q,  except  that  the  arc  Q  E,  the  series  of  sensations  of 
position  Q  E,  and  the  introductory  member  Q  would 
have  different  values. 

Finally,  if  it  should  happen  that  both  the.'points  P  and 
Q  were  irritated  to  the  same  degree,  and  the  arcs  P  and 
E  and  Q  E  were  similar,  but  opposed  to  each  other 
the  actual  rotation  P  E  and  Q  E  could  not  take  place, 
nevertheless,  the  irritation  of  the  points  P  and  Q  would 
not  be  inoperative.  Each  would  reproduce  the  series 
of  sensations  of  position  belonging  to  it,  P  E  or 
Q  E.  Therefore,  although  the  eye  does  not  move, 
the  excitement  of  the  points  P  and  Q  iissociates 
with  them  the  concepts  of  the  magnitude  and  peculiar- 
ities of  the  series  of  changes  which  would  be  experi- 
enced by  the  consciousness  in  the  act  of  transferring 
the  irritations  to  the  point  of  the  eye  where  they  would 
be  most  clearly  seen,  or,  in  ordinary  parlance,  in  the  act 
of  casting  a  glance.  We  now  may  state  that  in  the  act 
of  seeing  a  thing  to  the  right  or  left  of  a  given  line  of 
view  we  simply  become  conscious  of  the  amount  of 
effort  necessary  to  cause  them  to  coincide  with  that  line. 


44 


OUTMNKS   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


§9.  In  this  discussion  we  have  simply  explained  the 
relative  position  of  the  individual  colored  points  in  the 
field  of  view.  This  whole  inia«^e  would,  however,  have 
no  ])osition  in  any  <i:reater  space,  indeed,  no  concept  of 
such  space  would  l)e  ]>resent.  We  obtain  the  image  of  a 
l)hice  at  first  throu«^h  the  aj^ency  of  the  eye,  the  openin^:: 
and  closinji;  of  which  ( of  which  processes  we  are  otherwise 
conscious  )  determine  its  existence  and  non-existence. 

The  visible  world  is  before  the  eyes,  and  whatever  is 
behind  not  only  does  not  exist  for  us,  but  we  do  not  yet 
know  that  there  is  such  thin^^  as  ''  l)ehind  us."  Motions 
of  the  bodv  extend  our  knowledge.  If  the  field  view 
in  a  certain  position  contains  the  images  a,  b.  and  c, 
passing  fnmi  left  to  right,  and  we  then  revolve  upon 
the  axis  of  the  body  toward  the  right,  a  disai)])ears,  but 
on  the  right  d  is  added.     We  perceive  in  siiccession  the 

images  of  b  c  d,  c  d  e,  (1  e  f X  y  z,  y  z  a,  z  a  b,  a  b  c. 

As  a  result  of  a  recurrence  of  the  original  images 
we  have  two  thoughts:  first,  that  the  visilde  ol)jective 
world  is  in  the  form  of  a  continuous  extension  all  about 
ns.  and.  secondly,  that  the  alterations  in  our  condition, 
of  whirh  we  are  apprized  during  the  revolution  by  the 
varying  sensations  of  jjosition.  depend  upon  changes  in 
our  relations  to  this  tjuiescent  external  world,  /.  ^., 
upon  motion  on  our  part.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  out  of 
the  concept  of  a  continuous  horizon  the  concept  of 
spherical  extension  nniy  be  derived  by  various  revolu- 
tions in  other  directions. 


OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


45 


§10.  This  spherical  surface  would  possess  only  super- 
ficial extension,  and  no  hint  of  a  third  dimeiLsion  would 
be  given.  The  concept  that  such  a  thing  as  a  third 
dimension  of  space  exists  can  not  s])ring  uj)  s])ontane- 
ously,  but  must  be  derived  from  exi)erience.  which 
copies  of  passing  about  among  the  visible  objects. 

From  the  manifold  variations  in  the  various  images 
we  reach  the  impression,  in  a  way  tedious  to  descril^e, 
butejusy  to  imagine,  that  every  line  in  the  original  im- 
age is  the  beginning  of  new  surfaces,  which  do  not  coin- 
cide with  those  first  seen.  ])ut  lie  at  a  greater  or  less  dis- 
tance from  them  in  sj)ace  which  extends  in  all  directions. 

We  have  later  to  consider  the  question  how  we  esti- 
mate the  distances  in  this  third  dimension  of  space. 


§11.  The  crossing  of  the  rays  of  light  in  the  small 
opening  of  the  pui)il  causes  the  image  of  up])er  points 
in  an  object  to  lie  below,  and  those  of  lower  points 
a))ove.  upon  the  retina,  so  that  the  image,  as  a  whole,  is  re- 
versed. Hut  it  is  only  prejudice  which  nnikes  it  seem  en- 
igmatical that  we  do  not  see  tilings  upside  down  on  this 
account.  Like  every  geometrical  peculiarity  of  the  im- 
age this  relative  ))ositi()n  is  utterly  lost  in  the  trans- 
mission into  consciousness,  and  the  ])osition  in  which  a 
thing  is  seen  is  not  at  all  i)redicated  by  the  position  of 
the  innige. 

Hut  in  order  that  we  may  ascril>e  position  at  all   to 
objects— in  order,  in  other  words,  that  the  expressions 


46 


OrTLINRS   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


above,  below,  upright  and  inverted,  may  have  a  mean- 
ing, it  is  necessary  to  have  a  concept  of  space  which 
IS  entirely  independent  of  the  sensations  of  vision— a 
concept  of  space  in  which  the  entire  contents  of  the 
field  of  vision  may  be  arranged,  and  in  which,  above 
and  below  are  two  qualitatively  opposite,  and  conse- 
quently not  confusible  directions. 

The  muscular  sense  furnishes  such  a  concept.  Below 
is  the  point  towards  which  gravity  tends,  above  is  its 
opposite.  Both  these  directions  are  clearly  disting- 
uished bv  immediate  sensation,  so  that  we  are  never  de- 
ceived  as  to  the  position  of  our  body  in  the  dark. 

\Ve  call  objects  upright  when  the  lower  part  of  the 
object  is  seen  by  the  same  motion  of  the  eye  by  which 
we  see  parts  of  our  person  which  our  muscular  sense 
assures  us  are  below,  and  the  upper  parts  of  the  object 
in  like  manner  with  the  same  motions  which  bring  up- 
parts  of  the  body  into  view. 

This  agreement  is  brought  about  by  the  inverted  pos- 
ition of  the  image  on  the  retina.  In  an  eye  in  which 
the  sensitive  surfaces  were  in  front  of  the  axis  of  rota- 
tion, but  with  the  greatest  sensitiveness  in  the  centre 
of  the  retina,  the  same  result  would  require  the  image 
to  be  positive. 


§12.  It  is  not  possible  to  explain  satisfactorily  why 
we  see  singly,  although  having  two  eyes.  It  does  not 
indeed  always  happen,  but  two  impressions  must  fall 


i 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


exactly  upon  two  definite  points,  in  order  to  combine. 

Naturally,  we  might  explain  that  the  two  points 
which  correspond  must  produce  identical  local  indices 
which  can  not  be  distinguished,  but  we  can  not  demon- 
strate how  this  postulate  is  satisfied.  In  like  numner 
physiology  contents  itself  with  simple  names. 

Points  on  the  two  retinas  which  produce  simple  im- 
pressions are  called  identical  points,  and  those  which 
furnish  double  impressions  are  t-dWedi  )wn'i dent ical. 


§13.  We  naturally  refer  irritations  of  the  skin  at 
once  to  those  points  of  the  skin  where  we  see  them  op- 
erate, but  in  case  of  a  re[)etition  when  we  cannot  see 
them,  the  memory  does  not  assist  in  the  least,  for  most 
of  the  ordinary  irritants  have  affected  all  possible  parts 
of  the  skin,  and  might  l)e  referred  to  one  point  as  read- 
ily as  another. 

In  order  to  correctly  localize  them,  we  must  be  in- 
formed anew  at  each  moment  where  they  belong,  that 
is  to  say,  some  accessory  impression  must  be  associated 
with  each  primary  im])ression  (of  impact,  pressure, 
heat,  or  cold)  and  independent  of  it,  but  dependent  upon 
the  point  irritated. 

The  skin  is  able  to  give  rise  to  such  local  indices,  for, 
on  account  of  the  continuousness  of  the  skin,  no  single 
point  can  be  irritated  without  a  displacement,  tearing, 
stretching  or  vibration  of  the  adjacent  parts.  More- 
over as  the  skin  possesses,  at  different   points,  different 


48 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


49 


thickness,  Viirioiis  elasticity  or  moveableness— i)5issinj< 
now  over  firm  surfaces  of  bone,  now  over  the  fleshy 
muscles,  and  now  over  cavities — and,  as  these  rehitions 
vary  with  the  varying  positions  of  the  members,  it  fol- 
lows that  the  sum  of  the  accessory  influences  about  one 
irritated   point  would  be  different  from  those  t^rou^)ed 
about  another.     These  influences  when  received  by  the 
termini  of  the  nerves,  and  apprehended  by  conscious- 
ness, mav  cause  the  indescribable  sensation  by  means  of 
which  we  distinj<uish  a  touch  at  one  point  from  one  at 
another.     Ft  can  not  be  said,  however,  that  every  point 
of  the  skin  ha^  a  peculiar  local  index.    The  experiments 
of  E.  H.  Weber   show  that  on  the  mar^rins  of  the  lips, 
the  end  of  the  ton«rue.  and   the  ends  of  the  flutters,  two 
points  of  contart  (  with  dividers)  can   be  distin«^:uished 
when  only  one  half  a  line  apart,  while  there  are    ]daies 
<m  th«^  arm^,  le*rs.  aud  back  which  will    not  distinguish 
them  at  a  distame  less  than  twenty  lines.     This   is  ex- 
plained   as   follows:     Where  the  structure  of  the  skin 
varies  little  over    lar^e   areas,  the  local  indices  vary  but 
little  from  \Hnnt  to  point.      Where  both  irritants  oper- 
ate simultaneously,  the  accessory  effects  are  mutually 
obscured,  so  that  the  points  are  indistinguishable,  while 
the  same  irritations  produced  successively,  when    that 
obscuring  of  the  accessory  effects  is  not  ])roduced,  may 
be  still  (juite  distinguishable.     On  the  other  hand,    we 
do  not  know  how  to  explain  any  farther  the  extraordin- 
ary sensitiveness  of  the  lips,  for  exam]de. 


§14.  The  above  explanation  simply  shows  how  im- 
pressions upon  different  points  may  be  distinguished. 
It  remains  to  refer  each  impression  to  the  definite  point 
where  it  operates.  This  is  easy  for  those  who  see,  who 
already  have  a  perfect  image  of  the  surface  of  the  body, 
and  after  once  seeing  an  irritation  produced  at  any 
point  are  able  to  mentally  locate  the  sensation,  even  in 
the  darkness,  by  means  of  the  identity  of  the  local  in- 
dices. 

One  who  is  born  blind,  however,  must  construct  this 
image  by  means  of  the  sense  of  touch.     This,  of  course, 
is  accomplished  by  means  of  motions  of  the  tactile' 
members,  and  the  formation  of  an  estimate  of  the  dis- 
tance passed  through  in  connecting  one  point  with  an- 
other.    It  must  be  remembered  that  these  motions  are 
not  seen,   but  are   appreciated  only  by  the  sense  of 
muscular  exertion,  i.  e.,  by  means  of  sensations,  which, 
as  it  seems  to  us,  are  simple  qualitatively  diverse,  and 
and  do  not  in  the  least  indicate  the  motions  which  are 
their  real  causes.     How  this  muscular  sense  of  the  blind 
acts  as  an  index  of  position  we  cannot  say,  but,  in  all 
probability,  the  reason  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  sense  of 
touch,  like  the  organ  of  vision,  may  receive  several  im- 
pressions at  once,  and  that  during  a  motion  all  previous 
impressions  do  not  disappear  at  once,  leaving  no  trace, 
but  each  adjacent  set  of  impressions  have  a  common 
factor,  as  represented  above  by  the  combinations  a,  b,  C; 
b,  C,  d,  etc.     In  this  way   it  appears  that  the  idea  is 


i: 


50 


OUTLIKES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


reached  that  the  circumstance  which  produces  for  us 
the  alteration  in  muscuhir  sense  consists  in  a  change  in 
our  relation  to  a  series  of  objects  which  occur  in  a 
definite  order,  that  is  in  a  motion. 

§15.  It  may  be  doubted  whether  the  concept  of  space 
which  the  sense  of  touch  affords  a  person  born  blind,  is 
at  all  similar  to  that  of  one  who  sees.     It  would,  the 
rather,  be  assumed  that  there  would  be  far  less  distnict 
concepts  of  the  time,  degree  and  effort  in  motions  used 
in   connecting  various  points  as  compared    with    the 
clear,  easy  and  comprehensive  apprehension  of  those 
who  see.     (Compare  upon  this  point  the  evidence  of 
blind  persons  who  have  sustained  operations -.-Chesel- 
den  in  Philos.  Transact.,  1728,  vol.  35;  Helmholtz.  Phy- 
siologische  Optik.) 


CHAPTER  FIFTH. 

SENSUOUS  PERCEPTIOX  A^'D  ILLUSIONS. 

§1.  A  simple  sense-impression   represents  only  the 
impression  and  does  not  reveal  the  tluHf/  to  which  it  be- 
longs as  its  peculiarity,  condition  or  effect.     This  fur- 
ther interpretation   is  the  province  of  the  understand. 
ing.     It  is  the  understanding  that  is  at  fault  if,  after 
having  once    found  the  concept  a  connected  by   the 
incompletely  apprehended  accessory  conditions  c,  with 
the  second  concept  b,   we  are  led  to  conceive  that  a, 
when  repeated  under  other  conditions,  d,  must  be  con- 
nected with  the  same  concept  b. 

But  the  senses  themselves  are  not  always  so  innocent 
as  in  this  case. 

The  eye,  for  example,  as  it  represents  the  outer 
world  with  its  three  dimensions  upon  a  plane,  gives 
false  relations  between  the  images  of  individual  objects. 
Here,  therefore,  where  the  sense  falsities  and  the  under- 
standing must  rectify,  we  may  correctly  speak  of  illu- 
sions of  sense. 

Here  may  be  classed  the  diuiinution  in  the  size  of 
distant  objects;  the  convergence  of  parallels  in  the  dis- 
tance; the  elevation  of  the  surface  of  the  sea  above  its 
shore— siuiply   appearances  which  persist  as  sensuous 


in 
ffl 


52 


OUTLINES  OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


% 


apprehensions  even  after  the  understanding  is  convinced 
of  the  real  relations. 

§2.  We  estimate  the  same  portion  of  space  larger 
if  it  be  bright  colored,  but  smaller  if  dark;  the  filled 
bottle  appears  to  the  eye  larger  than  when  empty;  a 
rough  object  seems  larger  than  a  smooth  one  to  the 
sen^e  of  touch.     .\n  object  appears  longer  in  the  direc- 
tion indicated  by  the  course  of  numerous  lines  upon  it 
than  it  really  is.     All  these  effects  are  utilized  in  the 
decorative  arts.    We  estimate  distance  very  indefinitely, 
that  of  a  bright  object  less,  of  a  dark  one  more;  that  of 
an  object,  the  markings  of  which  remain  clear,  much 
less  than  when  causing  a  confused  impression.     Gener- 
ally, we  use  three  elements,  the  real  size,  the  apparent 
.size'and  the  distance  to  find  one  by  means  of  the  other 
two     If  the  real  size  is  given  (for  example,  because  we 
know  the  object  to  l>e  a  man  or  child),  and  at  the  same 
time  the  apparent  size,  then  we  estimate  the  distance 
■  as  so  much  the  greater  the  smaller  the  second  is  ,us 
compared  with  the  first.     If  we  know  the   apparent 
size  and  the  distance,  we  may  estimate  the  real  size  m 
the  same  wav.     If.  finally,  we  know  the  real  si/.e  a.i.l 
the  distance,  we  can  find  the  apparent  size  in  which,  for 
example,  the  object  must  lie  drawn  in  order  to  appear 

at  the  given  distance. 

If.  however,  the  objects,  for  example  mountains  and 
water  surfaces,  leave  no  natural  scale,  so  that  only   the 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


53 


apparent  size  is  given,  we  can  only  arrive  at  the  real  size 
and  distance  by  dividing  it  into  parts  which  we  esti- 
mate according  to  their  relations  to  the  apparent  size  of 
a  known  object  contained  in  them.     A  very  important 
means,   finally,   is   furnished    by    parallax,   i.   e.,    the 
amount  of  displacement  of  the  image  of  the  object  C, 
uiion  a  fixed  background,  P,  Q,  R,  if  viewed  from  both 
en.ls,  A  and  |{  of  a  line,  A  B.     This  is  greater  for  a 
nearer  and  less  for  a  more  distant  object.     We  use  this 
method  daily  by  fixing  an  object  in  one  eye  and  then 
the  other,  or  moving  the  head  from  left  to  right,  or 
walking  intentionally  to  and  fro. 

Science  hius  made  great  use  of  this  by  carefully  per- 
forming the  same  experiment  witli  the  assistance  of 
fine  iustrumeiits  for  measurement. 


§8.  The   compHrison   of  sensuous   qualities   (colors, 
sounds,  tastes,  dec^rees  of  warmth)  affords   a   certain 
quantitative  measure  of  the  impression,  l^e  it  intensity 
or  extension  in  space  or  duration  of  time.     It  demands, 
moreover,  that  the  testing  organ  be  exactly  the  same  in 
order  that  the  various  local  indices  shall  not  modify  the 
impressions  of  different  organs.     A  person  does  not  test 
the  warmth  of  two  vessels  of  water  simultaneously  with 
two  fingers,  but  successively  with  the  same,  etc.     At 
the  same  time  the  other  breakers  must  be  avoided -that 
of  allowing  too  great  a  time  to  intervene  to  leave  both 
impressions  vivid  in  consciousness,  or  too  short  a  time, 


54 


OUTl-INES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


t- 


so  that  the  secondary  effects  of  the  first  interfere  with 
the  second  impression.     These  secon.larv  effects  are  of 
two  sorts.     If  they  are  strong  and  fresh,  they  obscure 
the  second  impression,  but  very  often,  and  in  the  ca.ses 
of  different  senses,  it  happens  that  the  nerve  which  has 
been  for  a  long  time  subject  to  the  same  excitement,  after    . 
this  has  ceased,  spontaneously  assumes  another  sort  of 
excitement,  throufjh  wliich  it  pa^^ses  ajjnin  t..  its  state  of 
equilibrium.     .\nd   this   counter   excitement   produces 
sensations,  as,  for  example,   an  eye   Ion-   effected   by 
.rreen,  red.  or  ve'.U.w  sees  afterwards  the  .-omplnnent- 
ary  colors-red.  -reen.  and  vi-det.  These  contrasting  sen- 
sations appear  in  the   ease  of  onlinary  and   muscular 
sensation  as  well. 

^l.  We  consider  a  body  tok-  in  motion  if  its  image 
moves  over  the  retina,  and  this  appearance  not  only 
takes  place  if  we  experience  a  passive  motion  (as  in 
riding  on  shipboard  )  but,  also,  when  we  are  conscious 
of  on"-  motion  and  convinced  that  the  objects  which  we 
are  passing  are  stationary.  Naturally,  the  apparent 
motion  of  objects  is  the  opposite  of  our  own  motion. 

The  well-known  revolving  motion  which  occurs  after 
spinning  al>out  for  some  time  and  su.ldenly  l)ec.nning 
stationarv  appears  to  Ik"  caused  by  an  unconscious  move- 
ment of  the  eyes  in  the  direction  previ..usly  pursued  by 
the  body.  This  motion,  when  it  reaches  the  corner  of 
the  eyes,  is  instantly  reversed  but  to  Wgin  over  again, 


0PTLINE6   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


00 


thus  the  same  objects  pass  by  continually  without  in- 
termission. 


§5.  If  any  object,  as,  for  example,  a  staff,  is  brought 
into  loose  contact  with  the  body,  say  the  hand,  in  such 
a  way  that  change  of  position  is  possible,  a  new  and 
peculiar  combination  of  sensations  of  pressure  on 
the  different  hngers,  for  example,  is  produced.  Out 
of  each  combination  we  form,  from  earlier  experi- 
ence, a  concept  of  the  position  which  the  object  (as 
the  staff)  then  occupies. 

If  now  the  staff  be  brought  in  contact  with  an  exter- 
nal object,  and  if  it  meets  the  same  resistfince  in  all  its 
positions  and  this  pressure  acts  through  the  staff  upon 
the  hand,  we  not  only  transfer  the  position  of  this 
resistance  to  the  common  intersecting  point  of  all  these 
positions,  but  we  think"  we  feel  it  immediately  and 
clearly  at  the  place  where  it  is  offered,  just  as  if  the 
staff  were  endowed  with  sensation  as  much  as  the  sur- 
face of  the  hand  on  which  its  other  end  rests. 

This  feeling  of  (huble  contact,  which  has  innumer- 
able examples,  produces  a  peculiar  vividness  in  our  con- 
ceptions of  external  objects.  It  serves,  first  of  all,  to 
make  possible  the  profitable  use  of  many  tools,  as,  for 
example,  the  probe,  knife,  fork,  pen,  etc.  By  means  of 
it  we  seem  to  perceive  the  resistences  or  obstacles  to 
these  instruments  in  loco,  and  are  able  to  apply  the 
proper  corrective  instantaneously. 


f 


54 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY 


iiii' 


30  that  the  secondary  effects  of  the  first  interfere  witli 
the  second  impression.     These  secondary  etTects  are  of 
two  sorts.     If  they  are  strong?  and  fresh,  they  obscnre 
the  second  impression,  bnt  very  often,  and  in  the  cases 
of  different  senses,  it  happens  tliat  the  nerve  which  has 
been  for  along  time  snbject  to  the  same  excitement,  after    . 
this  has  ceased,  spontaneonsly  assnmes  another  sort  of 
excitement,  throu^^^h  wliich  it  pjisses  a^^ain  to  its  state  of 
equilibrium.     And   this   counter   excitement    i)r()(hices 
sensations,  as,  for  exanqde,   an  eye   h)ng   effected   ]>y 
green,  red,  or  yeUow  sees  afterwards  the  compliment- 
ary colors— red,  green,  and  violet.  These  contrasting  sen- 
sations appear  hi  the   case  of  ordinary  and   muscular 
sensation  as  well. 

^t.  We  consider  a  body  to  be  in  motion  if  its  image 
moves  over  the  retina,  and  this  appearance  not  only 
takes  place  if  we  experience  a  passive  motion  (as  in 
riding  on  shipboard )  but,  also,  when  we  are  conscious 
of  ou"  motion  and  convinced  that  the  objects  which  we 
are  passing  are  stationary.  Naturally,  the  apparent 
motion  of  objects  is  the  opposite  of  our  own  motion. 

The  well-known  revolving  motion  which  occurs  after 
spinning  al)out  for  some  time  and  suddenly  becoming 
stationary  appears  to  be  caused  by  an  unconscious  move- 
ment of  the  eyes  in  the  direction  previously  ])ursued  by 
the  bcHly.  Ttiis  motion,  when  it  reaches  the  corner  of 
the  eyes,  is  instantly  reversed  but  to  begin  over  again, 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


55 


thus  the  same  o])jects  pass  by  continually  without  in- 
termission. 


§5.  If  any  object,  as,  for  example,  a  staff,  is  brought 
into  loose  contact  with  the  body,  say  the  hand,  in  such 
a  way  that  change  of  position  is  possible,  a  new  and 
peculiar  combination  of  sensations  of  pressure  on 
the  different  fingers,  for  example,  is  produced.  Out 
of  each  combination  we  form,  from  earlier  experi- 
ence, a  concept  of  the  position  which  the  object  (as 
the  staff)  then  occupies. 

If  now  the  staff  be  brought  in  contact  with  an  exter- 
nal object,  and  if  it  meets  the  same  resistance  in  all  its 
positions  and  this  pressure  a^ts  through  the  staff  upon 
the  hand,  we  not  only  transfer  the  position  of  this 
resistance  to  the  common  intersecting  point  of  all  these 
positions,  but  we  think  we  feel  it  immediately  and 
clearly  at  the  place  where  it  is  offered,  just  as  if  the 
staff  were  endowed  with  sensation  as  much  as  the  sur- 
face of  the  hand  on  which  its  other  end  rests. 

This  feeling  of  douhle  contact,  which  has  innumer- 
able examples,  produces  a  peculiar  vividness  in  our  con- 
ceptions of  external  objects.  It  serves,  first  of  all,  to 
make  possible  the  profitable  use  of  many  tools,  as,  for 
example,  the  probe,  knife,  fork,  pen,  etc.  By  means  of 
it  we  seem  to  perceive  the  resistences  or  obstacles  to 
these  instruments  in  loco,  and  are  able  to  apply  the 
proper  corrective  instantaneously. 


tf 


56 


OUTLINF.S   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


It  teaxihes  us,  furthermore,  of  many  of  the  peculiar- 
ities of  things,  for  example,  of  the  length  of  a  balanced 
stick,  or  the  breadth  of  a  ladder  rung,  or  the  length  of 
a  thread  attached  to  which  a  ball  revolves  abou^  the 

hand. 

Finally,  it  gives  us  the  pleasant  feeling  of  an  exist- 
ence in  spirit  beyond  the  limits  of  our  bodies,  and  this 
is  the  reason  for  the  numerous  delicate  and  peculiar 
prolongations  or  appendages  of  our  body  which  usually 
serve  as  ornaments. 


ri^o/« -The  further  elaboration  of  this  thought  belongs,  to  Physiology,  \iMt 
the  force  of  the  remark  would  be  lost  if  considered  lo  apply  simply  to 
the  hair  and  nails,  upon  which  we  are  much  more  dependent  forour  sen- 
sations of  the  o.ter  world  than  we  at  first  realize.  The  minute  ridges 
and  points  found  upon  the  skin  of  the  hands  seive  in  the  same  way  that 
a  probe  does  to  acquaint  us  with  the  position  of  an  object,  for  example, 
a  needle,  which  otherwise  we  could  only  use  as  roughly  ap  we  now  do 
when  the  fingers  are  gloved.— C.  L.  H.] 


CHAPTER  SIXTH. 

r 

THE  FEELINGS.    [SUSCEPTIBILITIES.] 

§1.  We  apply  the  term  feelings  exclusively  to  con- 
ditions of  pleasure  or  displeasure  as  contradistijiguished 
from  senv^ations,  these  being  but  indifferent  perceptions 
of  a  content. 

We  do  not  thereby  assert  that  these  two  spiritual  ac- 
tivities appear  separately,  it  being  more  probable  that 
primarily  no  concept  is  entirely  indifferent,  but,  rather 
that  the  feelings  of  pleasure  or  displeasure  inhering  in 
them  only  escape  our  attention  because,  in  adult  life, 
the  sense  and  significance  which  the  impressions  have 
for  our  sphere  of  existence  have  become  more  import- 
ant to  us  than  the  consideration  of  the  impression  itself. 

We  conclude,  therefore,  that,  as  notions,  sensation 
and  feeling,  although  always  connected,  are  quite  dis- 
ti)ict  efforts,  and  not  derivable  the  one  from  the  other. 

Not  any  sort  of  a  relation  between  various  simultan- 
eous sensations  or  conditions  produces  of  itself,  an  effect 
upon  the  sensibilities,  but  it  is  necessary,  in  order  to 
produce  a  feeling  that  this  relation  should  be  brought  to 
bear  upon  the  soul,  producing  a  reactionary  activity  of 
a  faculty  not  previously  included,  \.  e.,  a  feeling. 


58 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


§2.  A  natural  though  undemonstrable  inference,  and 
a  reasonal)le  hypothesis  is  that  feelings  result  from,  and, 
at  the  same  time,  indicate  the  agreement  or  disagree- 
ment between  the  excitements  produced  within  us  and 
the  conditions  of  the  continuance  of  our  well-being. 
Pleasure  would  then  he  the  result  of  the  stimulation  of 
our  natural  faculties  within  the  limits  of  these  condi- 
tions, and  would  increase  with  the  intensity  of  the  ex- 
citement; pain,  on  the  other  hand,  would  be  induced  by 
the  fact  that  the  excitement  produced,  partly  on  account 
of    its  intensity,  and  partly  on  account  of  its   form 
(which  is  generally  overlooked),  disagrees  with  these 
conditions.     This  does  not  imply  that  the  soul  first  ob- 
serves the  excitement,  then  its  relation  to  these  condi- 
tions,  and,  finally,  decides,  according   to  the  opinion 
produced  by  these  acts,  to  feel  pleasure  or  pain,  but,  it 
is  like  sensation,  say  of  a  red  color,  simply  the  result  of 
a  series  of  processes  in  the  nerves  (although  it  does  not 
enumerate  them).     In  like  manner,  the  feeling  is  only 
the  last  result  of  that  strife  or  disagreement  and  only 
enters  consciousness  at  the  close  of  this   unperceived 
process. 


§3.  Pleasure  and  displeasure  are  general  terms, 
which,  thus  comprehensively  taken,  do  not  designate  a 
concrete  thing,  but  every  real  pleasure  or  displeasure 
has  its  own  specific  character,  and  these  cannot  be 
formed  out  of  various  portions  of  a  general  pleasure  or 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


59 


pain  any  more  than  the  various  colors  are  produced  by 
different  combinations  of  light  and  shade.  Of  the  con- 
ditions under  which  the  feelings  in  general,  or  definite 
forms  of  feelings  arise,  we  know  jilinost  nothing. 

The  first  group  which  we  can  distinguish,  the  sen- 
snoH.s  feelhuf.^,  i.  e.,  those  which  depend  directly  on 
sense  irritations,  are  the  more  intense  in  the  various 
senses  the  less  these  senses  are  adapted  to  discern  them 
objectively. 

Colors  and  their  contrasts  produce  sin^ily  satisfaction 
or  dissatisfaction;  dissonances  of  sounds  disturb  the 
hearer,  personally;  pleasure  and  displeasure  of  taste  and 
smell  are  much  more  intense;  but  onlv  in  the  skin,  which 
itself  furnishes  but  little  information,  and  in  the  inner 
portions,  which  do  not  contribute  at  all  to  our  know- 
ledge does  this  displeasure  assume  the  character  of  actual 
pain.  The  advantage  of  this  arrangement  is  evident,  but 
the  mechanical  cause  is  unknown. 


§4,  These  less  intense  feelings  of  the  higher  senses 
lead  to  a  second  chiss,  the  (vsthetic  feelings,  which  are 
connected  chiefly,  but  not  exclusively,  with  the  simultan- 
eous occurreiice  of  numerous  impressions  and,  in  the 
sim])lest  cases,  are  actually  dependent  upon  the  simplic- 
ity or  complexity  in  the  relations  which  subsist  between 
them. 

The  real  reason  why  this  simplicity,  for  example,  in 
concordant  sounds,  acts  favorably  upon  us  is  unknown, 


60 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


for  these  relations,  as  such,  are  not,  as  a  rule,  perceived. 
The  character  of  this  aesthetic  feeling  of  satisfaction 
or  dissatisfaction  can  l)e  distinguisheil  from  simple  sen- 
suous comfort  and  discomfort  in  that  the  universal 
spirit  within  us  and  not  our  personal  well-being  is 
augmented  or  disturl)ed  bv  these  impressions.  To 
these  are  added  the  ethical  feelings^  of  which  we  must 
speak  because  approbation  or  disapprobation  is  simply 
the  expression  of  an  importance  or  lack  of  it  which  we 
perceive  only  in  our  feelings,  and  on  this  account  is 
quite  distinct  from  a  merely  theoretical  judguient  con- 
cerning the  truth  or  falsity  of  a  postulate. 

§5.  Further  description  of  the  susceptibilities  is  un- 
necessary, but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  useful  to  dis- 
tinguish two  conditions. 

That  is  frequently  called  feeling  which  should  really 
he  called  ajf'ertion,  consisting,  not  in  a  quiet  condition 
or  mood  of  the  soul,  but  in  a  motion  which — as  in  anger 
or  fear — produces  disturbances  in  the  process  of  concep- 
tion, and  also  generally  includes  involuntary  motions, 
partly  simply  gestures,  and  partly  the  beginning  of  ac- 
tions which  arise  from  the  given  inducing  cause  if  not 
controlled. 

In  like  manner  we  must  distinguish  sentiments^  i.  f ., 
those  apprehensions  by  the  soul  that  certain  contents  of 
conception  have  always  a  definite  value.  Bravery  or 
patriotism  are  not  themselves  simple  feelings  but  causes 


ij 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


61 


out  of  which,  according  to  the  nature  of  circumstances, 
varying  sorts  of  feelings  may  spring. 


§6.  The  notion  "I"  is  usually  defined  as  that  of  the 
simultaneous  subject  and  object  of  consciousness.  This 
definition,  right  as  it  is  in  itself,  applies,  nevertheless,  to 
every  being  which  participates  in  this  general  character 
of  identity.  When  we  speak  of  self-eonsriousness  we  do 
not  mean  the  general  form  of  activity  which  ''thou" 
and  ''  he  "  possess  equally  with  ''  I,"  but  we  mean  that 
knowledge  by  which  we  distinguish  ''  1 "  from  ''  thou  " 
and  "  he."  It  would  be  useless  to  affirm  that  ''  I  "  is 
the  subject  and  object  of  niij  knowledge,  ])ut  *'  he  "  sub- 
ject and  object  of  lu'b,  as  long  as  we  are  not  fully  clear 
as  to  the  distinction  between  that  which  is  mine  and 
and  that  which  is  not  mine,  or  his. 

This  distinction  cannot  be  taught  by  any  simply  theo- 
retical consideration  in  which  ''  I "  and  ''  thou  "  would 
be  simply  indifferent  examples  of  such  a  subject-object. 

The  reason  that  we  are  able  to  call  one  of  them  "  I " 
and  contrast  it  with  the  whole  of  the  remainder  of  the 
world  by  distinctions  of  an  entirely  different  sort  and 
value  from  those  between  a  second  and  third  thinff  is 
that  our  own  conditions  are  not  simply  objects  of  con- 
ception, but  at  the  same  time  awaken  an  immediate  in- 
terest, pleasure  or  displeasure,  which  the  same  condi- 
tions pertaining  to  any  subject  in  general,  but  not 
suffered  by  us,  would  by  no  means  j)roduce. 


I" 
I 


I 


fi2 


OUTLINES   OF    PSY(  TIOLOOY. 


In  this  imnuMliate  way  we  lejirn  at  first  to  distinguish 
])etween  what  is  utitie  and  not  m'nw.  Tlie  concept  of 
''  I "  is  hiter,  and  si«<nities  that  snhjcct-ohject  which  is 
the  central  point  in  the  ''  mine''  tluis  discovered. 

Two  elements  are  to  be  distint^uished.  The  inia^ije 
which  we  form  of  onr  own  existence  may  l>c  more  or 
less  faulty  or  erroneous,  that  de}>endinij;u|Hm  the  amount 
of  that  power  of  rt^Hection  by  means  of  which  everyone 
strives  to  explain,  theoretically,  his  ]>osition  with  rela- 
tion to  this  central  point.  The  evidentness  and  vivid- 
ness with  which  every  susceptible  beinji:  distinguishes 
itself  from  the  whole  world  does  not  at  all  depend  ujion 
the  perfection  of  this  Hue  insight  into  its  own  existence, 
but  expresses  itself  in  the  lowest  animal,  in  so  far  as  it 
recognizes  its  own  condition  by  ]>leasure  or  pain  as  its 
own,  quite  as  vividly  as  the  most  intelligent  spirit. 

A  sj>irit,  however,  which  viewed  everything  without 
l)articipating,  by  jdeasure  or  pain,  would  neither  be 
capable  nor,  if  capable,  would  it  be  influenced  to  set 
itself  nj)  as  *' I  "  against  the  renuiinder  of  the  world; 
he  would  himself  \w  one  of,  but  not  at  all  taking  pre- 
ee<ience  of,  the  many  examples  of  a  l)eing  at  once 
subject  and  object  of  thought. 


CHAPTER  SEVENTH. 


MOTION. 


§1.  Our  motions  take  place  independently  of  a  know- 
ledge of  the  means — muscles  and  their  contractility — 
and  certainly  without  our  knowing  how  to  proceed  to 
cause  the  })roper  excitement  in  a  given  motor  nerve  to 
produce  a  definite  motion  in  the  necessary  muscles.  It 
follows  that  in  no  case  does  the  soul  produce  the  motion 
by  its  own  direct  action,  and  by  going  itself  into  the 
details,  it  always  produces,  however,  a  certain  inner 
condition  in  itself  (of  wish,  will  or  desire).  This  con- 
dition is  connected,  by  a  natural  law  quite  una[)proach- 
able  by  consciousness  and  independent  of  the  will,  with 
the  production  of  a  motion  as  its  result. 

It  is,  therefore,  only  necessary  to  learn  the  various 
conditions  of  the  soul  which  in  this  way  become  the 
occasion  of  bodily  movements. 

§2.  In  the  living  body  ceaseless  changes  are  going  on 
which  affect  the  motor  nerves  and  produce  motions,  in 
the  production  of  which  the  soul  does  not  participate. 
They  are,  nevertheless,  important,  for  it  is  only  by 
seeing  that  motions  occur  spontaneously  that  the  soul 
of  an  animal  can   reach  the  thought  that  its  body  is 


4 


«4 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


65 


movable,  and  that  its  motions  are  connected  with  its 
own  inner  conditions — an  idea  it  could  never  attain  if 
it  lived  in  a  body  never  set  in  motion  either  by  itself  or 
some  external  cause. 

§3.  The  reflex  motions  may  be  distinguished  as  a 
special  class.  Such  motions  take  place  when  an  excite- 
ment of  a  sensitive  nerve  produced  by  an  external  or 
internal  irritation  is  so  transferred  without  the  aid  of 
the  mind  in  the  central  organ,  to  motory  nerves  that,  at 
a  stroke,  the  group  of  muscles  necessary  to  the  appro- 
priate motion  is  excited  to  motion.  A  conscious  sensa- 
tion may  accompany  this  act,  or  the  excitement  may 
produce  the  motion  and  avoid  appearing  in  conscious- 
ness. 

Many  of  these  motions,  such  as  coughing  and  sneez- 
ing, the  movements  of  the  pupil  of  the  eye  when 
affected  by  light,  are  reactions  arranged  for  by  nature  in 
the  structure  of  the  body  as  protection  against  injury. 
That  they  are  certainly  mechanical  resultsof  the  excite- 
ments is  proven  by  the  fact  that  they  take  place 
involuntarily,  neither  can  they  be  prevented  by  the  will 
but  only  by  artificial  hindrances. 

§4.  In  the  mimic  and  physiognomic  motions- 
laughing,  crying,  sobbing  and  the  like— the  point  of 
departure  is,  in  the  first  instance,  a  psychical  condition, 
namely,  of  the  feelings,  and  they  are  all  very  difficult  to 


artificially  imitate,  and  then  only  when  one  purposely 
projects  himself  by  fancy  into  the  same  state  of  the 
feelings  which  is  their  real  cause. 

All  these  motions,  however,  take  place  without  know- 
ledge either  of  their  origin  or  use,  for  one  can  not 
explain  why  he  must  laugh  in  joy  and  cry  in  pain, 
rather  than  the  reverse. 

They  are,  therefore,  motions  which  are  connected  by 
a  natural  law,  which  is  neither  invented  nor  well 
understood  by  us,  with  states  of  our  feelings,  as  l)eing 
their  actual  results. 

§5.  A  fourth  class  is  formed  by  the  imitative  motions, 
as,  for  example,  those  made  when  the  observer  uncon- 
sciously imitates  the  blows  of  the  boxers  or  of  those 
playing  at  ten  pins,  and  when  the  uneducated  narrator 
imitates  the  motions  described.  In  this  case  it  is  the 
conception  and  that  of  a  definite  motion— which, 
without  further  knowledge  or  volition,  is  translated 
spontaneously  into  the  motion.  To  this  class  belong 
most  of  our  daily  motions  which  we  often  even  call  acts. 
As  soon  as.  at  the  conclusion  of  a  train  of  thought,  the 
conce])tion  of  a  motion  founded  upon  it  springs  up  and  no 
resistance  is  offered  it  in  any  quarter,  this  concept  passes 
over  spoutaiieously  into  a  motion  without  a  distinct 
impulse  of  the  will  needing  to  be  exerted  or  perceived. 

This  apj^lies  j)articularly  to  acquired  accomplishments, 
Jis  of  writing  or  piano-playing,  where  the  simple  con- 


I 


66 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


Hi 


ception  of  the  production  of  Ji  sound  produces  the  nec- 
essary movements  without  any  distinct  conception  of 
these  motions  being  developed  in  consciousness. 

§(J.  These  considerations  ai)pear  to  constitute  a  dis- 
tinction l)etween  rohtnUfn/  and  involHtttarij  actions.  In 
fact,  they  do  not.  Let  our  convictions  of  the  nature  of 
the  will,  to  be  developed  later,  be  what  it  may,  nothing 
can  he  ascribed  to  it  but  hIIIuu/.  !t  can  only  produce  a 
result  when  a  given  change  in  the  ccmdition  of  a  motor 
nerve  is  combined  with  a  given  decision  of  the  will  as 
the  spiritual  conditioning  agent,  by  a  natural  law  inde- 
pendent of  it.  When  this  is  not  the  case  the  will 
remains  a  useless  wish  without  result. 

An  act  is  voluntary  if  the  internal  initiatory   condi- 
tions  from  which  an  act  springs  are  approved,  adopted,  or 
controlled  by  the  will  when  they  have  taken  i>lace.  Invol- 
untary is  every  one  which,  although  it,  mechanically  con- 
sidered, springs  from  the  same  initiatory  point  and  pro- 
ceeds in  the  same  way,  does  not  experience  such  a]>proval. 
The  control  of  the  will  nmy  be  likened  to  our  use  of 
the  Alphabet.      We  can  not  devise  new  souiuls  or  let- 
ters l)ut  are  limited  to  those  which  the  organs  of  speech 
uiakes  i>ossible.  but  we  can  combine  these  in  endless 
varietv.    In  like  manner,  the  soul,  in  that  it  combines  the 
initiatory  ccuiditions  as  it  ]deases,  may  unite  these  ele- 
ments  of   corporeal    origin     motions— into    the    most 
varied  processes  and  thus  affect  the  expression  of  its  will. 


■I 

w 


PART  SECOND. 


THE    SOUL. 


(THEORETICAL   PSYCHOLOGY.) 


CHAiTKK    FIRST. 

ON  THE  EXISTENCE  OF  THE  SOIL. 

SL  After  this  eiiumeration  of  the  individual  elements 
of  the  inner  life  we  inquire  concernin<i:  the  nature  of 
the  suhjeet  in  whieli  they  inliere  or  are  made  possible. 

Our  tinal  conclusion  will  he  most  sim])ly  developed  by 
using  those  |)rovisional  views  which  we  are  accustomed 
to  at  first  emplov.  and  then  graduallv  transforminir 
them  in  order  to  adapt  them  to  encounter  difficulties 
with  which,  in  their  earlier  form,  they  could  not  cope. 
It  must  )>e  rememl>ered  that  everything  can  not  be  said 
at  once,  and  that  only  the  final  form  which  our  view 
iussumes  is  our  ultimate  conviction. 


^2.  The  permanent  union  of  the  spiritual  life  with 
the  lM)dily,  in  which  alone  it  l)econies  the  object  of 
observation,  nuikes  the  attempt  natural  to  regard  it  as 
.simply  a  |)roduct  of  bodily  functicnis. 

However,  it  is  an  old  discovery,  recently  newly  made, 
and  by  no  means  wanting  in  truth,  that  out  of  all 
combinations  of  material  conditions  the  origin  of  a 
spiritual  condition  of  the  soul  never  becomes  analytic- 
ally conceivable:  or.  more  simply  expressed,  if  Ave 
think  of  imiterial  elements  in  such  a  way  as  to  predic- 


72 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY 


ate  of  them  nothin^r  which  does  not  beh)iij^  to  tlie  notion 
of  matter,  if  we  simply  conceive  of  them  as  entities  in 
space  which  are  moveahle  and  may  call  each  other  into 
motion  hy  their  ]>ower;  if  we,  finally,  ima^jine  these 
motions  of  one  or  many  elements  as  varied  or  comhined 
as  we  please,  there  never  comes  a  time  when  it  is  self- 
evident  that  the  motions  hust  produced  may  not  longer 
remain  motions  but  must  be  transformed  ^into  sensa- 
tions. A  materialism,  therefore,  which  iissumed  that  a 
spiritual  life  could  spring  out  of  simply  physical  condi- 
tions or  motions  of  bodily  atoms  would  l>e  an  empty 
assumption,  and,  in  this  form,  has  hardly  ever  been 
advocated  in  earnest. 

The  materialistic  views  which  have  really  luul  adher- 
ents have  proceeded  from  the  premise  that  what  we  call 
matter  is  really  better  than  it  externally  appears. 
It  contains  in  itself  the  fundamental  peculiarity  out  of 
which  the  spiritual  conditions  may  develope  just  iis  well 
as  physical  predicates— extension,  impenetrability,  etc. 
—are  developed  out  of  another  fundamental  ])eculiarity. 
From  this  results  the  new  attempt,  out  of  the  recip- 
rocal operations  of  these  psychical  elementary  forces  to 
elucidate  all  the  elements  of  the  spiritual  life  just  as  its 
bodily  life  is  derived  from  the  reciprocation  of  the 
physical  elementary  forces  of  its  constituents. 

§3.  This  view,  though  not,  on  its  face,  improbable,  in 
wrecked  upon  the  fact  that  it  is  impossible  to  explain 


OFTLINKS    OK    PSYCHOLOGY. 


73 


by  it  th*'  origin  (»f  that  unity  in  consciousness  which  is 
a  fact  of  experience,  and  which  we  are  not  justified  in 
ignoring,  simply  because  it  is  enigmatical,  in  order  to 
explain  more  easily  the  bahince  of  experience. 

If  it  l)e  said  that,  just  as  fnun  two  different  motions 
a  pimple  resultant  is  prcnlnced  so  that  the  plurality  of 
the  causes  jucMhicingit  is  no  more  seen,  so,  from  a  unifi- 
cation »)f  the  ]»lurality  of  psychical  motions  a  complete 
unity  of  ctmsciousness  is  formed,  this  would  be  an  inac- 
curate exj)ression  of  the  analogy  drawn  from  mechanics. 

It  is.  indeed,  true  that  if  two  motions  aet  upon  one 
and  the  same  indivisible  })oint  or  physical  element, 
they  [>roduce  a  simple  resultant.  This  resultant  does  not 
hang  in  the  air,  however,  but  exists  only  as  a  condition 
of  the  sim]>le  element  up<m  which  the  components  oper- 
ated. Thus  completed,  this  analogy  does  not  lead  to  the 
result  expected,  but  back  to  the  ordinary  view,  namely, 
that  these  numerous  elements,  even  if  they  possessed 
psychical  capacities,  could  only  produce  the  unity  of 
consciousness  if  there  existed  a  single  indivisible  ele- 
ment upon  which  all  their  activities  operate,  and  which 
must  l)e  so  constituted  as  to  concentrate  all  these 
impressions  in  its  consciousness. 


5Hr.  If  we  denote  by  a,  b, z  the  single  bodily  ele- 
ments which  are  assumed  tol)e  both  physical  and  psych- 
ical, the  question  arises,  what  result  would  be  produced  in 
a  given  time  by  the  reciprocal  action  of  one  upon  an- 


OUTLINES    OF    PvSYCHOLOOY. 


OUTLINKH    OF    PSYCHOLOOY. 


75 


other?  If  they  were  ;ill  similar  and  under  like  conditions 
it  would  hardly  fail  to  ha])|»en  that  at  the  end  of  the  time 
all  would  be  in  a  similar  state,  Z.  If  this  state  Z  then 
were  a  consciousness  it  would  he  j)resent  in  our  con- 
sciousness with  the  same  content,  as  many  times 
expressed  as  the  number  (»f  elements  actin*::  uj)on  one 
another.  On  the  other  hand  a  unity  of  the  conscious- 
ness, aside  from  this  similarity  of  all  the  individiuil 
consciousnesses,  would  not  result. 

In  reality,  the  elements  a,  b, Z  are  not  similar, 

but  thev  certainly  stand  under  various  conditions 
in  the  structure  of  the  or<^anism.  some  of  them,  on 
account  of  their  restricted  nature  and  unfavoralde 
position,  can  apprehend  vividly  but  few  operations 
from  without,  others,  superior  and  ))etter  situated,  devel- 
ope  a  much  richer  consciousness  of  all  the  possible  con- 
ditions of  the  others  represented  in  it.  Which,  now,  out 
of  the  many  dissimilar  examjdes  of  consciousness  is  onrs 
— that  which  we  know  by  inner  experience?  We  natur- 
ally would  assume  that  it  would  be  the  consciousness  of 
the  most  highly  developed  element  of  all— the  central 
monad  of  our  body,  accordin<^  to  Leibniz.  For  we  find 
the  alterations  in  our  body  most  closely  connected 
with  the  condition  of  the  "  T,''  and  very  little  goes  on 
in  it  which  we  have  reason  to  ascribe  to  the  activity  of 
other  central  points  of  consciousness. 


view  of  the  single  and  indivisible  sHhJerf  [soul]  of  our 
consciousness  as  a  distinct  part,  wliile  the  other  parts 
constitute  a  hof/t/^  i.  r.,  an  aggregate  of  many  elements 
which,  taken  se])arately.  may  be  related  in  nature  to  the 
soul,  but  in  no  instance  are  identical  with  it,  but  are 
dissimilar  l)eings. 

This  assumption,  in  itself  conceivable,  of  a  soul  life 
in  every  bodily  element  remains  quite  useless  for  the 
explanation  of  our  soul  life,  for  we  can  not  transfer 
ourselves  into  the  condition  of  these  elements.  They 
have  worth  for  us  simply  as  they  operate  jis  irritants 
upon  our  soul  and  thus  produce  that  internal  condition 
which  is  alone  known  to  us.  Therefore  we  may  con- 
sider  material  elements  as  matter  simjily. 

The  other  related  assuni])tion,  that  the  soul,  on  the 
other  hand,  possesses  f)hysical  peculiarities,  perhaps 
promises  to  be  useful,  but  the  pojuilar  consensus  has  not 
received  it,  but,  rather,  has  contrasted  the  soul,  as  an 
immaterial  being,  to  material  elements  and  thus  \)vo- 
duced  the  difficulties  of  the  following  chapter. 


§5.  It  follows  that  we  do  not  succeed  in  evading  the 


CHAPTKR  SECOND. 

THE  liECIPlKK^AL  ACTION  BETWKKN  SOIL  AND 

BODY 

§1.  Let  the  possilnlity  of  an  immaterijil  existence  be 
jKlmitted  (of  which  more  iinoii)— it  is  then  customary 
to  object  that,  in  that  case,  no  reciprocation,  at  least, 
between  it  and  the  UAy  is  possible.  The  latter  would 
find  on  the  shadowy  soul  no  point  of  ap[)lication  for  its 
physical  forces:  the  soul  would  produce  no  effect  upon 
matter  bv  its  inner  conditions,  thus  the  complete  dissim- 
ilarity  of  the  two  would  prevent  all  action. 


§2.  To  this  it  may  be  replied,  that  we  deceive  our- 
selves if  we  believe,  in  any  ease  whatever,  that  we  aj)pre- 
hend  the  condition  of  a  reciprocation,  and  if  we  consider 
that  relation  l)etween  soul  and  boily  in  which  this  does 
not  occur  as  an  exceptional  state  of  inadaptability. 

If  we  observe  the  inner  mechanism  of  a  machine  and 
the  connection  of  its  parts,  we  think  we  undei-stand  its 
oj^^eration  because  our  observation  has  l)een  able  to 
notice  various  thinji^s  al>out  it.  Upon  a  little  reflection, 
however,  we  find  that  we  do  not  understand  either  of 
the  two  conditions  upon  which  rests  the  operation   of 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


4  i 


the  machinery,  /.  f.,  the  cohesion  of  its  j)arts  and  the 
transference  of  the  motion. 

Many  words  may,  indeed,  Ik?  exfiended  up(m  it.  but 
we  do  not  yet  know  how  one  element  of  a   solid   ImkIv 

• 

sets  about  it  to  hold  fast  its  nei^hl)or.  or  how  it  is  able 
to  cause  the  motion  with  which  it  is  affected  to  cease 
and  to  reappear  in  another  j)art.  What  we  really 
observe  in  these  cases  is  but  the  external  imagery  in 
which  a  series  of  processes  passes  by,  each  individual  of 
which  is  united  with  its  successor  in  a  completely  invis- 
ible and  incomprehensible  manner. 

In  the  relations  between  soul  and  Ixxly  we  cannot 
follow  this  series  of  processes  as  far  as  we  wish,  but  if 
we  were  able  to  follow  it,  for  exaniph\  to  the  point 
where  the  physical  excitement  acts  upon  the  soul,  this 
latter  transition  would,  indeed,  l)e  quite  unintelligible, 
but  no  whit  less  comprehensible  than  the  transference 
of  a  motion  from  one  material  element  to  another. 


§3,  The  source  of  the  doubt  a}H)ve-mentioned  is  the 
false  Jissumption,  common  even  in  antiquity,  that  only 
similars  can  oj)erate  one  upon  another,  or  lie  affected  by 
each  other. 

One  can  l>e  tempted  to  make  this  assumf»tion  only  by 
considering  the  activity  to  be  produced  simply  as  a  condi- 
tion which  is  already  present  in  the  operating  cause  a, 
and  may  be  transferred  to  b  without  alteration,  and, 
consequently,   presupposes   a   similar    lodgment    in    b 


78 


OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


:is    in    a,    Jincl    thus   a   complete   parjillelisiii    ))etweeii 

a  :iti(l  b. 

On  the  otlier  Inind,  we  l)orrow  from  metaphysics  the 
conviction  that  such  a  severing  of  the  condition  from 
that  of  whicli  it  is  a  condition  and  its  transference  to 
another  subject  is  completely  inconceivable.  The  effect 
of  an  a  upon  a  b  consists  always  in  the  fact  that  a  con- 
dition, A,  of  a  is  the  occasion  which  ])roduces,  according 
to  an  universal  law,  of  which  nothing  is  to  be  said  here, 
in  b,  out  of  its  own  nature,  the  condition  B,  which,  in 
general,  need  have  no  similarity  to  the  conditicm  A. 
Even  ordinary  experience  teaches  that  one  and  the  same 
effect.  A,  may  produce  the  most  various  results,  accord- 
ing jis  the  objects,  b,  C,  andd,  u])on  which  it  acts,  differ. 

We  have,  therefore,  no  right  to  set  up  conditions 
which  must  1k'  fulfilled  in  order  that  a  may  affect  b. 
The  identity,  or  similarity  of  both  gives  the  possibility 
of  their  operation  no  greater  comprehensibility  or  plaus- 
ibility than  would  their  dissimilarity  or  even  their 
incomparability. 


^4.  A  bond  between  ImmIv  and  soul  is  often  denuinded 
in  order  to  make  comprehensible  the  ])ossibility  of  their 
reciprocation.  However,  bonds  are  only  needed  to 
unite  those  things  which,  of  themselves,  will  not  act 
upon  each  other,  but  are  (juite  in<lifferent  to  each 
<)ther. 

The  uniting  power  of  a  bond  consists  in  the  fact  that 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


79 


its  elements  are  united  with  each  other;  nevertheless,  we 
can  not  be  always  suj)posing  Uf^w  connecting  links,  but 
come,  finally,  to  an  immediate  reciprocal  action  of  the 
individual  elements  which  cling  together  without  the 
intervention  of  any  sort  of  machinery. 

\  bond  between  body  and  soul  would,  then,  only  \ye 
needed  if  they  were  quite  indifferent  the  one  to  the  other. 
If  we  had  such  a  bond  it  would  not  help  us,  for  the 
specific  form  in  which  the  body  would  act  upon  the 
soul  and  the  soul  upon  the  body  by  means  of  it  would 
depend  not  upon  the  bond,  but  upon  the  specific  nature 
of  the  two  connected  elemejits  and  their  obligation  to 
reciprocation. 

Instead  of  one  such  bond  then,  wv  assume  that  both 
are  connected  by  many  peculiarly  formed  bonds.  Each 
individual  reciprocal  action  to  which  they  are  compelled 
by  their  own  nature,  is  such  a  bond,  which  connects, 
not  in  a  general,  but  in  a  definite  wav. 


5J5.  We  proceeded  upon  the  agreement  that  the 
notion  of  the  soul  as  an  immaterial  l)eing  is  possible. 
Now.  however,  even  this  is  denied.  Only  sensuous 
things,  it  is  said,  are  authenticated  by  immediate  obser- 
vation, super-sensuous  are  products  of  phantasy.  How- 
ever, only  the  most  primitive  view  of  nature  considers 
that  we  api)rehend  the  existence  of  the  ol)jects  them- 
selves in  their  sensuous  jieculiarities  of  color,  taste, 
hardness,  etc. 


80 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


81 


We  hiive  been  lon*<  iMUivinced  that  ;ill  these  predi- 
cates are  but  appeaniiices  whiih  ori^^inate  in  our  con- 
sciousness by  excitation  from  without.  NVliat  really  is, 
they  do  not  exphiin.  Actual  sensuous  perception  of 
material  elements  was  early  disclaimed  by  science. 
But  it  has  for  a  lon^  time,  in  its  jioticm  of  the  atom, 
conceived  of  formal  elements,  similar  to  the  sensuously 
perceived  bodies,  which  are  supposed  to  be  formed  by 
their  combination,  that  is.  very  small  bodies,  having, 
however,  a  j^iven  extension  of  unknown,  but  still 
definite  form-  and  this  small  volume  endowed  with 
perfect  impenetrability. 

Manifold  difficulties  c(mi]»licating  this  notion  have 
led  to  the  attempt  in  ])hysics  to  re^mrd  the  atom  as 
completely  unextended,  or  as  a  point  which  is  distin- 
guished from  an  abstnict  ])oint  in  space  simply  in  that 
it  is  the  focus  of  forc«^s  which  o|)erate  outwardly,  as 
well  as  the  point  of  application  for  forces  comin<?  from 

without. 

Such  a  conception  as  this  sinqdy  means  that  the 
atom,  in  itself,  is  nothin^r  other  than  a  super-sensuous 
entity,  /.  e.,  not  only,  on  account  of  its  minuteness, 
unattainable  by  our  sense,  but.  by  its  nature,  imattain- 
able  bv  ami  sensuous  ap]u'ehension.  and  that  the  sen- 
suous  apprehensions  which,  at  first,  seem  to  re|»resent 
the  real  are  simply  secondary  appearances  which  the 
results  of  the  reflex  activities  of  elements,  in  them- 
selves entirely  super-sensuous,  are  made  known  to  us. 


Hence  the  notion,  not  of  the  immaterial,  but  of  the 
material  requires  to  l>e  demonstrated,  and  the  gulf  which 
seemed  to  separate  body  and  soul  as  two  completely 
heterogenous  elements  and  thus  to  prevent  their 
reciprocal  action  really  does  not  exist. 


[^b^«.--The  reader  will  be  interested  to  compare  the  ideas  briefly  set  forth  in 
this  section  xvith  the  dicta  of  modern  materialism.  (Compare  the  open- 
ing page,  of  Hermann  Ulrici's  X<;i6ttm/6'€^/6).  Someofthe  various  phases 
of  materialistic  thought  on  the  relations  of  soul  and  bodv  will  be 
gathered  from  the  following  sentences:— 

*'  Will  is  tho  necessary  expression  of  a  condition  of  the  brain  occa- 
sioned by  external  influences"  (Moleschott). 

"  Man  is  but  tha  sum  of  parents  and  nurse,  of  place  and  time,  of  air 
and  weather,  of  light  and  sound,  and  of  food  and  clothing;  "  or  accord- 
ing to  Feuerbach,  "  Der  Mensch  nur  ist  was  er  isst,"  i.  g.,  Man  is  but 
what  he  eats. 

The  flnal  ultimatum-"Thoughl  is  as  much  a  secretion  of  the  brain 
_    asbiJeis  of  the  liver  or  urine  of  the  kidney-  ^C.   Vogt;  stands  in  bold 
..contrast  to  the  teaching  of  our  author  here  and  elsewhere.-C  L  H  ] 


OCTLINKS   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


83 


fffll  I 


CHAPTER  THIRD. 


THE  SEAT  OF  THE  SOUL. 


§1.  A.n  immaterial  being  can  have  no  extension  but 
may  have  place,  and  we  define  this  as  the  point  to 
which  all  effects  from  without  must  be  transferred  in 
order  to  produce  an  impression  upon  this  being,  and 
from  which  alone  this  being  exerts  its  immediate  activ- 
ities upon  the  environment. 

In  regard  to  the  soul,  no  one  questions  that  it  is  only' 
present  within  its  own  body  and  here  only  acts  immedi- 
ately upon  its  environment  by  the  agency  of  the  body. 

§2.  It  has  been  attempted  to  conceive  of  the  soul's 
special  relation  to  the  body  according  to  the  analogy  of 
our  conception  of  the  omnipresence  of  God.  We  under- 
stand by  this  that  God  is  as  near  with  immediate 
efficiency  to  one  point  of  the  world  as  to  every  other, 
that  his  will  neitlier  requires  to  ptiss  over  any  distance 
to  reach  the  world  element  z  nor  needs  any  intermedi- 
ary means  to  apply  it  to  z.  But  we  do  not,  by  any 
means,  understand  that  the  unlimited  extent  of  the 
arena  which  God  thus  rules  applies  to  himself  as  a  per- 
sonal peculiarity. 

In   like  manner,  it  is  conceived,  the  soul,  without 


extension  in  space  itself,  is,  in  its  own  body,  all-present. 
This  analogy  is,  however,  quite  unserviceable.  We 
have  already  seen  in  the  discussion  of  feelings  of 
double  contact  how  nature  succeeds  in  producing  the 
illusion,  so  indispensable  to  the  beatification  of  our  life, 
that  we  are  present  with  immediate  sensation  and 
motion  in  every  part  of  our  body. 

On  the  other  hand,  physiological  experiments  show 
that  the  soul  stands  only  in  immediate  reciprocation 
with  the  central  organ  of  the  nervous  system,  with  the 
entire  remainder  of  the  body,  however,  only  mediately, 
through  the  nerves  themselves. 

§3.  We  are  accustomed  to  assume  of  a  physical  force 
that  it  operates  in  infinite  distances  without  intermediate 
mechanism.  It  operates,  however,  in  diminishing  ratio, 
in  that  the  intensity  of  its  activity  diminishes  with  the 
distance. 

According  to  the  first  condition,  we  may  say  of  that 
body  which  is  the  conveyer  of  the  force,  it  is  univer- 
sally distributed  in  space;  according  to  the  second,  how- 
ever, we  must  confine  it  to  a  limited  space,  that  is, 
where  the  activity  is  greatest.  This  analogy  is  also 
quite  inapplicable.  The  slightest  discontinuity  in  a 
nerve,  even  in  closest  proximity  to  the  brain,  destroys 
the  reciprocation  with  the  soul  throughout  the  entire 
region  supplied  by  it.  It  has,  therefore,  no  force  opera- 
tive at  a  distance  which  can  overleap  this  separation. 


84 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


85 


The  third  analogy  alone  remains,  *.  e.,  that  of  opera- 
tions which  take  place  in  contact  through  transmission 
of  motions. 

§4.  This  analogy  has  been  chiefly  followed,  and  it 
has  been  attempted  to  find  such  a  point  in  the  central 
organ  in  which  all  sensitive  nerves  unite  in  order  to  deliver 
up  their  messages,  and  from  which  all  motor  nerves 
spring  in  order  to  distribute  the  excitements  received  to 
the  body.  This  conception  not  only  has  certain  inter- 
nal difficulties,  but  it,  in  general,  does  not  agree  with 
our  empirical  knowledge.  Not  only  has  such  a  central 
point  of  the  entire  nervous  organism  not  been  found 
thus  far,  but  we  have  well-founded  reason   to  assert 

that  it  never  will  be.* 

The  question  now  arises  how,  under  these  circum- 
stances, the  notion  of  a  seat  of  the  soul  can  be  held  ? 

§5.  We  return  to  our  original  definition,  but  extend  it 
as  follows:— We  err  when  we  assert  that  because  a  thing 
is  in  a  given  place  it  can  act  upon  that  environment. 
As  long  as  we  neglect  the  activity  it  is  impossible  to  say 
what  is  meant  by  a  thing  s  being  in  a  place  nor  how  it 
differs  from  its  existence  in  another  place  where  it 
would  be  exactly  as  well  situated  as  in  this  one. 

We  think  the  order  of  thought  ought  to  be  reversed. 


♦See  Part  Third— FunctlonB  of  the  optic  thalmus  and  corpora  striata, 


and  should  say  if  it  is  in  the  nature  of  a  being,  a,  to 
reciprocate  activities  with  b,  C,  d,  then,  by  this  fact,  its 
systematic  position  is  determined,  and,  in  the  arrange- 
ment of  the  world  in  space,  it  is  that  point  of  which 
the  immediate  surroundings  are  formed  by  b,  c,  and  d. 
But  the  connection  of  all  things  may,  in  general,  be 
so  many-sided  that  an  element,  a,  is  not  only  deter- 
mined to  reciprocate  with  the  group  b,  C,  d,  but  equally 
immediately  with  p,  q,  r,  while  p,  q,  and  r,  on  account 
of  other  relations  in  which  they  stand,  cause  its  system- 
atic position,  and  hence  its  position  in  space,  not  to  be 
near  them,  but  separated  from  them  by  an  interval.     In 
this  case  the  active  element  a  would  not  have  one,  but, 
with  the  same  degree  of  truth,  several  positions  in  space 
without  being  sub-divided  into  a  plurality,  just  as  we 
conceived  of  God  as    omnipresent,   but   not   himself 
extended. 

Omnipresence,  of  course,  includes  all  space,  here, 
however,  we  must  assert  that  the  immaterial  being 
must  have  several  distinct  seats  which  are  separated  by 
intermediate  spaces  in  which  their  presence  does  not  in 
the  same  sense  reside. 

Nevertheless,  no  real  difficulty  inheres  in  this  view. 
We  have  simply  to  rise  above  the  power  of  ordinary 
training  which  leads  us  to  conceive  of  the  immaterial 
being  according  to  the  analogy  of  bodily  atoms,  and, 
therefore,  ascribe  to  it  a  sensible,  limited  magnitude 
and  form,  and  hence  but  a  single  position  in  space. 


86 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


87 


ill 


m 


§6.  The  question  remains  why  certain  portions  of  the 
brain  have  the  preference    as    seat   of   the   soul   over 
others,   although,   so   far  as   we   know,  there  are   no 
remarkable  differences  in  the  structure  or  arrangement. 
Here  also  we  must  alter  the  ordinary  conception.     A 
single  element,  a,  is  not  designed  to  always  stand  recip- 
rocated with   one  kind  of  element,  b,    but  not   with 
another,  e.     Every  being,  a,  is  affected  or  excited  to 
activity  solely  by  what  takes  place  in  other  beings.  Let 
this  activity  be  denoted  by  X,  which,  according  to  uni- 
versal natural  law,  is  the  operative  premise  from  which 
it  is  designed  that  a  new  condition  shall  be  produced  in 
a,   then  it  is  produced,  and  a  receives  this  influence, 
whether  it  is  originated  in  b  or  c.     On  the  other  hand, 
if  X  is  not  such  a  premise,  a  remains  indifferent  and  un- 
changed whether  x  occurs  in  b  or  c.     In  exactly  the 
same  way  the  soul  will  enter  into  reciprocity  only  with 
those  points  in  the  central  organ  in  which  all  the  com- 
binations, adjustments  and  rearrangements  of  physical 
excitations  are  carried  on  after  the  completion  of  which 
alone  these  can  rise  up  into  consciousness  of  the  soul,  or 
which  are,  in  other  words,  the  legitimate  stimuli  of  its 
activities. 


points  of  the  brain  individual  psychical  processes  would 
proceed  at  the  instigation  of  physical  processes  there 
taking  place,  and  the  unit  being  of  the  soul  would  never 
appear  as  the  object  of  such  observation.  However,  we 
do  n(jt  accept  the  interpretation  given  by  materialism 
for  these  facts. 

These  psychical  functions  do  not  take  place  as  self- 
evident  appendages  or  products  of  the  physical  processes, 
they  can  only  be  conceived  as  possible  if  the  latter  act 
simply  as  excitements  operating  upon  the  peculiar 
nature  of  that  soul-being  which  is  omnipresent  within 
these  limits  and  not  confined  to  a  point,  and  thus  lead- 
ing to  the  exercise  of  its  own  peculiar  faculties. 


§7.  Tf  one  were  able,  therefore,  to  observe  microscopic- 
ally as  accurately  what  goes  on  within  the  brain  as  we  may 
observe  the  anatomical  structure,  it  would  appear  super- 
ficially just  as  assumed  by  materialism;  /.  e.,  in  various 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


89 


I 


■l! 

J 

I 


If 


!. 


CHAPTER  FOURTH.  • 

THE  RELATION  OF  THE  SOUL  TO  TIME. 

§1.  Experience  could  only  lead  us  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  soul  originates  and  dies  with  the  body. 
Necessities,  foreign  to  these  theoretical  investigations, 
have  excited  the  desire  to  establish  its  immortal  iff/, 
and  this  has  Ijeen  attempted  by  including  it  under  the 
notion  of  a  substance  which  contains,  even  in  its  own 
nature,  the  quality  of  indestructibility. 

This  subordination  leads  to  two  undesirable  results 
which  would  gladly  be  avoided,  namely,  the  reasons  by 
which  the  human  soul  may  be  included  under  the  notion 
of  substance  would  apply  equally  to  every  animal  soul. 
On  the  other  hand,  this  indestructibility  pre-supposes 
not  only  immortality  after  death,  but  endless  existence 
before  birth,  and  thus  we  do  not  know  where  to  begin; 
nor  does  experience  give  us  any  evidence  of  such  pre- 
vious existence. 

Finally,  it  would  be  asked,  if  the  notion  of  substance 
contains  such  an  unavoidable  difficulty,  is  it,  after  all 
useful,  and  not  rather  a  simple  figment  of  the  brain, 
and  whether,  in  the  former  case,  the  soul  would  belong 
to  that  class  which  should  be  included  in  it. 


§*2.  In  fact,  substance  is  but  a  name  for  everything 
which  is  able  to  act  upon  others,  to  be  acted  upon,  or  to 
sustain  various  conditions  and,  in  these  changes, 
remains  the  same  as  a  permanent  unit. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  a  figment  of  the  brain  to  be- 
lieve that  further  explanation  can  be  adduced  as  to  how 
the  faculty  for  such  conduct  is  originated,  and  to  seek 
this  explanation  by  conceiving  of  a  bit  of  rigid  and 
indistructible  substance  in  each  thing,  around  which 
nucleus  the  other  peculiarities  or  conditions,  by  the 
which  one  such  thing  differs  from  another,  are  grouped. 
Such  a  notion,  when  applied,  shows  itself  ever  com- 
pletely unfruitful  in  explaining  those  appearances, for 
which  it  was  assumed. 

It  does  not  appear  how  such  a  substantial  nucleus 
can  be  consistent  with  the  plurality  and  changeability  of 
the  peculiarities  which  we  are  accustomed  to  assume 
(by  the  use  of  a  word  without  significance)  ''inhere" 
in  it.  Briefly,  then,  things  are  not  things  because  a 
substance  is  concealed  in  them,  but,  since  they  are  as 
they  are,  and  conduct  themselves  as  they  do,  they  pro- 
duce in  our  phantasy  the  false  appearance  of  such  a 
substance  as  the  cause  of  their  conduct. 

The  soul,  then,  inasmuch  as  it,  as  unit-subject  of  its 
inner  conditions,  conceives  not  only  of  others  but  is 
conscious  of  itself,  deserves,  in  the  highest  degree,  the 
title  of  a  substance  or  being. 

But  this,  on  the  other  hand,  does  not  at  all  justify 


90 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


the  assertion  that  this  capacity,  if  once  exercised,  must 
h  en  always  be  exercised,  and  cannot,  in  the  career  of 
the  thing,  be  originated  or  cease  to  be. 


§3.  For  the  decision  of  this  matter  we  borrow  from 
metaphysics  a  demonstration  which  stands  opposed  to  the 
conception  to  which  the  study  of  nature  hiis  accustomed 
us.  For  the  latter  attempts  to  explain  the  course  of 
nature  by  assuming  a  multiplicity  of  original  elements, 
of  which  each  might  exist  if  the  others  did  not,  and 
which,  further,  have,  in  themselves,  no  necessary 
connection  one  with  another,  but  are  either  brought 
into  such  relation  or  else  had  somehow  been  placed 
there,  and  which,  finally,  are  obliged  by  general  laws  to 
exert  one  reciprocal  action  in  one  relation  and  another 
in  another  relation. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  briefly  assert  that  really  no 
effect  of  one  element  upon  another  is  conceivable  with- 
out contradiction  as  long  as  they  conceived  of  as  origin- 
ally independent  and  unrelated  one  to  another.  It  is 
only  possible  if  we  consider  them  as  dependent  modifi- 
cations of  a  single  actual  being  which  is  in  them  all  as 
the  ground  of  their  existence  and,  further,  the  reason 
why  they  are  obliged,  under  definite  conditions,  to  act 
in  a  definite  manner,  and,  finally,  as  that  which  makes  the 
fulfilment  of  the  above-descril)ed  obligations  possible; 
or.  otherwise  expressed,  all  things  are  not  what  they  are, 
neither  do  thev  act  as  thev  do  because  of  an  endowment 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


91 


of  their  nature  which  belonged  to  them  before  the 
world  was.  Neither  was  the  world,  at  a  later  period, 
obliged  to  conform  to  them,  so  that  there  was  only  pro- 
duced, in  consequence,  what  was  permitted  by  these 
postulates.  But  they  all  exist,  and  operate  as  commis- 
sioned by  this  single  absolute  being;  and  all  that  we 
generally  consider  as  the  final  unalterable  elements  and 
laws  of  nature  have  this  invariableness  and  value  only 
in  conformity  to  the  plan  for  the  fulfilment  of  which 
they  were  ordained. 

This  view  was  not  invented  to  satisfy  the  present 
requirements,  it  is,  rather,  necessary  in  order  to  compre- 
hend the  simplest  effect  of  one  element  upon  another, 
but  it  is  applicable  to  our  case. 

It  may  lie  within  the  bounds  of  possibility  that  all 
these  varying  appearances  are  produced  by  combinations 
of  unchangeable  elements  at  the  dictation  of  universal 
laws.  For  this  reason,  then,  there  are  in  the  world 
those  constant  quantities  whose  activities  always  occur 
in  the  same  wav  and  which  are  but  the  actions  con- 
stantly  produced  or  sustained  by  each  individual  exist- 
ence. But  it  also  lies  within  possibility  that  there 
are  other  elements,  only  appearing  in  given  points  of 
time  in  the  course  of  nature,  namely,  when  all  the 
conditions  are  met  which,  according  to  the  universal 
plan,  can  bring  them  into  being. 

There  is  no  reason  why  these  elements,  when  once 
produced   should   not  conduct    themselves    as   simple, 


90 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


the  assertion  that  this  capacity,  if  once  exercised,  must 
h  en  always  be  exercised,  and  cannot,  in  the  career  of 
the  thing,  be  originated  or  cease  to  be. 


§3.  For  the  decision  of  this  matter  we  borrow  from 
metaphysics  a  demonstration  which  stands  opposed  to  the 
conception  to  which  the  study  of  nature  hiis  accustomed 
us.  For  the  hitter  attempts  to  exphiin  the  course  of 
nature  by  assuming  a  multiplicity  of  original  elements, 
of  which  each  might  exist  if  the  others  did  not,  and 
which,  further,  have,  in  themselves,  no  necessary 
connection  one  with  another,  but  are  either  brought 
into  such  relation  or  else  had  somehow  been  placed 
there,  and  which,  finally,  are  obliged  by  general  laws  to 
exert  one  reciprocal  action  in  (me  relation  and  another 
in  another  relation. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  briefly  assert  that  really  no 
effect  of  one  element  upon  another  is  conceivable  with- 
out contradiction  as  long  as  they  conceived  of  as  origin- 
ally independent  and  unrelated  one  to  another.  It  is 
only  possible  if  we  consider  them  as  dependent  modifi- 
cations of  a  single  actual  being  which  is  in  them  all  as 
the  ground  of  their  existence  and,  further,  the  reiison 
why  they  are  obliged,  under  definite  conditions,  to  act 
in  a  definite  manner,  and,  finally,  as  that  which  makes  the 
fulfilment  of  the  above-described  obligations  possible; 
or,  otherwise  expre.^sed,  all  things  are  not  what  they  are, 
neither  do  thev  act  as  thev  do  Wause  of  an  endowment 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


91 


of  their  nature  which  belonged  to  them  before  the 
world  was.  Neither  was  the  world,  at  a  later  period, 
obliged  to  conform  to  them,  so  that  there  was  only  pro- 
duced, in  consequence,  what  was  permitted  by  these 
postulates.  But  they  all  exist,  and  operate  as  commis- 
sioned by  this  single  absolute  being;  and  all  that  we 
generally  consider  as  the  final  unalterable  elements  and 
laws  of  nature  have  this  in  variableness  and  value  onlv 
in  conformity  to  the  plan  for  the  fulfilment  of  which 
they  were  ordained. 

This  view  was  not  invented  to  satisfy  the  present 
requirements,  it  is,  rather,  necessary  in  order  to  compre- 
hend the  simplest  effect  of  one  element  upon  another, 
but  it  is  applicable  to  our  case. 

It  may  lie  within  the  bounds  of  possibility  that  all 
these  varying  appearances  are  produced  by  combinations 
of  unchangeable  elements  at  the  dictation  of  universal 
laws.  For  this  reason,  then,  there  are  in  the  world 
those  constant  quantities  whose  activities  always  occur 
in  the  same  wav  and  which  are  but  the  actions  con- 

ft/ 

stantly  produced  or  sustained  by  each  individual  exist- 
ence. But  it  also  lies  within  possibility  that  there 
are  other  elements,  only  appearing  in  given  points  of 
time  in  the  course  of  nature,  namely,  when  all  the 
conditions  are  met  which,  according  to  the  universal 
plan,  can  bring  them  into  being. 

There  is  no  reason  why  these  elements,  when  once 
produced  should   not  conduct    themselves    as   simple, 


92 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


indevisible    and   independent   foci   of  converging  and 
diverging  activities. 

Among  these  elements  we  numl>er  the  soul.  A 
further  question — how  these  are  brought  into  that  con- 
dition of  independence — we  dismiss  as  out  of  place.  Nor 
can  we  explain  how  it  is,  or  was  brought  about,  that 
those  constant  elements  exist  and  continue  eternally. 


§5.  At  the  place  and  moment  in  which,  in  the  course 
of  physical  nature,  the  embryo  of  an  organic  Ijeing  is 
formed,  the  soul  })elonging  to  the  organism  is  formed 
out  of  that  universal  l)eing  everywhere  present,  and 
this  act  is  a  consequent  of  that  physical  process.  Super- 
ficially viewed,  materialism  seems  to  l)e  correct  in 
stating  that  the  soul  originates  in  and  with  (not,  how- 
ever, out  of  and  through)  the  body.  And  it  is  useless  to 
question  regarding  the  manner  in  which  it  appears,  as 
it  were^  from  without  simultaneously  with  the  body. 

So  far  as  immortality  is  concerned,  it  is  not  a  subject 
to  be  decided  upon  from  a  theoretical  standpoint. 
We  hold,  as  of  general  applicability,  only  the  funda- 
mental law  that  whatever  has  once  been  formed  will 
endure  as  long  as  it  has  an  unaltered  value  for  the 
coherence  of  the  world,  but  will  self-evidently  cease  to 
exist  as  soon  as  this  is  not  the  case.  Yet  this  law  is  not 
applicable  in  our  hands,  we  cannot  presume  to  say  what 
may  constitute  the  merit  which  produces  the  perman- 
ence, or  the  lack  which  makes  it  impossible. 


CHAPTER  FIFTH. 


THE  SOUL'S  ESSENCE. 


§1.  Ij I  investigating  the  essence  of  a  thing  we  may 
first  inquire  how  this  thing  differs  from  another; 
second,  how  it  is  that  the  content  thus  indicated  can 
exist  as  a  real  thing. 

The  second  question  may  be  answered  in  the  case  of 
objects  whose  distinctive  peculiarities  consist  only  in 
the  form  of  a  material  previously  existing.  In  this 
case  we  usually  consider  matter  as  the  ^^being,'^  and 
the  form  as  unessential.  But  simple  matter,  like  every 
simple  being,  cannot  be  continually  derived  from  some- 
thing different  from  itself. 

We  have  often  before  dismissed,  as  unanswerable, 
the  questions  how  it  is  that  any  content  can  exist,  and 
act  and  be  acted  upon  as  a  thing.  Our  inquiries  must, 
then,  be  what  are  the  peculiar  characteristics  consti- 
tuting the  soul's  real  being,  by  which  it  is  distinguish- 
able from  other  substances. 

We  can  only  learn  of  tne  nature  of  each  thing,  and 
in  like  manner  of  matter,  through  its  operations  and 
effects.  It  is,  therefore,  not  an  error,  but  the  natural 
method  of  psychology  to  define  the  nature  of  the  soul 
thus  reversely. 


94 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


95 


The  first  systematic  attempt,  in  the  doctrine  of 
the  faculties  of  the  soul^  has  remained  unfruitful. 
The  multitudinous  psychical  activities  were  classified 
according  to  their  resemblances,  and  it  was,  indeed,  cor- 
rect to  ascribe  to  each  such  group  of  actually  produced 
activities  a  faculty. 

However,  this  notion  was  not  as  fruitful  as  that  of 
force  in  physics,  for  the  physicist  only  seriously  speaks 
of  a  force  when,  not  only  the  form  of  the  effect  is 
known,  but  when  a  law  can  be  given,  according  to 
which  its  magnitude  varies  in  proportion  to  the  varia- 
tion in  certain  conditions. 

The  faculties  of  the  soul,  on  the  other  hand,  were 
simply  abstracted  from  the  form  of  the  activities  and 
no  law  was  found  for  them,  thus  simply  a  tautology 
was  reached  as,  for  example,  in  the  statement  that  the 
faculty  of  sensation  produces  sensation  without  ex- 
plaining under  what  conditions. 

On  the  other  hand  physics  has  been  successful  only 
in  so  far  as  it  has  reduced  all  natural  processes  to 
motions  of  masses.  By  means  of  this  similarity  in  tfhe 
processes  it  was  possible  to  accurately  define  the  result 
obtained  by  the  simultaneous  and  combined  oj)eration 
of  various  forces  upon  the  same  object.  But  psych- 
ical conditions  can  not  be  reduced  to  such  a  common 
standard. 

We  have  no  idea  of  what  would  result  from  the  com- 
bined action  of  the  faculties  of  susceptibility  and  of 


conception.  What  is  known  concerning  it  is  derived 
independently  of  it  from  experience  and  a  knowledge  of 
humanity. 

Both  these  deficiencies  are  not  to  be  removed  by  any 
better  carrying  out  of  the  theory.  It  can  only  serve, 
then,  as  a  convenient  catalogue  of  spiritual  activities 
but  not  as  an  explanation  of  them. 

§3.  The  unproductiveness  of  this  theory,  and  the  poor 
standard  it  supplies  for  the  connection  of  the  various 
faculties  (which  it  always  viewed  as  the  expressions  of 
an  individual  soul)  induced  Herbart  to  attempt  the 
explanation  of  all  these  spiritual  activities  and  fac- 
ulties as  a  series  of  results  springing  successively  from 
a  single  primitive  activity  of  the  soul. 

The  soul  was  considered  as  one  of  the  super-sensuous, 
absolute  beings  of  completely  simple  nature,  which 
always  remain  unchanged  if  undisturbed,  and  yet,  when 
they  are  affected  by  external  irritants  which  would 
produce  disturbances  in  their  nature  put  forth  activ- 
ities for  self  preservation.  And  these  self-preservative 
efforts  vary  with  the  disturbances  producing  them. 

In  the  case  of  other  real  beings,  as,  for  example,  those 
composed  of  matter,  we  can  know  nothing  of  the 
character  of  this  process  of  restoring  the  equilibrium. 
In  the  soul,  on  the  other  hand,  we  know,  or  dare  to 
assume,  that  they,  in  general,  are  in  the  form  of  con- 
ceptions. 


I 


96 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


97 


By  means  of  physical  irritations,  which  Herbart  did 
not  follow  further,  the  soul  is  induced  to  put  forth  this 
reaction,  and  the  conceptions  here  occurring,  a.  e.,  of 
simple  sensations,  a  definite  color,  sound  or  taste,  are 
the  simple  elements  through  the  farther  reciprocation 
of  which  results  the  whole  of  the  remainder  of  the  soul 

life. 

We  mention  here,  gratefully,  only  the  previously 
mentioned  explanation  which  elucidates  the  process  of 
conception  according  to  general  mechanical  laws. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  agree  with  the  attempt 
to  derive  all  the  higher  activities  of  the  soul  as  inde- 
pendent mechanical  products  of  this  process  of  conception 
without  the  supposition  of  some  faculty  in  it  not  yet  men- 
tioned. This  law  was  not  indeed,  considered  necessary,  for 
Herbart  himself  admitted  that  even  the  simplest  sensa- 
tions group  themselves  in  entirely  distinct  classes, 
colors,  sounds,  tastes,  none  of  which  are  derivable  one 
from  another;  that  the  soul  thus  really  possess  quite 
distinct  faculties  which  we  cannot  derive  from  that 
unity  which  we  still  insist  upon. 

Nothing,  then,  was  to  prevent  the  assumption  that 
these  sensations  and  their  relations  among  one  another 
operate  as  new  stimuli  upon  the  soul  unit,  and  then 
produce  entirely  new  reactions  which  it  would,  how- 
ever, be  impossible  to  derive  from  these  sources  them- 
selves. 

Such  an  assumption    would   only    be   met  by   th« 


demonstration  that  it  is  unnecessary,  and  that  really 
all  the  higher  activities  are  quite  independent  results 
of  the  reciprocal  attrition  of  the  simplest  concepts. 
This  demonstration  has  not  succeeded  as  may  be  seen 
from  the  following  examples. 

§1.  We  have  already  found  it  impossible  that  a  soul, 
were  it  but   a  conceiving  being,   should    conceive   of 
relations  between  its  concepts  other  than  they  really 
are,  for  example,  as  though  they  were  in  space  while 
they  are  not.     If  it  does  so,  then  it  must  add  to  this 
actual  existence  something  new  from  its  own  nature 
which  is  not  derived  from  the  thing  itself.     In  like 
manner  it  was  found  impossible  to  consider  attention 
as  simply  the  intensity  of  the   conception  itself;  the 
subject  which  exerts  all  the  applying  activities  in  which 
the  real  office  of  attention  consists  would,  in  that  case, 
be  entirely  wanting.     We  now  find  it  quite  impossible 
to  consider  feelings  of  pleasure  or  displeasure  as  inde- 
pendent results  of  the  various  positions  in  which  the 
conceptions,  during  their  progress,  may  become  related 
one  to  another.     If  the  soul  were  simply  a  conceiving 
being  it  would  conceive  all  these  facts  accurately  and. 
indifferently,  even  though  they  were  fraught  with  its  own 
destruction.     The  fact  that  it  partakes  in  an  interest  in 
them  is  a  new  fact  which  must  proceed  from  some  other 
peculiarity  of  its  own  existence. 

Finally,  no  one  could  l)e  persuaded  that  what   we 


V     i 


1 


98 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


99 


mean  when  we  say  "  I  will  "  signifies  simply  the  access 
of  a  conception  into  consciousness  through  a  conflict 
with  forces  which  attempt  to  prevent  it. 

However  obscure  and  inexplicable  the  idea  that  in 
this  case  we  have  to  deal  with  an  act  and  not  simply  a 
happemmj—B.n  act  produced  by  ourselves,  the  unit- 
subject  of  our  world  of  concepts— yet  the  fact  itself 
which  we  thus  designate  and  discover  immediately  in 
inner  experience  cannot  be  displaced  by  this  hypo- 
thesis which  throughout  explains  nothing,  any  more 
than  the  appearance  only  of  such  an  act  could 
present  itself  to  us  as  distinguished  from   its  simple 

occurrence. 

We  close,  then,  with  the  conviction  that  it  is  possible 
and  necessary  to  credit  to  the  unit-being  of  the  soul 
more  than  a  simple  adaptability  for  conceptions,  and 
that  even  these  reactions  of  the  first  order  which  take 
place  as  a  result  of  external  stimuli,  in  the  form  of 
conceptions,  may,  by  their  relations  and  combinations, 
become  new  stimuli  by  means  of  which  faculties  of  the 
soul  not  before  affected  are  excited  to  expression. 

§5.  The  explanation  of  the  origin  of  the  higher 
spiritual  activities  from  the  lower  must  be  given  up.  In 
the  place  of  such  a  mechanical  construction,  another 
view  may  be  presented,  which  aftirms  that  the  sum  of 
spiritual  expressions,  let  them  originate  as  they  may, 
are,  at  any  rate,  suited  to  one  another,  and  necessary, 


hence,  those  ideas  which  express  the  destiny  of  the  soul 
are  completely  realized. 

The  Idealistic  systems,  and  particularly  latterly 
that  of  Hegel,  made  this  attempt.  According  to 
these,  the  world  in  general  is  not  a  simple  fact 
It  has  also  a  meaning.  In  this  whole  every  individual 
has  Its  definite  position,  and  the  being  of  each  thing 
consists  really  in  the  partial  idea  with  the  real- 
ization  of  which  it  is  intrusted  and  through  which  it 
contributes  its  own  to  the  unbroken  whole  of  the 
ultimate  or  universal  idea  of  the  world. 

If  we  can  formulate  an  accurate  exhaustive  expres- 
sion  for  this  ultimate  idea,  we  can  derive  from  it  the 
form  of  each  thing,  the  totality  of  the  faculties  neces- 
sary  to  it,  and,  finally,  the  general  laws  according  to 
which  these  must  operate  in  order  to  reach  that  con- 
summation. 

As,  however,  that  definition  is  impossible,  instead  of 
a  scientific  deduction,  capable  of  proof  and  counter 
proof,  we  must  accept  one  which  comb  nes,  with  more 
or  less  tivste,  more  or  less  of  aesthetic  correctness  the 
single  spiritual  activities  with  such  a  comprehensive 
expression  as  may  have  been  found  for  this  ultimate 
idea. 

The  learned  conceptions  which  are  possible  in  the 
premises,  an<l  which  have  not  been  wanting  have, 
moreover,  Income  one-sided  on  ,iccount  of  an  "historic' 
circumstance. 


*i 


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OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


The  question  concerning  the  method  and  truth  of 
our  knowledge  or  concerning  the  relation  })etween 
subject  and  object  has  so  absorbed  all  attention  that  the 
process  by  which  the  existing  being  Ijecomes  conscious 
of  its  own  existence,  /.  ^..  the  development  of  self- 
consciousness  is  considered  the  real  goal  or  the  final 
content  of  the  entire  world-system.  The  soul  appears 
simply  designed  for  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  self- 
consciousness  within  the  earthly  life,  and  the  various 
forms  in  which  this  office  of  pure  intelligence  is  gradu- 
ally performed  fill  nearly  the  whole  field  of  psychology. 

The  content  of  this,  however— that  which  is  sensuously 
perceived,  or  viewed,  or  conceived— on  the  other  hand,  is 
quite  as  much  neglected  as  the  entire  remainder  of  the 
soul  life,  of  susceptibility  and  volition,  which  only 
comes  under  consideration  in  as  far  as  it  can  be  applied 
to  this  problem  of  self-objectivity. 


CHAPTER   SIXTH. 

THE  MUTABLE  CONDITION  OF  THE  SOUL. 

§1.  The  life  of  the  soul  consists,  not  in  a  uniform 
possession,  but  in  the  varying  operation  of  its  faculties. 
In  this  it  is  in  most  obvious  dependence  upon  the  body. 
The  opportunity  afforded  by  certain  disturbances  of  the 
body  has  made  it  possible  to  define  this  dependence- 
more  accurately. 

Three  interpretations  of  the  observations  made  con- 
cerning  them  are,  however,  possible.  Firstly,  the  organ 
disturbed  may  be  the  operative  cause  of  the  spiritual 
function  which  can  not,  therefore,  be  performed  after 
its  disarrangement;  secondly,  this  organ  may  be  the 
sole  transmitter  of  the  irritations  necessary  to  the  soul 
in  order  that  it  may  be  induced  to  put  forth  a  function 
otherwise  explicable  out  of  its  nature;  or,  thirdly,  the 
disturbance  may  exert,  either  directly  or  by  means  of 
alterations  which  it  induces  in  other  organs,  a  positive 
activity  of  a  repressive  sort  upon  the  soul,  and  this 
prevents,  for  a  time,  the  expression  of  the  faculty  which 
itself  persists. 

Only  the  first  of  these  interpretations  appears  unten- 
able on  account  of  the  impossibility  of  considering 
psychical  functions  as  self-evident  products  of  physical 


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OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


103 


processes.  If  we  wish  to  prove  the  two  factors  actually 
connected,  one  or  the  other  of  the  last  mentioned  inter- 
pretations would  be  necessary  in  every  individual  Cfuse, 
the  first  alone  would  require  further  demonstration. 

§*2.  If  we  understand  by  consciousness  that  which  we 
more  explicitly  call  the  condition  of  wakefulness,  the 
question  arises  upon  what  depends  its  opposite,  /.  ^., 
unconsciousness,  the  first  example  of  which  is  normal 
sleep.  In  relation  to  this,  it  is  plain  that,  in  ^^eneral, 
both  methods  of  explanation  are  admissible,  but  that 
the  entrance  of  sleep  and  the  possibility  of  its  inter- 
mission does  not  indicate  an  exhaustion  of  the  nervous 
forces,  so  that  they,  consequently,  are  not  able  to  pro- 
duce the  necessary  stimuli  to  continue  wakefulness,  buti 
rather,  a  positive  hindrance,  in  various  directions 
minute,  but  as  a  total,  constituting  the  feeling  of 
weariness  which  lessens  the  interest  of  the  soul  in  the 
carrying  on  of  the  train  of  thought  and  which,  by 
means  of  this  abandonment  on  the  part  of  the  soul,  is 
increased  in  its  effectiveness. 

Instantaneous  unconsciousness  from  fear  appears  to 
originate  in  the  same  way.  Considered  as  simply  a  phys- 
ical stimulus  the  frightful  vision  or  the  jiews  heard  is  very 
insignificant  and  harmless.  Only  after  our  reflection, 
which  considers  the  significance  of  it  in  its  entire  con- 
nection with  our  existence  does  this  perception  acquire 
its  fearful  power.     Then  the  process  of  our  spiritual 


life  may  be  disturbed  immediately,  and  the  bodily  insen.- 
sibility  following  may  be  simply  the  reaction  of  these 
psychical  disturbances.  This  view  is  not  entirely 
excluded  in  the  case  of  unconsciousness  in  sickness  or 
after  injuries  of  the  brain.  The  restricting  influences 
are  felt  partly  in  the  form  of  pain,  but  not  necessarily 
so.  As  we  are  quite  unconscious  of  the  conditions 
prevailing  in  our  nerves  previous  to  sensation  and  only 
the  latter  enters  consciousness,  so,  likewise,  the  con- 
sciousness may  disappear  without  the  workings  of  the 
forces  which  quenched  it  becoming  objects  of  percep- 
tion. 

§3.  It  has,  in  recent  times,  been  frequently  thought 
that  the  activities  of  certain  irritations  conduce  to  the 
continuance  of  wakefulness  and  their  absence  to  the 
production  of  unconsciousness. 

It  is  concluded  from  experiments  upon  hypnotism 
that  in  the  complete  exclusion  of  external  excitements 
of  sense  and  prevention  of  motion  the  entire  spiritual 
activity  is  so  reduced  that  the  state  of  wakefulness 
cannot  be  maintained,  but  complete  unconsciousness 
takes  place,  a  process  which  has  been  in  a  few  cases 
observed  in  human  beings,  but  w^hich  affords  no  trust- 
worthy conclusion.  Moreover,  we  know  that  when 
interest  is  not  excited  by  some  inner  a3tivity  of  the 
mind,  as  in  a  state  of  enmil,  even  the  operation  of 
external  irritants    does    not    prevent    falling    asleep. 


m 


'!  V 


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OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


105 


Positive  agencies  are  also  known  which  dispose  to  sleep, 
such  are,  a  multitude  of  ret^ularly  recurring  rythmic 
motions  of  the  body,  rocking,  knitting,  combing,  the 
continuous  viewing  of  large  illuminated  uniform  sur- 
faces, the  convergence  of  the  axes  of  the  eyes  in 
squinting,  etc.  Lastly,  the  manipulations  of  the  mes- 
merist belong  here. 

Nevertheless,  upon  none  of  these  methods  can  certain 
conclusions  be  formed,  for  the  instances  of  their  inop- 
eration  are  extremely  frequent,  and  admit  of  a  supposi- 
tion of  a  co-operating  condition  as  yet  unknown.  In 
all  cases,  however,  at  the  very  most,  only  the  external 
condition^  on  the  one  liand^  and  its  effects,  on  the  other, 
are  known,  while  the  intermediate  processes  which  con- 
nect the  one  with  the  other  are  quite  obscure. 

§L  Tf  the  minimum  activity  of  the  waking  condition, 
/.  e.,  sensation  of  external  impressions,  be  exerted,  it 
does  not  of  necessity  follow  that  the  next  higher  activ- 
ity, i.  ^.,  the  consciousness  of  the  relations  between  the 
individual  impressions,  should  l3e  present  at  the  same 
time. 

It  is  well-known  that  in  our  daily  experience,  this 
latter  activity  may  be  absent,  as  when,  for  example,  we 
follow  with  attention  some  chain  of  thought  to  which 
these  impressions  are  foreign,  or  when  we  are  excited 
by  painful  emotions. 

There  are,  however,  pathological  derangements,  of  a 


nature,  indeed,  as  yet  unknown,  which  produce  inadapt- 
ability for  the  unification  or  understanding  of  impres- 
sions perceived  in  sense. 

§5,  We  do  not  need  to  tissume  a  corporeal  basis  to 
explain  the  retention  of  the  conception  once  received, 
/.  e,,  the  fact  of  memory.  For  even  in  material  ele- 
ments we  cannot  discover  how  far  it  is  their  materiality 
which  causes  the  observed  persistence  of  their  condi- 
tions. 

On  this  account  it  would  be  equally  pertinent  to 
ascribe  this  peculiarity  to  every  immaterial  subject 
which  is  capable  of  acting  or  receiving  action. 

However,  the  necessity  of  thinking  of  a  vast  number 
of  various  mixed  impressions  enduring  within  the  com- 
plete unity  of  the  soul  favors  the  other  view  that  this 
necessity  would  be  better  satisfied  by  assuming  a  large 
number  of  elements.  Not  as  though  the  impressions 
produce  a  condition  of  quiescence  by  their  reactions, 
but,  rather,  according  to  the  analogy  of  light  and  sound 
waves,  motions  are  assumed  which  extend  over  many 
elements  and,  unperceived,  after  interaction,  undergo 
further  development.  Nevertheless,  it  would  be  imposs- 
ible  to  use  this  general  analogy  further  in  detail. 

Each  image  of  an  approaching  object  would,  in  each 
instant,  be  the  source  of  new  vibrations  which  do  not 
obscure  the  previous  one.  How  a  single  concept  of  the 
object  can  result  out  of  these;  again,  how  two  simult- 


I 
I 


I 


i 


I! 


.1 


106 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


107 


aneous  motions  can  associate  themselves  so  that  the 
renewal  of  the  one  should  reproduce  the  other  without 
the  production  of  a  new  impact;  finallj,  how  it  hap- 
pens that  one  motion,  which  belongs  to  a  partial 
impression  of  a  complex  image,  awakens  exactly  those 
others  which  belong  with  it  as  parts  of  the  same  image 
— for  all  these  questions  a  physical  analogy  is  wanting. 
Although  this  discussion  seems  to  make  a  corporeal 
basis  unnecessary,  still,  pathological  observations  show 
that  it  is,  in  some  form,  present. 

The  fact  that  those  events  immediately  prior  to  the 
outbreak  of  an  illness  frequently  are  forgotten  may  be 
explained  by  the  fact  that  their  concepts  had  associated 
themselves  with  a  sense  of  illness  which  is  not  present 
after  convalesence,  so  that  the  key  is  wanting  the  touch 
of  which  alone  could  reproduce  them  in  memory. 

Nevertheless,  other  facts — the  impossibility  of  recall- 
ing certain  similar  groups  of  concepts,  for  example,  sir- 
names  or  single  sayings — do  not  admit  of  explanation. 

§(»,  The  unconsciousness  of  sleep  is  of  various  degrees 
of  intensity  which  can  be  measured  by  the  magnitude 
of  the  excitements  necessary  to  waking. 

It  is  often  incomplete  in  so  far  that,  for  example, 
irritations  of  the  senses  of  feeling  and  hearing  operate 
upon  the  consciousness  and  produce  the  consequent 
sensations. 

As,    however,    in    sleep,   that  attention,    which    is 


exerted  intentionally  during  wakefulness,  and  which  is 
then  conscious  of  the  complete  connection  between  the 
surrounding  objects,  chiefly  through  the  instrument- 
ality of  the  sense  of  sight,  is  absent,  the  sensations 
reproduce  themselves  without  the  selection  of  those 
which  are  apparently  connected  by  their  contents,  or 
are  brought  into  connection  by  some  prior  process  of 
conception.  Upon  this  fact  depends  the  fantastic  char- 
acter of  dreams,  which  very  frequently  collect  about  a 
very  small  nucleus  of  actual  sensation  complex  imagery 
which,  although  concordant,  is  not  in  reality  connected 
in  the  least  with  it. 

This  activity  of  consciousness  may  so  increase  as  to 
permit  the  correct  answering  of  questions,  and  it  thus 
becomes  possible  for  those  who  are  awake  to  direct,  to 
a  certain  extent,  the  train  of  thought  and,  perhaps,  even 
the  actions  of  the  sleeper,  for  no  presiding  conscious- 
ness of  actual  relations  and  the  personal  condition 
opposes  the  direct  translation  of  the  conception  excited 
into  the  resulting  motion. 

§7.  We  ascribe  considerable  influence  over  the  pro^ 
cess  of  all  spiritual  conditions  to  the  femjyeraments^  by 
which  is  simply  meant  an  expression  for  the  amount 
and  kind  of  excitability  to  external  impressions;  the 
greater  or  less  extent  to  which  the  excited  conception 
reproduces  others;  the  rapidity  with  which  concepts 
vary;  the  intensity  with  which  they  unite  with  them- 


tm 


H 
X. 


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1:1 


108 


OUTLIXKS  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


109 


selves  feelings  of  pleasure  and  pain ;  and  the  ease  with 
which  external  acts  associate  themselves  with  them. 
Notwithstanding  the  infinite  variety  of  temperaments 
considered  in  this  sense,  there  may  be  mentioned  the 
four  common  ones  as  the  most  definite  tyi)es: — 

The  samjuine,  exceedingly  mutable  and  with  vivid 
excitability;  tlie  phleff mafic,  with  slightly  varied  and 
slow,  but  not  on  this  account  feeble,  reactions  ;  the 
choloric,  with  one-sided  receptivity  and  great  energy  in 
certain  directions;  the  sentimeutal  (in  place  of  the 
melancholic),  distinguished  by  especial  receptivity  to 
the  susceptibilities  of  all  possible  relations,  but  which  is 
not  affected  by  the  simply  matter-of-fact. 

It  is  necessary  to  avoid  confusing  the  temperaments 
with  various  pathological  conditions  or  peculiarities  of 
character,  although  it  is  clear  that  each  temperament 
has  its  strong  and  weak  side  for  moral  culture  and 
bodily  health.  We  have  no  definite  knowledge  con- 
cerning the  corporeal  basis  of  the  temperaments. 

§8.  Phrenohiiy  or  Cranioscopi/  has  claimed  to  dis- 
cover, by  external  indications,  a  series  of  organs  for  the 
individual  spiritual  functions. 

This  is,  indeed,  without  any  foundation,  in  as  far  as 
it  sought  to  define  the  position  of  these  organs  and  to 
separate  them  in  space.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  not 
entirely  in  error  when  viewing  certain  external  forma- 
tions as  simply  the  indications  which  show  that  the, 


otherwise  unknown,  conditions  exist,  upon  which  actu- 
ally depend,  we  know  not  how,  the  particular  intensity 
of  these  functions. 

It  is  prevented  from  becoming  such  a  useful  collec- 
tion of  facts,  however,  by  another  fault.  Only  those 
functions  or  talents  can  be  taken  into  account  which 
are  not  ambiguous  and,  when  present  cannot  be  well 
concealed  nor  yet  counterfeited  when  absent,  for  exam- 
ple, musical,  artistic  or  mathematical  talents,  of  all 
which  we  have  actual  examples  enough  of  inheritance 
in  a  family. 

But  peculiarities  of  character  which  can  be  estimated 
only  by  a  delicate  knowledge  of  human  nature,  and  not 
even  then  with  certainty,  and  which,  in  a  given  case, 
may  be  the  product,  not  simply  of  natural  abilities,  but 
of  education  and  accident,  are  not  at  all  adapted  to  this 
determination,  although  often  so  used. 

§9.  A  Stnsonum  commune  and,  more  recently,  a 
motorium  commune  have  been  distinguished.  The 
necessary  activity  of  the  first  results  from  the  fact  that 
the  individual  impressions  cannot  become  objects  of 
the  cognition  of  the  soul  as  such  but  only  after  com- 
bination or  some  other  adjustment.  The  organ  has  this 
office,  the  simple  collection  of  the  impressions  into 
one  place  seems  unnecessary.  How  far  this  process 
extends  we  do  not  know,  apparently  it  may  be  related 
to  the  previously  explained  process  of  apprehension  of 


: 


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ii 


110 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


Ill 


space,  to  which,  perhaps,  a  large  part  of  the  brain  is 
dedicated. 

It  would  be  assumed  concerning  a  rwo/oriMm  commune 
that  it  combines  the  individual  roots  of  the  motor 
nerves  in  such  various  ways  that  there  results  a  series 
of  subordinated  centres,  each  of  which  needs  but  a 
single  impulse  in  order  to  set  in  motion  at  once  many 
properly  combined  activities.  The  sort  of  effect  which 
the  soul  exerts  upon  these  points  is  certainly  incorrectly 
conceived,  if  it  be  assumed  that  the  impulses  coming 
from  the  soul  are  of  identical  sorts  and  only  distin- 
guished in  their  effects  by  the  direction  which  they 
take,  and  hence  the  various  termini  which  they  finally 
reach. 

The  determination  of  such  a  direction  would  be 
impossible  unless  the  soul  possessed  a  knowledge  of  the 
structure  of  the  brain  with  which  we  cannot  credit  it. 
We  assume,  therefore,  on  the  contrary,  that  every 
concept  of  motion,  a,  which  arises  in  the  soul  is  a 
qualitatively  different  condition  from  another  concept 
of  motion,  b. 

To  a  belongs  the  resulting  condition  A,  to  b.  another, 
B.  Both  these  conditions  can  only  take  place  in  those 
points  of  the  nervous  system  which  are  adapted  by 
their  organization  to  l^e  excited  thereby,  just  as  a  glass, 
for  example,  only  responds  to  tho.*e  tones  which  are 
capable  of  producing  vibrations  in  it  by  impact.  The 
impulses  of  the  soul  do  not.  then,  require  to  be  directed, 


but  find  the  place  for  their  application  spontaneously. 
It  should  not  be  understood,  however,  that  they  require 
to  pass  over  a  distance  from  a  given  point  to  that  place. 

We  should  conceive  the  function  of  the  organ  of 
speech  in  a  similar  way,  this  being  the  only  one  which 
has,  with  considerable  certainty,  been  referred  to  a 
definite  spot  in  the  hemispheres  of  the  cerebrum. 

Injury  of  this  spot  prevents  the  possibility  of  com- 
bining the  conceived  sound-pictures  of  a  word  with  the 
excitement  of  motions  in  the  muscles  of  speech  by 
which  the  actual  articulation  of  the  sound  is  produced. 

Although  we  can  form  but  little  conception  of  the 
sort  of  activity  incumbent  upon  the  organ,  we  are  yet 
more  in  the  dark  as  to  the  method  by  which  such  a  dis- 
turbance in  its  activity  can  be  produced  as  takes  place 
in  a  pathological  state  of  aphony. 

§10.  For  the  higher  spiritual  faculties  which  consist 
in  the  judgment  upon  relations  of  given  concepts,  we 
do  not  know  how  to  prove  empirically  a  definite  cor- 
poreal organ,  nor  yet  how  to  conceive  how  such  an  one 
would  subserve  for  the  solution  of  the  important  part 
of  the  problem,  i.  ^.,  the  production  of  the  act  of  judg- 
ment itself. 

It  is  conceivable,  on  the  other  hand,  that  this  higher 
activity  might  be  the  complete  and  clear  representation 
of  those  contents  upon  which  judgment  is  to  be  passed, 
and  hence  might  be  considered   but   the   undisturbed 


112 


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OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


113 


function  of  those  organs  which  contribute,  first,  to  the 
sensuous  perceptions,  then,  to  their  reproduction  and 
connection  with  others,  finally,  to  the  proper  connec- 
tion with  the  feelings  of  the  value  of  each. 

§11.  There  remains  to  be  considered  a  large  number 
of  statements  concerning  abnormal  spiritual  activities 
in  conditions  of  bodily  ailment.  The  various  instances 
of  such  cases  are  not  all  equally  incredible.  The  assump- 
tion that  cases  exist  of  an  immediate  communicatioi^  of 
consciousness  with  distant  parts  of  the  external  world 
without  the  agency  of  the  physical,  cannot  be  dismissed 
a  priori^  for  all  mediate  perception  must  be  reduced,  in 
the  last  instance  to  immediate.  Experience  only  can 
teach  us  when  physical  mediation  is  present  and  when 
not.  Certain  it  is  that  the  entire  wakeful  and  spiritual 
life,  which  alone  is  amenable  to  accurate  experimenta- 
tion, is  connected  with  the  external  world  by  physical 
mediation. 

Senseless  is  the  assumption,  on  the  other  hand, 
that  the  given  appearances  may  be  explained  through- 
out by  the  operation  of  that  animal  magnetism 
which  is  supposed  to  be  discovered.  Again,  it  is 
not  impossible  that  a  simple  sensation,  such  as  that 
of  light,  can  originate  in  nerves  not  designed  for  them, 
but  it  is  quite  impossible  that  an  orderly  apprehension 
of  a  multiplicity  of  sensations,  for  example,  the  reading 
of  a  letter,  should  take  place  in  superficial  nerves  which 


are  not,  like  the  optic  nerve,  constructed  for  this  com- 
bination of  impressions. 

Finally,  it  is  possible  that  various  spiritual  functions 
take  place  more  vividly  in  such  pathological  conditions 
as  diminish  the  regular  intercourse  with  the  external 
worid,  and  thus  remove  those  little  cares  and  the  timid- 
ity which  in  ordinary  life  stand  opposed  to  the  exercise 
of  a  given  faculty. 

In  these  cases,  for  example,  when  a  problem  is  solved 
in  somnambulance  which  was  before  insoluble,  this 
only  takes  place  through  the  agency  of  those  faculties 
which  have  been  cultivated  during  the  wakeful  state. 
That  nothing  higher  is  reached  in  this  condition 
than  is  attainable  in  a  waking  condition  is  shown  hr 
the  unimportant  content  of  all  the  disclosures  received 
in  it,  and  by  the  fact  that  the  multitude  of  such  cases 
have  not  combinedly  produced  any  advance  in  our 
knowledge. 


*ll 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


115 


CHAPTER  SEVENTH. 


THE  REALM  OF  SOULS. 


§1.  We  have  no  reason  to  speak  of  a  soul  at  all 
except  where,  without  this  assumption,  facts  would  be 
incomprehensible.  In  reality,  however,  such  inspiration 
may  extend  further  than  required  by  this  test.  An 
inspiration  of  all  things  has  been  conceived  of,  but  this 
thought,  although  there  may  be  good  ground  for  it, 
has,  as  yet,  remained  unfruitful  for  the  explanation  of 
individual  appearances. 

In  sooth,  plant-souls  have  been  bespoken  with  great 
partiality,  (Fechner,  Nanna,  oder  ueber  das  Seelenleben 
der  Pflanzen;  Leipzig,  1848,)  and  certainly  inspiration 
is  not  connected  with  the  centralized  structure  which 
we  observe  in  animals  and  fail  to  find  in  plants.  Never- 
theless, the  more  the  organization  of  the  plant,  and 
hence  the  expressions,  by  means  of  which  alone  its 
inner  life  can  become  an  objectof  our  knowledge,  varies 
from  that  structure,  so  much  the  less  does  it  become 
possible  to  produce  from  this  phantasy  (although  it  may 
be  correct)  an  object  of  science.  The  animal  kingdom, 
then,  alone  remains  as  affording  us  such  an  fiscending 
series  in  spiritual  life. 


§2.  It  would  be  a  mistake  to  consider  all  animal 
souls  as  beings  originally  of  the  same  sort,  which  either 
were  afterwards  furnished  with  powers  or  were  adapted 
simply  by  the  diversity  of  the  external  impressions  for 
the  greater  or  less  development  and  the  peculiarities  of 
their  spiritual  perfection. 

We  consider  ''  soul,"  as  before,  only  as  a  title  which 
applies  to  all  those  beings  which  experience  their  inner 
conditions  and  the  reactions  from  excitements  in  the 
form  of  concepts,  susceptions  and  volitions. 

But  that  which  is  expressed  by  this  term  in  common 
phrase,  i.  e.,  the  real  heinrj  of  the  soul,  may  differ 
as  essentially  as  we  consider  gold,  silver  and  lead 
to  do,  although  they  only  show  this  diversity  by  the 
differences  in  the  degree  of  the  same  physical  qualities, 
weight,  cohesion,  hardness  and  others. 

The  question  may  arise  where  the  idea  of  the 
instinct  of  animals  comes  in,  to  which  is  to  be  reck- 
oned not  simply  remarkable  instinctive  impulses  but 
the  entire  typical  life  of  all  lower  animals.  Per- 
haps, for  example,  in  the  lower  classes  the  souls 
are  not  prepared  to  the  same  extent  for  learning  from 
experience,  but,  in  agreement  with  their  bodily  organ- 
ization, have  an  original  content  in  consciousness  by 
which  they  are  regulated  in  the  same  way  that  we 
are  sometimes  by  the  accidentally  formed  ideas  of 
dreams.  However,  this  assumptio)i  cannot  be  fruitfully 
pursued. 


116 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


117 


As  a  farther  assistance  in  the  explanation  it  may  be 
added  that,  in  an  entirely  different  organization  of  the 
nervous  system,  perhaps  the  vegetative  processes,  of 
which  we  are  quite  unconscious,  are  objects  of  percep- 
tion and  starting  points  for  acts  which  appear  reason- 
less to  us.  Not  less  probably,  there  may  exist  sensa- 
tions of  external  circumstances,  the  organs  for  which 
we  do  not  possess,  as,  for  example,  sensitiveness  to 
minute  electric  variations  in  the  environment  from 
which  might  result  sensitiveness  to  changes  in  the 
weather,  not  as  premonitions  of  the  future,  but  as 
perceptions  of  what  already  exists.  Nevertheless,  it 
is  wrong  to  refer  all  animal  soul-life  to  such  instinct. 
For  certainly  there  exist  in  their  actions  accommoda- 
tions to  circumstances  in  such  a  way  that  the  same 
reflection  and  use  of  experience,  upon  which  our  every 
day  existence  rests  must  exist  in  them  as  well. 

§3.  If  the  understand hig  and  its  activity,  fhou</ht, 
are  to  serve  as  the  distinguishing  characteristics  of 
humanity  we  must  insist  that  the  understanding  does 
not  simply  allow  the  process  of  conception  to  go  on 
according  to  mechanical  laws,  but  puts  forth  an  activity 
which  separates  those  conceptions  not  belonging 
together  and  not  merely  permits  those  belonging 
together  to  remain  sq,  but  causes  them  to  be  at  once 
conceived  in  the  form  of  general  notions  or  laws  indic- 
ating that  they  belong  together. 


There  is  no  occiision  for  referring  such  comprehensive 
reflection  to  animals  in  order  to  explain  the  purpose 
seen  in  their  activities,  and  the  way  in  which  they 
adapt  themselves  to  circumstances.  The  ordinary  pro- 
cesses of  conception  (inasmuch  as  even  they  gradually 
associate  themselves  according  to  their  affinities)  serve 
quite  9.S  well  for  them  as  they  do  even  for  man  in  the 
greater  part  of  every-day  life. 

If  the  understanding  or  thought  be  considered  as  a 
distinctive  character  of  man,  the    following    circum- 
stances   may  be  mentioned  which   favor   its   develop- 
ment:— The  long  period  of  helpless  childhood,  which 
makes   the   collection    of   many   experiences  possible; 
then  the  skilfulness  of  the  hand  which  makes  man  a 
born  experimenter,  and  permits  a  multitude  of  con- 
nected observations;  finally,  speech,  partly  because  the 
sound  images,  as  symbols  of  conceptions,  serve  to  fix 
their  content  and    make    possible  the  combination  of 
many  conceptions  into  an  object  of  internal  contempla- 
tion ;  partly,  and  chiefly,  because  communication  causes 
a   further  development  of  each  individual  process  of 
conception  through  the  stimulating,  enriching  and  cor- 
recting supervention  of  new  chains  of  thought. 

§4.  Reason  is  considered  the  most  definite  peculiarity 
of  man,  and  by  this  is  understood  the  faculty  of  per- 
ceiving immediately  eternal  verities  in  itself  whenever 
external  experience  has  furnished  to  consciousness  the 


« 


118 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


facts  concerning  which  it  has  to  form  a  judgment,  par- 
ticularly concerning  moral  propriety  or  impropriety. 

We  know  nothing  regarding  the  primal  psychological 
origin  of  this  simplest  law  of  our  knowledge  and  hence 
have  reason  to  consider  it  one  of  those  reactions  in  the 
original  nature  of  the  spirit  which  can  never  be 
explained  by  the  external  occasions  which  are,  never- 
theless, necessary  that  it  may  be  awakened,  although 
this  explanation  has  been  attempted. 

It  is,  moreover,  indifferent  whether  they  be  consid- 
ered as  inborn  endowments  or  acquired  by  experience  in 
life,  if  it  only  be  admitted  that,  after  it  has  been  formed, 
it  is  the  expression  of  truth,  found,  indeed,  in  experi- 
ence, but,  as  to  its  content  and  value,  quite  independent 
of  it. 


§5.  Moral  truths  are  designed  to  govern  the  will.  Of 
this,  in  like  manner,  we  only  speak  in  the  case  of  man, 
according  no  volition  to  the  acts  of  animals  because  we 
consider  their  acts  as  simply  the  natural  results  of  im- 
pulses but  not  as  acts  of  a  will.  Impulses  are  originally 
but  feelings,  and  chiefly  those  of  displeasure,  or  of 
unrest.  They  are  usually  connected  with  incitations  to 
motion  which,  after  the  manner  of  reflex  motions,  lead 
to  all  sorts  of  motions  which  have  proven,  after  more 
or  fewer  errors,  the  proper  ones  to  allay  that  discom- 
fort. Then  after  the  feeling  of  discomfort  has  com- 
bined  with   the  concept   of   that   act   by   which    the 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


119 


discomfort  was  allayed,  a  real  impulse  is  formed  which 
has  a  goal  to  reach,  and  which  sways  the  acts  of  the 
soul.  In  the  same  way  many  operations  of  human  life 
are  performed  which  we  incorrectly  say  are  willed  when, 
in  fact,  simply  no  will  was  exerted  to  prevent  their 
taking  place. 

We  can  only  speak  correctly  of  will  when  the 
motives  of  various  actions  and  their  values  are  compared 
in  full  consciousness,  and  then  a  choice  is  made  between 
them.  It  is  quite  unreasonable  to  assume  that  we  ex- 
press by  the  words  ^'  I  will ''  no  more  than  is  involved 
in  the  future  tense  "  I  shall."  This  would  only  be  the 
case  if  the  verb,  the  future  tense  of  which  is  used,  itself 
means  an  act  in  the  notion  of  which  there  inheres  the 
idea  cf  volition.  Unprejudiced  observation  must  admit 
that  the  peculiar  approval  of  a  conceived  act  or  the 
adoption  of  a  resolution,  however  impossible  it  may  be 
to  construe  it,  is  an  actual  process  within  us,  inexplic- 
able by  the  mechanism  of  conception. 


§(>.  And  if  this  characteristic  of  the  will  be  conceded 
it  would  be  expected,  from  the  standpoint  of  explana- 
tory science,  that  the  utterances  of  the  will  would  be 
determined  by  definite  laws.  If  ethics  assert  the  free- 
dom of  the  will  psychology  need  not  be  appealed  to  to 
decide,  on  the  basis  of,  so-called,  experience,  whether 
this  freedom  is  possible. 

It  is  not  true  that  we  find  in  our  subjective  observa- 


120 


OUTLINES    OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


tion  the  determining  causes  of  all  our  acts.  Very  often 
we  find  nothing,  and,  even  where  we  think  we  have 
found  something,  it  is  ambiguous,  for  if  the  motives  for 
two  opposed  acts,  a  and  b,  have  been  long  compared  in 
reflection,  and  then  a  decision  in  favor  of  a  is  formed, 
it  will  always  afterward  appear  as  though  the  reasons 
in  favor  of  a,  by  their  forceful ness  hiid  mechanically 
subdued  those  for  b,  and  this  semblance  would  result 
just  the  same  if  the  decision  in  favor  of  a  had  been 
really  reached  by  a  completely  undetermined  freedom. 

It  must  be  relegated  to  metaphysics  to  inquire 
whether  the  notion  of  such  freedom  is  harmonizable 
with  our  universal  apprehension  of  the  world,  and  to 
practical  philosophy  to  inquire  if  it  promises  the 
advantage  which  caused  its  employment. 


PART  THIRD. 


THE  STRUCTURE  OF  THE  BRAIN. 


-BY- 


C.     L.     HERRICK, 


STRUCTURE  OF  THE  BRAIN. 


I 


I 


PRIMITIVE  ELEMENTS. 

§1.  The  animal  body,  complex  and  mysterious  as  it 
seems,  and  diverse  and  complicated  as  its  various  organs 
really  are,  is  composed  of  nothing  but  cells  and  cell 
derivatives. 

As  stated  by  Lotze,  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  conceiv- 
ing of  man  iis  a  unit-entity  surrounded  by  or  resident  in  a 
heterogeneous  agglomeration  of  corporeal  units,  and 
yet  it  is  impossible  to  picture  to  ourselves  the  way  in 
which  the  various  processes  which  bring  about  sensa- 
tions and  which  are  really  only  states  in  various  unlike 
bodily  elements  transmit  the  perfected  product  to  our 
spiritual  apprehension.  However,  although  there  is  no 
physical  analogy  for  the  process  it  must  be  accepted  as 
a  fact,  and  we  may,  at  least,  be  interested  to  learn  just 
what  adjustments  in  the  body  are  necessary  to  such  and 
such  spiritual  affectations,  and  through  what  mediation 
the  spirit  controls  the  body. 

The  nervous  system  is  no  exception  to  the  above 
statement,  and  all  of  that  wonderful  mechanism  which 
we  call  the  brain,  and  which  is  the  physical  basis  of 
character  and  the  soil  in  which  the  soul,  in  its  corporeal 


126 


OUTLINES  OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


relations,  is  rooted,  is  a  mass  of  cells  and  cell  products 
like  the  muscles  and  bones  which  do  its  bidding. 

§3.  All  of  these  simplest  morphological  elements  are 
descended,  in  the  case  of  every  individual,  from  one.  or 
rather,  two  primitive  cells-egg  and  sperm.     Only  in 
the  lowest  group  of  animals.  Protozoa,  does  the  entire 
organism  consist  of  but  a  single  cell.     In  this  case  the 
cell  as  a  whole  performs  all   the  functions  devolving 
upon   a  vital  being,   and,  in  the  absence  of  nervous 
organs,  the  whole  animal  may  be  said  to  do  the  thinking 
and  feeling  as  well  as  feeding  and  moving.   This  primi- 
tive condition  is  never  entirely  lost  in  any  living  cell 
however  highly  differentiated  the  animal,  and  however 
restncted,  as  a  consequence,  the  functions  of  the  indi- 
vidual parts  may  be.     The  last  function  which  could  be 
given  up  would  be  nutrition,  for  should  a  cell  become 
too  highly  specialized  to  take  nutriment  its  life  would 
at  once  be  lost.     It  is  found,  moreover,  that  others  of 
the  original  functions  persist,  though  to  a  different  ex- 
tent in  different  types  of  cells,  in  many  of  the  cellular 
elements  of  the  body.     In  animals  of  a  higher  rank 
than  the  Protozoa  differentiation  is  inaugurated  by  the 
subdivision  of  the  primitive  cell  into  numerous  similar 
bodies  and  finally  into  groups  of  such  cells,  the  func- 
tions of  which  differ  with  their  position. 

§3.  Ordinarily,  the  first  stage  in  this  process  is  the 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


127 


formation  of   a   loose  aggregation  of  cells  called  the 
morula,  after  which  a  central  cavity  may  be  formed  by 
the  further  subdivision  and   growth  of  the  peripheral 
cells,  and  a  hollow  sphere  called  the  bJastula  results.    A 
portion  of  the  cells  may  now  become  invaginated   so 
that  a  double  sack  is  formed.     In  this,  or  in  analagous 
ways,  a  body,  consisting  of  two  germ  layers,  ectoderm 
and  entoderm,  arises,  and  from  these  two  layers  of  cells 
all  the  parts  of  the  body  are  produced  by  similar  pro- 
cesses of  invagination  or  by  the  migration  of  groups  of 
cells  to  the  cavities  between  these  germ  layers.   In  such 
animals  as  never  pass  beyond  the  gasfrula  stage  the 
ectoderm  commonly  furnishes  the  cells   charged  with 
locomotion  and  nervous  functions,  while  the   entoderm 
is  charged  with  nutrition.     Even  in  higher  animals,  in 
which  these  systems  are  perfectly  distinct  in  adult  life, 
the  organs  of  locomotion  and  enervation  spring  primar- 
ily from  the   ectoderm,  while  the  digestive   system  is 
only  the  greatly  modified  entoderm. 


§4.  In  the  process  of  development,  the  cells,  once 
similar,  become  greatly  modified,  and  it  is  only  by  the 
help  of  high  powers  of  the  microscope  and  the  delicate 
manipulations  of  modern  histology  that  the  cellular 
character  can  be  discovered  in  many  tissues. 

Nervous  tissue  consists,  in  general,  of  two  distinct 
elements — ganglion  cells  and  nervous  fibres.  The 
latter  may  be  considered  as  simply  appendages  to  the 


128 


OUTLINKS  OF  PSY(  HOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


129 


former.  The  cell,  as  we  have  seen,  is  the  unit  of  struc- 
ture, and  as  nerve  cells  are  designed  to  exert  their 
influence  in  all  parts  of  the  organism,  it  is  evident  that 
when  differentiation  of  the  body  removes  the  generators 
of  nerve  power  from  immediate  contact  with  the  parts 
to  be  affected  there  must  be  provided  conducting  chan- 
nels of  nervous  matter  to  transmit  the  excitation.  This 
is  the  office  of  the  nerves. 

Nerve  cells  vary  greatly  in  form  and  size,  but  consis 
of  a  nucleated,  pigmented  mass  of  sarcode,  usually  with 
no  true  cell  wall,  and  giving  off  nerve  fibres  composed 
of  a  similar  substance.  8ome  nerve  cells  are  so  large  as 
to  be  visible  to  the  unassisted  eye,  while  others  are 
among  the  most  minute  morphological  elements. 

Nerves  are  essentially  bundles  of  minute  fibres 
insolated  by  various  protective  sheaths.  As  a  nerve 
issues  from  its  cell  it  is  usually  without  a  sheath, 
and  then  consists  only  of  a  bundle  of  nerve  fibres  con- 
stituting the,  so-called,  (txis  ct/Iinder,  This,  the  essential 
portion,  is  surrounded  by  two  sheaths  which  unite, 
node-like,  at  intervals.  Each  nerve  is  thus  a  bundle  of 
primitive  fiibrilla^  surrounded  by  the  medular  sheath 
and  the  jyrimit ire  sheath  of  Sfranif. 

§5.  Of  both  these  elements,  ganglion  cells  and  nerve 
fibres,  there  are  two  sorts,  motory  and  sensory.  All  the 
various  procssses  of  mental  life  may  be  divided  into  two 
primary  groups;  first,  those  concerned  with  influences 


from  without  and,  second,  those  which  are  designed  to 
exert  influences  upon  the  bodily  organs.  So  far,  at 
least,  as  the  simpler  acts  of  mind  are  concerned,  they 
may  l)e  said  to  consist  of  shocks  from  without  and  reac- 
tions from  within,  hence  we  expect  to  find,  as  we  do, 
that  the  centripital  and  the  centrifugal  channels  are 
connected  by  linking  nervous  threads.  The  simplest 
connection  of  a  nervous. system  will  then  picture  to  us 
a  sensitive  apparatus  upon  the  surface  of  the  body  which 
selects  certain  of  the  many  external  irritants  to  trans- 
mit to  the  brain.  Here  the  nerve  terminates  in  a 
ganglion  cell  which  is  excited  to  ac'ion,  the  kind  of 
action  l)eing  determined  by  the  character  of  the  stim- 
ulus, its  modification  in  the  organ  of  sense,  but  particu- 
larly by  the  structure  of  the  ganglion  cell  itself.  We 
must  avoid  considering  the  activity  of  the  ganglion  cell 
as  caused  simply  by  the  impulse  which  is  received  from 
the  nerve.  The  nerve  furnishes  the  occasion — the  form 
of  the  reaction  depends  upon  the  structure  and  position 
of  the  cell.  The  third  link  in  this  chain  of  processes 
is  the  transmission  of  this  new  and  different  stimulus  to 
a  ganglion  seated  at  the  root  of  a  motory  nerve.  Here 
again  it  is  conceivable  that  the  character  of  the  excite- 
ment is  completely  changed  in  a  manner  dependent 
very  largely  upon  the  position  and  structure  of  the 
motory  ganglion.  The  last  nervous  process  is  a  state 
of  excitement  transmitted  through  the  motory  nerve 
which  acts  like  an  electric  shock  upon  various  muscles 


^ 


I- 


130 


OUTLIiiKS   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


131 


at  the  peripheral  termini  causing  contractions  in  the 
sensitive  niyolon  material. 

All  the  above  processes  are  explicable  according  to 
physical  analogies,  but  this  does  not  explain  in  the  least 
how  any  of  these  processes  are  brought  into  relation 
with  the  soul  so  as  to  excite  in  consciousness*  an  appre- 
hension of  external  happenings  or  internal  states. 

We  discover  from  experience  that  sensations  from 
various  organs  as  well  as  the  most  diverse  mental  states 
•succeed  in  producing  activities  in  one  and  the  same 
motory  centre,  so  we  are  prepared  for  the  discovery  of 
anatomy  that  there  is  the  most  intimate  anastamosis  of 
the  various  ganglion  cells,  so  that  the  simple  picture 
drawn  above  must  be  filled  in  with  many  details.  No 
crant'lion  is  affected  without  transmitting  more  or  less 
of  its  agitation  to  neighbouring  parts,  and  the  intimacy 
of  connection  is  different  in  aifferent  sets  of  cells  ; 
thus  the  perfection  of  the  brain  as  an  organ  of  mind 
depends  fis  much  upon  the  perfection  of  the  correlation 
and  subordination  of  the  various  parts  as  upon  the  size 
and  delicacy  of  its  material. 

CHEMICAL  CONSTITUENTS. 

§6,  Before  taking  up  the  more  intimate  description 
of  the  brain,  it  may  be  well  to  mention  some  of  the 
chemical  peculiarities  of  nervous  matter.  Although 
little  is  known  of  the  composition  of  the  materials  in 
which  nervous  functions  reside,  it  is  at  least  certain  that 


they  are  very  complex  and  in  a  state  of  very  unstable 
equilibrium.  Of  these  substances  Lecithin,  Cerebin 
and  Cholestrin,  having  the  formulas  C44H:oNP09, 
CarHrisNOa,  and  C36H44O,  respectively,  are  most  im- 
important.  Lecithin  is  a  substance  resembling  fat^ 
composed  of  the  radical  of  the  fatty  acids,  phosphoric 
acid,  and  clycerine,  united  with  the  amine  base, 
Neurine.  In  addition  to  these  are  various  albuminous 
compounds  from  which  the  above  may  be  derived. 
Another  substance,  Nuclein,  is  among  the  elements 
but  is  found  in  the  nuclei  of  all  active  cells,  so  that  it 
cannot  be  reckoned  among  the  necessary  constituents 
of  nervous  matter.  The  primitive  fibrillae,  as  well  as 
the  nuclei  of  the  ganglion  cells  are  rich  in  albuminous 
matter,  while  the  protoplasm  of  the  ganglia  and  the 
nerves  seems  to  be  largely  made  up  of  Lecithin  and 
Cerebrin.  This  much  is  clear,  that  the  physical  force 
liberated  in  all  nervous  processes  is  derived  from  the 
decomposition  of  the  highly  complex  and  unstable 
molecules  of  the  nervous  tissues.  The  materials  needed 
to  supply  the  waste  thus  produced  are  afforded  by  the 
blood,  although  some  of  the  specific  nervous  compounds 
seem  to  l)e  the  result  of  a  synthesis  produced  on  the 
spot  where  they  are  needed  from  materials  richly  sup- 
plied by  the  general  circulation.  (For  a  valuable  dis- 
cussion of  the  way  the  force  resulting  from  the 
chemical  changes  taking  place  in  the  nervous  matter  of 
ganglia  and  nerve  cells  is  applied,  or  the  "  physiological 


132 


OUTLINES   OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


mechiinics  of  nerve-substance,"  see  Wiindt,  Grimdzuege 
der  Physiologischen  Psychologie,  Chapter  VI.,  under 
the  above  caption.)  A  further  discussion  of  this  sub- 
ject is  not  here  permissible. 

FORM  AND  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  CENTRAL 
PORTION  OF  THE  NERVOUS  SYSTEM. 

§7.  The  earliest  condition  of  the    nervous   system 
which  we    need  to  notice  finds  the  brain  and  spinal 
cord  in   the  form   of    a    hollow    cylinder    somewhat 
expanded  and  modified  anteriorly.     This  front  or  brain 
portion  now  l)egins  to  grow  much  more  rapidly  than 
the  rest  and  its   walls   expand    and   l^ecome   variously 
folded  upon  themselves  and  almost  all  of  the  compli- 
cated mechanism  of  the  brain  in  man  is  derived  from 
repetitions  of  this  process  of  in-  and  evagination   of 
the  walls  of  the  primitive  neural  tube.     Three  expan- 
sions appear  at  first,  forming  the  first  indications   of 
the  differentiation  about  to  take  place.     The  anterior  of 
these  prominences  divides  to  form  the  cerebral  hemi- 
spheres and  optic  thalmi,  the  middle  one  forms  the 
optic  lobes  or  corpus  bigeminum,  while  the  posterior 
one   produces   the  cerebellum  and   medula  oblongata. 

(Fig.  1,  Plate  I.)' 

The  separate  chambers  thus  formed  are  still  connected 
with  each  other  and  the  central  cavity  of  the  spinal 
cord.     (Fig.  2,  Plate  I.) 

Now   liegins   a  separation    of    the    above-described 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


188 


organs  into  pairs,  a  process  which  is  nearly  complete  in 
the  case  of  the  hemispheres;  the  thalmi  optic  open  out- 
wardly; the  separation  is  simply  indicated  in  the  case  of 
the  lobi  optici;  while  the  cerebellum  divides  and  again 
unites.  As  a  result  of  this  process,  of  course,  the  cavity 
within  is  greatly  modified,  that  contained  in  the  hemi- 
spheres becomes  separated  into  two,  called  the  first  and 
second  ventricles,  that  portion  within  the  thalmi  is 
called  the  third  ventricle.  The  opening  in  the  medula 
is  called  the  fourth  ventricle  and  is  connected  bv  a  nar- 
row  canal  (the  aqwvdnctu^  stflrii)  with  the  third  ven- 
tricle. There  is  also  a  small  cavity  connecting  the 
cerebellum  with  the  brain  basis.  The  most  remarkable 
change  which  now  takes  place  is  the  change  of  position 
in  the  anterior  portion  of  the  nervous  axis.  At  first 
the  ])rain  is  obviously  the  continuation  of  the  spinal 
cord,  and  so  remains  in  fishes  and  amphibians  (Fig  8, 
Plate  I),  but  in  higher  vertebrates  great  flextures 
change  the  original  position,  and  great  and  unequal 
growth  obscures  the  original  relations.  Two  important 
changes  thus  brought  about  may  be  mentioned.  First, 
the  excessive  development  of  the  cerebrum  causes  it  to 
extend  beyond  and  overlap  first  the  corpus  bigeminum 
and  finally  the  cerel)ellum;  second,  the  growth  also 
causes  foldings  and  impressed  lines  called  fissures, 
the  first  of  which  to  appear  is  thefissura  silvii.  Another 
fissure  is  opposed  to  the  silvian  and  nearly  at  right 
angles  to  it — the  fissure  of  Rolando  or  medium  sulcus. 


134 


OUTLINES    OF    PSYCHOLOGY. 


By  this  means  the  cerebrum  is  divided  into  h>bes,  of 
which  the  frontal,  parietal  and  occipital  are  most 
important.  In  man,  the  whole  surface  of  the  cerebrum 
is  thrown  into  convolutions  which  conform  more  or  less 
to  the  direction  of  the  principal  sulci  mentioned  (Fig. 

4,  Plate  I). 

The  spinal  cord  is  that  portion  of  the  primitive  ner- 
vous tulje  which  changes  least,  but,  notwithstanding, 
great  changes  in  form  and  structure  are  encountered 
here  also.     The  central  canal  becomes  reduced  in  size 
and  the  whole  is  divided  into  two  symmetrical  halves  by 
a  longitudinal  fissure  both  before  and  behind.     These 
halves   are   connected   by   two   commissures   or  nerve 
bundles— the  anterior  and  posterior  commissures.     The 
substance  of  the  cord  is  composed  of  grey  material  or 
ganglion  cells  collected  in  two  masses  in  the  centre  of 
white  external  matter  con- 
sisting  or   threads   passing 
forward   toward   the  brain. 
The   nerves    which    spring 
from  the  anterior  or  ven- 
tral side  are  motory   while 
the     posterior     roots     sup- 
ply sensitive  nerves.     (Fig. 
5.*) 


*  Fig  5  -  Tran^erse  Section  of  the  Lower  Part  of  the  Spinal  Cord. 

b  Anterior;  c,  Posterior  median  groove;  fir,  Spinal  canal;  *,  PoBtenor; 
i,  Anierior  nerve  roots;  d,  Anterior  comus,  with  larger  cells;  «,  Posterior 
cornus,  with  email  ganglion  cells;  /,  Auterior;  h.  Posterior  commissurei. 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


185 


The  meduhi  ohhngata  is  simply  a  somewhat  modified 
anterior  portion  of  the  spinal  cord,  and  the  rather 
simple  arrangement  of  the  nervous  fibres  is  here  ex- 
changed for  a  more  complicated  order.  The  longitudinal 
fibres  group  themselves  into  various  bundles  called  the 
pyramids,  the  lateral  and  posterior  bundles,  which 
latter  forms  the  funiculus  gracilis,  funiculus  cuneatus 
etc.  Upon  the  pyramids  is  seated  a  pair  of  peculiar 
prominences  called  the  olives. 

The  cerehellum  is  differentiated  early,  and,  like  the 

other  parts  of  the  brain  mantle,  as  distinguished  from 

its  basis,  consists  of  an  external   or  cortical  layer  of 

grey  or  cellular  matter,  which  in  man,  is  thrown  into 

strong   convolutions,  thus   presenting  in   section    the 

re<nilar  fij^ure  known  as  the  arbor    vitae.     The   cere- 

bellum  receives  several  distinct  bundles  of  nerves,  the 

lower  of  which  forms  the  processus  ad  med.  ohlonga- 

turn,  the  upper  being  the  processus  ad  corpus  bif/em- 

inuw.     From  the  sides 

issue    the    processi    ad 

ponieni  which  unite  to 

form   a   band  of   fibres 

bridging  over  the  med- 

ula,    and   hence   called 

the  pons  rahri.     (Fig. 

6.*) 


n 


♦Fig.  6.  -Basal  portion  of  Brain  frotn  above.  ( A  portion  of  the  cerebellum 
is  removed.)  TA,  Thalmi  optici;  Con,  Conari urn ;  nad<, Conns bigeminum 


130 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSY(  HOLOGY. 


137 


The  spinal  cord  is  produced  forward  after  passing,  as 
we  have  seen,  through  the  medida,  as  the  two  cnira 
^  which  support,  like  stalks,  the  hemispheres.  Seated 
upon  the  crura,  and  forminjj:  with  them  parts  of  the 
basis  of  the  brain  is  the  corpus  h'Kicminum.  The 
position  of  the  thai  mi  opfiri  has  been  already  referred 
to  as  forminor  the  walls  of  the  third  ventricle.  From 
the  front  of  this  chaml3er  two  small  openin<2^s,  the 
foramina  of  Monro,  lead  into  the  two  ventricles  of  the 
hemispheres.  There  is  a  small  appendaj^e  l>elow  the 
thalmi  called  the  Jti/pophf/sis.  The  two  hemispheres 
are  united  in  mammals  by  a  strong,  thick  band— the 
corpus  callosuni.  The  crura,  or  extensions  of  the  axis 
of  the  spinal  cord,  unite  with  the  hemispheres,  and 
near  this  point  of  union  is  accumulated  a  large  amount 
of  grey  cellular  matter,  forming  a  prominence  projecting 
into  the  lateral  ventricles  called  the  corpus  sfriututu. 
We  need  not  proceed  farther  with  the  description  of 
anatomical  details. 

The  histology  as  well  as  the  configuration  of  the  cere- 
bral elements  associate  them  in  two  groups.  The  first, 
consisting  of  those  parts  which  are  the  direct  continua- 
tion of  the  spinal  cord,  constitute  the  basis  of  the  brain, 
and  agree  with  that  organ  in  having  the  grey  matter 


(natee  and  teetep);  /V,  Pednnculus  ceruhelli  superior  (Proce^pnn  ad  Corp. 
higemimim);  Ptn,  Pediiucnliii*  cerebelli  medlalis  (Proc^npiis  ad  ponteni. 
Betweeu  Prf.  and  A/j.  is  seenihe  Pednnculus  cerehelli  inferior— Proc»8P  ad 
med.  oblongatam);  g.  Girdling  flbres;  /c,  Fiiuicnlue  cnneatas;  fg.  Funic- 
ulus gracilis;  *.,  Funiculus  lateralis;  C.  Cerebellum. 


arranged  about  the  canal,  or  at  least,  medianly,  while 
that  part  of  the  brain,  including  the  cerebrum  and  cere- 
bellum, which  forms  a  covering  for  the  others,  has  the 
cellular  elements  arranged  cortically  in  a  more  or  less 
thick  laver,  below  which  are  white  fibres  passing  down- 
ward  toward  the  base  of  the  brain  to  find  exit  with  the 
medula.     The  cortex  of  the  brain  is  about  2  mm.  thick 
and,  as  a  whole,  as  well  as  in  its  cellular  elements,  is 
invested  with  a  web  of  delicate  threads  of  connective 
tissue.     This  ueuroffh'a  serves  not  only  to  isolate  the 
cells,  but  to  convey  bloodvessels  to  each  individual  cell. 
These  cells,  which  are,  perhaps,  the  most  important  of  the 
cerebral  organs,  are  arranged  in  layers,  the  superficial 
layei-s  containing  smaller,  the  deeper  layers  larger  cells. 
The    nerves     coming    from    peripheral    parts    first, 
after   reinforcement   in   the   base   of   the   brain,  con- 
tribute their    stimuli    to    the    superficial    or    sensory 
cells.     The    resulting    activity   in  these   smaller   cells 
seems   then    to   be   imparted   the    larger    or    motory 
ganglion  cells,  from  wdiich  the  impulses  there  gener- 
ated  are   conducted   again   to   the   base  of   the  brain 
and,    after     correlation     and     various     modifications, 
an  impulse  to  motion  is  transmitted  to  the  appropriate 

muscles. 

Nervous  threads  are  thus  either  centripital  (sensory) 
or  centrifugal  (motory)— names  derived  from  the 
direction  in  which  the  nerve  is  adapted  to  transmit 
impressions. 


138 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


13^ 


THE   CONNECTION   BETWEEN   THE    BHAIN   AND 
OTHER  PARTS  OF  THE  NERVOUS  SY'STEM. 

§8.  The   sensory    nerves  spring  from  the   posterior 
part  of  the  spinal  cord  while  the  motorj  threads  arise 
anteriorly,  and  the  continuation  of  these  nerves  toward 
the  brain  within  the  spinal  cord  maintain,  in  general,  the 
same  relations.     There  is,  however,  a  crossing  of  u  cer- 
tain portion  of  the  fibres,  especially  in  the  case  of  sen- 
sory nerves.     This  is  a  provision  against  accidents.     In 
general,   however,   the   anterior   and    posterior    nerve 
bundles  represent  the  nerve  roots  of  the  corresponding 
sides  while  the  lateral  bundles  contain  fibres  from  both. 
By  dividing  the  spinal  cord  on  one  side  there   results 
a  total  loss  of  motion  and  increased  irritability  on  that 
side,  and  diminished  power  of  motion  and  irritability  on 
the  side  opposite.     In  the  medula,  also,  there  is  a  cross- 
ing of  fibres  from  one  side  of  the  body  to   the  other 
which  occurs  in  different  sets  of  nerves  at  different 
points.     The  cutting  of  these  nerves  above  this  point 
causes  total  loss  of  motion  to  the  portion  of  the  oppo- 
site side  of  the  body  supplied  by  their  termini. 

The  cerebellum  is  connected  directly  with  the  spinal 
cord  by  the  fibres  of  the  processus  ad  med.  oblongatum. 
The  processus  ad  ponteni  sends  fibres  down  to  end  in  the 
grey  cells  of  the  bridge  from  which  connection  i* 
afforded  with  the  corpus  striatum  and  other  anterior 
centres.     The  fibres  passing  toward  the  cerebrum  enter 


the  cells  of  the  red  nucleus  of  the  crown  of  the  crura. 
It  is  not  known  that  any  of  the  fibres  pass  directly  to 
the  cortical  substance  of  the  cerebrum.     It   therefore 
appears  that  sensory  fibres  transmit  stimuli  to  the  cere- 
bellum which  do  not  produce  sensations  because   they 
never  reach  directly  that  part  of  the  brain  over   which 
consciousness  bears  sway,  but  that  the  excitations  are 
transferred  to  ganglion  cells  at  the  base  of  the  brain 
where  the  stimuli  necessary  to  produce  motion  are  set 
into  operation  immediately.     If  this  be  the  case  we  are 
prepared  to  understand  how  the  cerel^ellum  comes  to  be 
the  seat  of  reflex  and  automatic  activities  as  is  usually 
maintained.  Thus  the  function  of  the  cerebellum  seems 
to  be  in  part  the  same  as  that  of  the  grey  ganglion  cells 
of  the  spinal  cord,  which,  in  like  manner,  form  second- 
ary centres  independent  of  the  consciousness  through 
which  sensory  stimuli  switch  off,  as  it  were,  from  the 
regular  routes  to  the  brain,  to  be  transferred  to  appro- 
priate motory  fibres. 

From  the  optic  thalmi,  corpus  striatum,  and  other 
basal  portions  of  the  brain  fibres  pass  to  all  parts  of  the 
cortex  of  the  cerebrum,  and,  iis  some  recent  authors  claim, 
the  former  is  receptive  to  sensory  nerves,  optic,  auditory 
and  olfactory,  as  well  as  those  of  ordinary  sensation, 
while  the  latter  is  the  starting  point  for  motory  nerves. 
It  is  farther  assumed  that  after  the  sensations  are  trans- 
formed into  appropiate  stimuli  and  these  are  co-ordin- 
ated they  are  transferred  directly  to  the  small  cells  in 


140 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


141 


OTA. 


the  periphery  of  the  cerebral  cortex  giving  rise  to  sensa- 
tion. Then,  ,t  may  lye,  new  forces  are  developed,  accom- 
panied by  chemical   decomposition   and  the  evolution 
of  heat.  These  forces 
are  conveyed    along 
the  nervous   threads 
springing  from   the 
small    cells    to     the 
larger     deep  -  seated 
cells    of    the    cere- 
bral cortex,  (Fig.  7.*) 

and  here,  as  in  new  generators,  motory  impulses   are 
produced,  and  these  are  conveyed  to  the  corpus  striatum 
where  correlations  and  combinations  are  affected,  which 
result  in  the  production  of  more  or  less  complicated  and 
prolonged    motions    of    the  body,  in  which  they  are 
assisted  and  partially  controlled  by  unconscious  pro- 
cesses carried  on  in  the  grey  matter  of  the  cerebellum 
and  spinal  cord. 

Such,  most  simply  expressed,  is  the  present  view  of 
simple  cerebral  activities.  The  detailst  which  fill  in 
and  complete  this  outline  are  abstruse,  and  only  obtain- 
able  by  recondite  researches. 


*Fig.  7  —Diagram  of  the   Courses  of  Nervnu»    9ti».,.i- 
theory  of  Luys.  '     nervous  Sttmiat,   according  to  the 

tThe  above  etatemente  with  leferencH   tn  »k.  f       .■ 
.....i  are  .a.en  .„.  .„,  .„,  -r^^oto^ -^trrr.rie'tS : 


PHYSIOLOGY  OF  THE  BllAlN. 

§9.  The  simplest  function  of  the  central  organs  of 
nervous  system  is  rejiejr  artiriftj.  In  its  simplest  form 
this  would  consist  of  the  transference  of  a  sensory 
stimulus  directly  to  a  motory  nerve.  Practically,  how- 
ever, it  is  necessary  that  the  sensory  affection  should 
undergo  a  change  before  it  is  suited  to  act  upon  a 
muscle.  Organs  for  this  purpose,  as  we  have  seen,  are 
the  ganglion  cells  of  the  spinal  cord,  medula  and  cere- 
bellum.    • 

Simple  reflex  activities  lodge  in  the  spinal  cord,  while 
those  of  a  higher  order  occur  in  the  medula.  Breathing, 
swallowing  and  the  l)eating  of  the  heart  are  such  activ- 
ities.    Certain  conditions  in  the  capillaries  of  the  lungs, 
for  example,  produce  excitements  in  nerves  passing  to 
the  medula  which,  without  the  aid  of  consciousness  or 
of  the  will,  produce  the  necessary  muscular  exertion  to 
cause  inhalation,  while,  ordinarily,  no  such  effort  is 
exerted  in  expiration.     Reflex  activities  are  found  to  be 
intimately  connected,  and  this  is  explained  by  the  vari- 
ous intimate  anastamosings  which  takes  place  between 
the   cells  of  the  medula.     Thus  quickened   breathing 


nerveux-  or  in  EuKlifh,  in  the  Brain  and  its  Functions,  by  the  eame  author, 
forming  one  of  the  volume,  of  the  International  Scientific  Series.  The  writer 
,.  forced  to  admit  t  hat  these  views  are  far  from  proven  and,  indeed,  are  con^ 
trudicted  b.  the  results  of  many  experiments.  Nevertheless  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  such  a  relation  ai  is  here  described  exists  between  some  of  the 
ceils  in  the  brain,  and  if  not  these,  it  matters  httle  for  the  present  purpose, 
lu  ihe  case  of  the  corpus  striatum  facts  seem  unanimous. 


142 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


143 


<iauses  accelleration  of  the  pulse,  and  certain  affections 

of  the  gustatory   nerve   are    accompanied    by    reflex 

motions  in  the  mimic  muscles  of  the  face.     It  is  found 

that  the  brain  exerts  a  restricting  influence  upon   the 

reflex  activities  so  that  the  removal  of  the  hemispheres 

increases   the  reflex  actions.     This  may,  perhaps,   be 

explained  by  supposing  that  that  part  of  the  stimuli 

which  would  normally  be  transmitted  to  the  cerebrum 

is  deflected  upon  the  subordinate  fibres  leading  to  reflex 

centres. 

Automatic  motions  are  a  subordinate  class  of  reflex 
activities  in  which  the  stimulus  does  not  come  from 
without,  /.  e.,  is  not  adapted  to  produce  sensation,  but 
consists  of  a  change  in  the  condition  of  adjacent  inter- 
nal organs. 

The  vast  majority  of  such  motions  seem  to  be  pro- 
duced by  changes  in  the  circulation  or  in  the  blood 
itself.  The  tensity  of  the  muscles  of  the  capillaries  and 
the  beating  of  the  heart  is  regulated  automatically,  as  is 
the  breathing  in  part. 

Experiments  seem  to  prove  that  the  cereheUum  is 
designed,  through  the  correction  of  various  sensations, 
for  the  regulation  of  voluntary  motion  as  well  as  for 
xjertain  reflex  activities  of  a  different  sort.  The  removal 
of  the  cerebrum  causes  dizziness,  uncertain  gait  and, 
often,  undesigned  motions,  although  the  will  is  easily 
exerted,  and  the  connection  of  the  motor  roots  with  the 
-corpus  striatum  is  unbroken. 


Of  the  functions  of  the  cerebrum  it  is  not  necessary 
to  speak  farther.  What  the  physiological  basis  of  the 
higher  spiritual  functions  is  we  are  quite  unable  to  say. 

The  accompanying  diagram  indicates  portions  of  the 
cerebrum  which  have 
been  found,  with  greater 
or  less  certainty  to  be 
connected  with  the 
perception  of  certain 
classes  of  sensations  or 
the  production  of  spec- 
ific motions.  (Fig.  8.*) 

DEVKLOPMENT  OF  SENSORY  FUNCTIONS. 

§10.  Our  knowledge  of  sensory  functions  is  derived 
from  investigations  of  the  anatomy  of  the  external 
organs  of  sense,  but  also  in  part  from  the  behaviour  of 
animals  when  affected  by  different  stimuli.  Such 
investigations  seem  to  place  it  l>eyond  peradventure 
that  all  the  more  complicated  sensations  and  sensory 
organs  are  derived  from  the  differentiation  of  primitive 
sensations  and  organs  originally  identical. 

Ordinary  sensation,  including  the  sense  of  touch,  of 
temperature,  and  muscular  sense,  seems  to  be  the 
starting  point.  • 

♦Fig.  ^.—Motory  Centres  of  th*  Brain. 
A,  Motory  centre  of  Facialis  ard  Hypog  ophs  region;  5,  Motory  centre 
of  arm  nuiecle8>;    6',  Motory  centre  of  leg  rauecles;  2?,  Motory  centre  of 
«peech;  E,  Seupcry  centre  of  speech ;  i^,  Vieual  region  (?);  5,  Visual  region. 


144 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


145 


In  the  most  lowly  animals  the  sarcode  which  constit- 
utes the  entire  body  must  be  the  seat  of  every  sensation 
by  which  the  animal  can  be  affected.  It  is  assumed 
that  those  irritants  which  produces  motions  in  the  sar- 
code  also  give  rise  to  sensations,  but  that  these  will 
exhibit  as  diversity  from  each  other  in  proportion  as  one 
part  of  the  body  is  different  from  another.  Light  prol>- 
ably  is  perceived  only  as  warmth,  and  even  those  pigment 
flecks  in  the  Infusoria  which  undoubtedly  serve  to  absorb 
and  thus  condense  the  light  may  not  give  rise  to  the 
sensation  of  light. 

The  development  history  of  the  organs  of  sense  sup- 
ports the  idea  that  all  sensory  functions  are  derived 
from  those  of  ordinary  sensation. 

The  development  proceeds  in  two  ways;  flrst,  the 
sense  of  touch  becomes  more  highly  differentiated  by 
the  development  of  special  tactile  organs;  second, 
organs  adapted  for  specific  sensations  are  produced,  so 
that  the  nerve  termini  become  sensitive  to  special 
stimuli,  such  as  light,  sounds,  tastes  and  odors. 

In  all  cases,  however,  these  organs  are  produced  by 
modification  of  the  outer  surface  of  the  body. 

The  development  of  the  tactile  sense  is  eariiest,  and 
goes  hand  and  hand  with  the  production  of  special 
organs  of  locomotion.  The  clothing  of  cilia  found  in 
the  Infusoria  serves  both  purposes  at  once.  In  the 
case  of  insects  we  find  sensory  organs  composed  of  rods 
seated  oh  the   enlarged  termini  of   nerves,   the   rods 


being  simply  designed  to  communicate  motions  to  the 
sensitive  cell  below.   (Fig.  9.) 

This  constitutes  a  transition  to  the  more  highly 
developed  tactile  organs  in  which  epithelial  cells  of 
peculiar  form  enclose  or  include  the  termini  of  sensory 
nerves.  The  teeth,  nails  and  vibrissae  are  examples  of 
accessory  tactile  organs  in  higher  animals  which  are 
not  themselves  sensitive,  but  stand  in  intimate  relation 
to  the  nerves. 

In  cases  where  no  special  apparatus  is  developed — and 
this  applies  to  the  majority  of  our  sensory  nerves — the 
ends  of  the  nerves  seem  to  be  free  between  the  epith- 
elial cells. 

Special  organs  of  touch  occur  in  the  skin  and  in  vari- 
ous inner  organs,  tus  the  capsules  of  the  joints  and  the 
mesentaries.  Tactile  spheres  consist  of  two  or  more 
cells  in  a  capsule,  between  which  are  disc-like  organs 
usually  parallel  to  the  surface.  ( Fig.  10. )  The  office  of 
these  organs  appears  frequently  to  be  the  intensification 
of  the  pressure,  etc.,  or  its  direct  application  to  the 
nerve. 

Among  the  specific  sensory  organs  those  of  taste  and 
smell  seem  morphologically  most  nearly  related  to  the 
organs  of  touch.  Among  lowly  forms  both  these 
senses  seem  to  be  lodged  in  the  same  organs  or  the 
functions  are  not  yet  distinct.  Organs,  not  only  for 
recognizing  but  for  producing  odors,  seem  to  be  present 
in  certain  insects,  as  butterflies,  and  serve  to  assist  the 


iMr»^.yia»itiiiiiiBgiBW!iiwii 


146 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


sexual  instincts.  The  termini  of  the  olfactory  nerve 
correspond  to  the  simple  condition  of  the  organ  of  touch 
where  it  consists  of  rod-like  bodies  seated  on  the  nerve 
cell.  In  the  sense  of  taste  there  is  greater  differentia- 
tion and  the  cells  which  constitute  the  termini  of  the 
nerves  are  enclosed  in  beaker-like  groups  of  cells  which 
are  situated  below  the  surface.  Similar  organs  under 
the  skin  of  fishes  have  been  thought  to  indicate  a  sixth 
sense.  (Figs.  11  and  12.) 

The  organ  of  hearing  seems  to  have  been  derived  from 
the  transformationof  a  ciliated  surface.     It  is  possible 
that  even  in  the  ciliated  Protozoa  the  cilia,  which  are 
so  easily  affected  by  sound  waves,   may   render   them 
recognizable.    Most  invertebrates  and  some  vertebrates 
possess  ears  which  consist  of  cavities  lined  with   cilia 
and  containing  otoliths   which   seem   to   communicate 
the  oscilations  produced  by  sound  waves  to  the  cilia  and 
thence  to  the  nerve.     An  advance  on  this  simple  ear, 
which  can  hardly  be  supposed  to  distinguish  different 
tones  is  furnished  by  such  as  have  the  cilia  or   rods  of 
different  sizes  and  lengths,  each  length  apparently  cor- 
responding to  a  definite  wave  length.    Hensen   (in  the 
Zeitschrift fur  Wissenschafthrhe  Zoolofjie,  xiii,  p.  374) 
claims  to  have  demonstrated  by  immediate  observation 
that  different  filaments  respond  to  differences  in  pitch. 
In  manv  insects  otoliths  are  wanting,  but  the  rods  are 
more    solid   and   are    covered   by   a  tense    membrane 
acting  like  a  tympanum.     The  various  classes  of  verte- 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


147 


brates,  beginning  with  the  fishes,  exhibit  a  gradual  dif- 
ferentiation and  increase  in  complexity.  The  auditory 
sac,  which  is  usually  bi-lobed.  develops  on  one  side  the 
semicircular  canals,  and  on  the  other  the  cochlea.  (Fig. 
13.)  The  perfect  ear  is  a  wonderfully  complex  organ, 
the  physiological  significance  of  the  various  parts  being 
but  imperfectly  understood.  It  has  been  supposed  that 
certain  modified  epithelial  cells  covered  with  cilia  of 
various  lengths  serve  to  record  the  varying  pitch  of 
tones.  This,  so-called,  organ  of  corti  has  been  compared 
to  a  harp,  each  string  of  which  is  attuned  to  respond  to 
a  definite  tone.  The  most  credible  hypothesis  seems  to 
be  that  the  analysis  of  a  harmony  into  different  tones 
is  accomplished  by  the  membrane  lining  the  cochlea, 
the  varying  width  and  tensity  of  which  may  make  it 
better  adapted  for  the  purpose  than  a  series  of  rods  of 
varying  length.  Wundt  supposes  musical  tones  are 
distinguished  in  this  way  while  tones  which  are  com- 
posed of  irregular  vibrations,  i,  e.,  noises,  may  be  recog- 
nized by  the  bundles  of  hairs  before  mentioned.  Other 
parts  of  the  organ  seem  to  be  designed  to  concentrate 
the  sound  waves,  or  to  serve  as  dampers  upon  the 
receiving  organ. 

The  organ  of  vision  consists  essentially  of  a  receiving 
nerve  and  deposits  of  light-absorbing  pigment.  If  the 
pigment  flecks  found  in  certain  Infusoria,  and  especially 
in  many  low  worms  where  they  are  closely  connected 
with  the  central  ganglia,  are  really  eyes,  we  have  in  them 


■■'<*-«o#aW*i*«S«««9«»^ 


148 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


OUTLINES  OF  PSYCHOLOGY. 


149 


examples  of  this  simplest  condition.  In  rotifers,  etc., 
the  cells  in  which  the  pigment  is  deposited  are  peculi- 
arly modified  and  furnished  with  rods  which  are  prim- 
itive retinal  rods — a  kind  of  structure  present  in  all 
higher  eyes,  and  indicating  a  power  of  distinguishing 
between  various  visual  impressions.  The  next  step  in 
the  development  is  marked  by  the  addition  of  modified, 
transparent  cells  serving  as  lenses  to  concentrate  light 
upon  the  retina  cells.  (Fig.  14.)  In  the  compound 
eyes  of  insects  a  large  nuumber  of  lenses,  each  fitted  to 
but  a  single  rod  or  retina  cell  are  grouped  together  like 
a  mosaic  and  it  is  necessary  to  suppose  that  the  frag- 
mentary images  produced  by  each  lense  are  united  in 
the  central  ganglion  into  a  continuous  representation 
of  the  field  of  vision.  This  theory  is  called  that 
of  mosaic  vision.  The  eye  of  man  is  not  modeled 
after  the  compound  eye  of  insects,  but  upon  the  simpler 
type  offered  by  worms  and  mollusks. 

The  pin-hole  camera,  a  device  by  which  a  dim  image 
is  produced  in  a  dark  chamber  by  rays  of  light  entering 
through  a  minute  aperture,  is  mimiced  by  the  eye  of 
the  nautilus.  (Fig.  15.)  A  second  chamber  in  which 
is  developed  a  lense  changes  the  pin-hole  camera  to  a 
photographer's  camera  in  which  lenses  secure  the  dis- 
tinctness of  the  image,  while  the  larger  size  of  the 
aperture  greatly  increases  its  brightness.  An  illustra- 
tion of  this  sort  of  an  eye  is  furnished  by  the  higher 
Cephalopoda  (Cuttlefish).    (Fig.  16.) 


The  eye  of  vertebrates  differs  from  that  of  the  cuttle- 
fish chiefly  in  the  fact  that  the  elements  of  the  retina 
are  arranged  in  the  reverse  position.  This  is  due  to  the 
greater  complexity  in  the  embryological  development 
of  the  former,  so  that  the  epithelial  layer  out  of  which 
the  retina  is  formed  suffers  a  double  instead  of  a  single 
invagination. 

The  accompanying  diagram  (Fig.  17)  indicates  the 
arrangement  of  the  various  elements  of  the  retina. 
It  is  proven  that  the  rods  and  spindles  are  sensitive 
to  light  while  the  ganglion  cells  and  the  filaments  of  the 
optic  nerves  are  not  at  all  so,  though  they  are  more  im- 
mediately exposed  to  its  action.  The  ends  of  the  rods 
are  imbued  with  a  purj)le  red  pigment  which  is  exces- 
sively sensitive  to  the  influence  of  light,  changing  rapidly 
in  color  when  exposed  to  it.  This  pigment  is  constantly 
renewed  by  the  process  of  nutrition  during  the  life  of 
the  animal. 

The  optic  nerves  pass  to  the  corpus  bigeminum 
and  usually  cross,  or  form  a  chiasma  in  their  passage. 
This  crossing  is  only  complete  when  the  fields  of  the 
two  eyes  are  quite  distinct.  The  larger  the  part  of  the 
field  of  vision  the  two  eyes  have  in  common,  the  more 
near  the  optic-nerve  fibres  are  to  being  equally  divided. 
(Fig.  13.)  In  man  it  is  found  that  the  fibres  passing 
to  the  inner  half  of  the  two  retinas  cross  while  those 
from  the  outer  half  pass  directly  to  the  portion  of  the 
corpus  bigeminum  on  the  same  side. 


n 


150 


OUTLINES   OF   PSYCHOLOGY. 


A  destruction  of  one  half  of  the  corpus  begem- 
inum  results  therefore  in  the  blindness  of  half  of 
each  retina,  while  binocular  vision  is  still  possible  for 
the  remaining  halves. 

The  above  outline  touches  upon  a  few  points  which 
may  serve  to  introduce  the  reader  to  a  line  of  study 
second  to  none  at  the  present  time  in  interest  and 
importance.  For  a  careful  review  of  the  whole  field 
refer  to  Wundt's  Physiological  Psychology. 


PLATE  I. 


PLATE  I. 

Fig.  \.— Embryo  of  Chick. 

Fb,  Fore-brain;  Mb,  Mid-brain;  Mb\  Cerebellum; 
Mb^,  Medula  oblongata;  Ai\  Auditory  vesicle;  Pi\ 
Primitive  vertebra?;  MJ\  Mesial  or  neural  fold;  T,  Cau- 
dal lobe. 

Fig.  2. — Longitudinal  Section  of  Brain  of  Frog. 

1,  2,  Lateral  ventricles,  or  chambers  of  the  hemi- 
spheres; S,  Chamber  of  optic  thalmus,  or  third  ventricle; 
4,  Chamber  of  cerebellum;  5,  Fourth  ventricle;  as, 
Aquaeductus  Silvii. 

Fig.  3. — Brain  of  Fish.  (Polypterns.) 

A,  From  above;  B,  From  the  side;  O,  Olfactory 
lobes;  H,  Hemisphaees;  Th,  Optic  thalnii;  Lo,  Lobi 
optici;  Ce,  Cerebellum;  Mo,  Medula  oblongata. 

Fig.  4^.— Brain  of  Human  Foetus,  at  seven  months, 

F,  Frontal  lobe;  P,  Parietal  lobe;  0,  Occipital  lobe; 
T,  Temporal  lobe;  *S^,  Fissura  Silvii;  7?,  Sulcus  of 
Rolando;  MO,  Medula;  C,  Cerebellum. 

Fig.  ^.—Sensory  apparatus  in  the  Frobosis  of  Fly, 

n.  Nerve;  g.  Ganglion  cell;  r.  Tactile  rods. 

Fig.  18.— Diagram  of  the  Course  of  Nerve  Fibres, 
passing  from  the  retina  to  the  brain. 


t 


i 


I 


PLATE  II. 


Fig.  10.— Tactile  bodies. 

A,  B,  Tactile  spheres  from  the  bill  of  a  duck;  C,  Tac- 
tile body  imbedded  in  papilla  of  human  skin;  e,  Epi 
dermis;  n.  Nerve;  s.  Tactile  body. 

Fig.  11.— -4,  An  epithelium  cell  with  two  olfactory 
cells,  from  Proteus;  g,  ganglionic  portion  of  olfactory 
cell;  By  Epithelium  and  olfactory  cells  of  man. 
Fig.  \2.— Gustatory  Cup  from  Mouth  of  Babbit. 
A,  Entire;  B,  Isolated  sensory  cells  from  such  a  cup. 
Fig.  Id.— Diagrams  of  the  Development  of  the  Laby- 
rinth in  (A)  Fishes,  (B)  Birds,  (C)  Mammals;    F, 
Utriculus;  S,  Sacculus;  C,  Cochlea;  i?,  Recessus  laby- 

rinthi. 

Fig.  \L—Eye  of  Spider  in  Section. 

L,  Lense;  e.  Epidermal  layer;  s,  Rods;  g.  Ganglion 

cells;  p.  Pigment. 

Fig.  l^.—Diagramatic  Section  of  the  Eye  of  Nautilus. 

i?,  Retina;  o  n,  Optic  nerve. 

Fig.  IQ.—Diagramatic  Section  of  the  Eye  of  a  Cuttle- 

* 

fiish. 

i,  L\  Lenses;    el    Eye-lids;  R,    Retina;  og,   Optic 

ganglion;  on,  Optic  nerve;  m^  Integument. 

Fig.  11.— Section  of  Human  Retina. 

t,  Membrana  limitans  interna;  g\  Ganglion  layer; 
^2,'second  ganglion  layer;  .^^^  Third  layer  of  ganglion 
cells;  b,  b\  Granular  layers;  a,  Rod  and  spindle  layer; 
e,  External  pigment  layer. 


PLATE  11. 


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